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The general topic of this cumulative dissertation and thus the linking theme for all papers is 
the analysis of the marketing budget process. In summary, this work contains four papers 
which allow for a comprehensive study of marketing budgeting, including a descriptive and 
normative analysis. The four papers are outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Overview of Dissertation Projects 
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Marketing budgeting is one of the most important aspects of management and of highly 
relevance for business success (Miles, White and Munilla 1997). Due to rising competitive 
pressure and a considerable increase in marketing investments the importance of this subject 
has additionally grown in the last years. For this reason, marketing budgeting receives a huge 




Council Report of 2007: „The number-one challenge for most chief marketing officers is to 
quantify, measure, and improve the value of marketing investments and resource allocations“. 
The Marketing Science Institute (2010) set this issue as top research priority for the time 
period 2010-2012: „How should firms determine the absolute level of marketing spending and 
how should spending be allocated at the strategic level - that is, across products, customer 
groups, and geographies?” 
The academic literature has been dealing with questions regarding the marketing budget 
process for a long time (Ramaseshan 1990) and therefore this issue has been discussed and 
analyzed in multiple ways (Leeflang and Wittink 2000). The focus of this literature has been 
on the allocation of budgets as previous research (Tull et al. 1986; Chintagunta 1993) has 
shown that profit improvement from better allocation is much higher than from improving the 
overall budget. To give an overview of the existing literature we may distinguish between two 
main research streams: (1) the descriptive and (2) the normative analysis of marketing 
budgeting. 
Descriptive literature discusses the status quo of the marketing budgeting process in 
companies, i.e. it identifies how marketing budgets are actually determined and allocated by 
managers. Two types of descriptive studies have emerged in the literature. The first type 
covers a broad range of manager surveys about budgeting behavior. They indicate that budget 
decisions are mainly based on the application of some simple budgeting rules (Lilien 1979), 
such as the “Percentage of Sales” or “Competitive Parity” method, which are easy to apply 
and therefore be preferred by manager (Bigné 1995). But these studies ignore for the high 
complexity of the budgeting process and are exposed to several biases of survey studies. 
Therefore insights on the budgeting process based on survey results are quite limited 
(Armstrong and Overton 1973). The second type of descriptive studies try to explain 
budgeting behavior by estimating the impact of relevant factors on the observable size and 
allocation of the marketing budget to identify determinants of budget setting (e.g., 
Balasubramanian and Kumar 1990; Huskamp et al. 2008). But as all of these studies apply 
highly different approaches in model design results across studies about the impact of 
determinants on budgeting are characterized by high heterogeneity. So in summary, literature 
may only provide a fuzzy and fragmented picture on how manager determine their marketing 
budget. 
Normative literature discusses how the marketing budget should be determined. A large body 
of work assists practitioners by developing diverse approaches for allocation optimization, 




these solutions offer important general insights into the budgeting problem but generally are 
not implemented in the marketing practice as they cover only some aspects of the budget 
allocation problem and/or give suggestions on budget allocation which are not understood and 
therefore are not accepted by manager. For this reason, researcher developed several 
heuristics (e.g., Albers 1998) or decision calculus models (e.g., Little 1970) which address the 
problem that optimization models cannot be well implemented in companies and offer easy to 
understand and close to optimum solutions for the complex allocation problem. But while all 
of the heuristics are focused on short-term profit maximization and thus ignore for dynamic 
effects which are highly important for budget allocation, the decision calculus models may 
only give imprecise implications for budget allocation. This explains why the application of 
scientific models for resource allocation by practitioners is quite rare (Bigné 1995).  
The objective of this dissertation is to offer a comprehensive analysis of marketing budgeting. 
Therefore this work contributes to descriptive as well as normative research by addressing 
two main research gaps which exist in the literature. In terms of descriptive analysis the 
existing literature provides only a fragmented picture about influential factors in the 
budgeting process. In terms of normative literature no method has been developed which 
address the complexity of the budget allocation task for a multi-country, multi product-firm as 
well as the need of practitioners for simple allocation rules. 
The first two papers of this dissertation address the descriptive analysis issues by (1) 
reviewing and structuring the fragmented literature of marketing budgeting behavior, and (2) 
developing an innovative approach to analyze empirically the application of budgeting 
methods in pharmaceutical companies. The last two papers of this dissertation address the 
normative analysis issues by (3) introducing and implementing an innovative solution to the 
dynamic marketing allocation budget problem for multi-product, multi-country firms, and (4) 
analyzing and comparing the performance of different allocation rules by simulation analysis. 
In summary, the dissertation’s focus is to understand how marketing budgets are set by 
practitioners, and how the allocation decision process can be improved. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the classification and the contribution of the four dissertation projects. The next 
four sections present the research objectives, its contributions, and the main results of each 
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1. Project: Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung:  
Was wissen wir darüber? 
The project “Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber?” 
[“Determinants of Marketing Budgeting: What do we know?”] reviews the large body of 
empirical studies which consider influential factors on marketing budgeting behavior.  
As pointed out in the introductory discussion, the marketing budgeting process in companies 
has been analyzed extensively and in multiple ways. Empirical studies show that marketing 
budget decisions of managers are in general far from the optimal solution (Naik, Raman and 
Winer 2005; Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta 2004; Sinha and Zoltners 2001) which raise 
the question how manager determine their budget instead. But empirical studies on budgeting 
behavior provide highly heterogeneous results and are based on different concepts of how 
budgets are determined. This complicates a total view on the marketing budgeting practice 
and its influential factors. That motivates our project in which we review the fragmented 
literature regarding empirical results on determinants of marketing budgeting in order to 
derive empirical generalizations about factors which determine the size and allocation of 





The review of the descriptive literature indicates that the determination of marketing budgets 
follows a complex decision process which is influenced by several factors. In particular, it is 
highly exposed to political influences within the company so that the measurement of the 
impact of influential factors is very complicated (Piercy 1986). Basically, surveys among 
managers identify simple budgeting methods, such as “Percentage of Sales”, which are 
applied for determining the marketing budget. They are preferred in practice as they are easy 
to understand and to implement. But these methods cannot explain fully the final budget 
decision. In addition, we see a significant impact on the level and the allocation of the 
marketing budget by several factors, such as company-, product-, or market-specific 
characteristics. Moreover, we observe that most of these factors have an indirect impact on 
budgeting behavior as well by influencing the choice of the applied budgeting method. This 
project aggregates all empirical results and therefore provides empirical generalizations about 
the impact of determinants on marketing budgeting. 
Summarizing the key results, we find a higher marketing intensity for products of high quality, 
and product classes characterized by a low purchase frequency. Similarly, large companies 
which dominate the market and/or are characterized by a high involvement of top 
management into the budgeting process show a lower marketing intensity. We also find a 
strong competition orientation by managers resulting in more marketing spending due to 
intense competitive marketing spending. In terms of applied budgeting methods, large and 
profitable firms rather apply more sophisticated methods, such as “Objective and Task”. 
But the reviewed empirical results should be considered with caution. Most studies on 
budgeting behavior ignore very often for theoretical contributions so that models are 
incomplete and results are not related to normative literature on marketing budgeting. 
Particularly, all studies are generally descriptive which does not allow the derivation of any 
managerial implications. In addition, the formalization of certain effects differs across studies 
which complicate a comparison of the results. With regard to methodology the studies vary 
further in terms of study design, analysis method and sample which may explain the 
heterogeneity in results across studies. Moreover, the studies are exposed to several biases, 
such as single source bias or simultaneity problems. Against this background, this project tries 
to examine the sources of heterogeneity in the results in order to provide empirical 





2. Project: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Practitioner Rules for 
Setting the Product Marketing Budget 
This paper is a joint research project with Marc Fischer (University of Cologne). In this 
project we analyze the application of rules in the marketing budget allocation process of 
companies by developing a conceptual framework that allows the estimation of the impact of 
practitioners’ rules on the marketing outcome.  
A review of 26 studies published since 1975 on actual budgeting behavior of firms from 
different countries and from diverse industries consistently shows that managers apply simple 
rules for allocation of marketing budgets. According to their focus these methods may be 
categorized into sales-oriented methods, such as “Percentage of Sales”, competition-oriented 
methods, such as “Competitive Parity”, and profit-oriented methods, such as “Objective and 
Task”. These rules are preferred by practitioners as they are easy to understand and to 
implement. 
But almost all insights into application of budgeting rules are based on manager surveys. 
These studies offer a good first insight into the determination of budgets, but lack of validity 
because they are exposed to several biases and do not provide detailed information about how 
much and to what extent managers follow budgeting rules, or under which conditions they 
change applied rules (Mitchell 1993). We want to address these gaps in existing literature by 
providing answers to the following questions: (1) What is the influence of each of the three 
budgeting methods of sales-, competition-, and profit-oriented methods, on the budget 
decision?, (2) Are there differences in application across companies?, and (3) Which factors 
or conditions favor the use of some rules over others? 
For this purpose, this project addresses the methodological problems of manager surveys by 
introducing an innovative analysis approach which may allow the identification of the impact 
of budgeting rules on the final budget decision. Building on previous research we develop a 
conceptual framework which relates the marketing budget of a product to the most frequently 
used practitioners’ rules identified by survey literature research. As we formulate a random 
parameter model we are able to estimate the influence of each budgeting rule in each 
company simultaneously. Additionally, we integrate a comprehensive set of determinants as 
moderators to identify the conditions which favor the use of some rules over others. Our 
budgeting model is estimated with aggregate data at the brand level in the European 





Our analysis reveals important insights about budgeting behavior by analyzing the true 
application of budgeting rules. We find empirical support for the application of all three 
categories of budgeting rules. But the impact on the marketing budget varies significantly 
across brands which indicate that they are applied in different ways. More specifically, we 
find that for 81.2% of brands sales-oriented methods, for 53.2% of brands competition-
oriented methods and for 40.5% of brands profit-oriented methods are applied. Our estimation 
results regarding the application of sales-oriented methods are in line with survey studies (e.g., 
Bigné 1995). But our study shows that the focus on competition is clearly underestimated by 
managers, while the focus on profit-oriented methods is overstated. So our study shows that 
the budgeting behavior of managers is much more influenced by competitors than expected, 
while budgeting methods derived from profit maximization are less applied. This finding 
contradicts one of the main assumptions of structural modeling. 
Finally, our results indicate that the application of specific budgeting rules is affected by some 
moderating effects. Summarizing the main results of our moderator analysis, we find that 
sales- and profit-oriented methods are rather preferred by dominant firms. The application of 
profit-oriented methods particularly dominates in highly competitive markets when an 
expiring patent status enhances competitive intensity and therefore increases the need for 
sophisticated budgeting. On the contrary, competition-oriented methods are preferred in the 
early stages of the life cycle when it is important to create awareness and to obtain 
distribution in the market. 
3. Project: Dynamic Marketing Budget Allocation across Countries, 
Products, and Marketing Activities 
This paper is a joint research project with Marc Fischer (University of Cologne), Sönke 
Albers (Kühne Logistics University), and Monika Frie (Bayer Schering Pharma AG). In this 
project we develop a heuristic solution for the complex budget allocation problem which is 
easy to understand and gives close to optimal solutions. Further, we implement the proposed 
allocation rule in the company of Bayer to support management in the budgeting process and 
improve the allocation decision. Our paper was awarded with the “ISMS-MSI Marketing 
Science Practice Prize 2009-2010” for outstanding implementation of marketing science 
concepts and methods in practice.  
The task of marketing budget allocation is characterized by high complexity. As companies 
generally offer a broad product portfolio to customers from various countries and use a 




budget across countries, products, and communication activities. For many firms this task 
requires the determination of individual budgets for hundreds of allocation units. But to find 
the optimal allocation solution an evaluation of the impact of marketing investment decisions 
on future cash flows is necessary which is particularly complicated as the total impact of 
marketing on sales often fully unfolds in future periods.  
To simplify the marketing budget allocation problem manager prefer to apply simple rules as 
shown in the descriptive analysis part of this dissertation. Unfortunately, these rules lead to 
suboptimal budget allocations as they ignore multiple information. Based on this background, 
we (1) introduce an innovative and feasible solution to the dynamic marketing budget 
allocation problem for multi-product, multi-country firms, (2) derive the heuristic allocation 
rule from optimal solution and explain it in detail, (3) implement the allocation rule in the 
company of Bayer, and (4) discuss the impact on the marketing budgeting practice at Bayer. 
Our dynamic allocation rule proposes a budget allocation across the portfolio based on the 
three factors of (1) long-term effectiveness of marketing investments in the focal product, (2) 
profit contribution of the focal product, and (3) the focal product’s growth expectations. It is 
suggested to be close to optimum while being easy to understand and to implement. For 
implementation into the company of Bayer, we developed a Decision Support Tool that 
integrates the proposed allocation heuristic into an Excel-based software program which 
produces a recommendation for the allocation of the total marketing budget. 
Together with the management of Bayer, we implemented the heuristic for the product 
portfolio of Bayer’s Primary Care business unit. This portfolio includes 36 products from four 
strategic therapeutic areas that are marketed worldwide including diabetes, hypertension, 
erectile dysfunction, and infectious diseases. The market positions of these products are quite 
diverse and determined by product age and competition. Depending on age and expected 
changes in the competitive and market environment, products offer different growth potentials. 
In addition, product managers can choose among six different types of marketing activities, 
such as detailing or print advertising. Hence, the challenge for the management was to find a 
balance in the allocation of marketing resources that trades off the size of the business, the 
growth expectations, and eventually the effectiveness of marketing expenditures. The main 
objective of this project was to improve the process and results of annual budget allocation in 
order to maximize discounted profits from the product portfolio over a planning horizon of 
five years. 
The implementation of the heuristic at Bayer had various significant impacts on the 




understanding of the allocation task by providing structure and solution to a complex decision 
problem and giving information about product’s contribution to profit, growth expectations of 
the product, and effectiveness of marketing expenditures across the portfolio. Second, the tool 
contributes to a reorganization of the bottom-up driven budget allocation process by adding 
an independent, top-down perspective that eventually resulted into the creation of a 
completely new marketing intelligence unit called Global Business Support. Third, the 
application of the tool initiated an important strategic discussion within the firm which 
affected a shift of more resources to older products and among several marketing activities. In 
summary, the empirical application revealed a profit improvement potential of more than 50% 
or nearly EUR 500 million of incremental discounted cash flows over the next five years. 
4. Project: Investigating the Performance of Budget Allocation Rules:  
A Monte Carlo Study 
This paper is a joint research project with Sönke Albers (Kühne Logistics University), and 
Marc Fischer (University of Cologne). In this project we analyze and compare the 
performance of different allocation rules by conducting a comprehensive simulation study. 
The review of budgeting literature identifies a huge variety of different marketing budget 
allocation approaches which are characterized by different degrees of complexity. We find 
sophisticated optimization approaches provided by academics as well as simple ‘rules of 
thumb’ which are preferred by practitioners because they are easier to understand and to 
implement. Nevertheless, literature does not provide a systematic analysis how these rules 
perform in different market environments so that we cannot derive implications about which 
budgeting approach should be preferred in specific market scenarios. 
This motivates our study in which we analyze under changing market conditions the 
performance of several allocation rules which are characterized by different complexity. 
Specifically, we apply the naïve solution of an equal distribution of the budget across the 
product portfolio, the common practitioners’ rule of “Percentage of Sales” which proposes to 
allocate the budget proportional to the sales share of the product, the heuristic by Fischer et al. 
(2011) which has been developed by academics but still provides transparent solutions, and 
the numerical optimization approach. The evaluation of the performance of the four allocation 
rules is based on profit measures gained by application of these allocation rules compared to 
the optimal solution.  
To test the near-optimality of the allocation rules as well as their convergence properties (if 




generating a multitude of different market scenarios in which we apply the four allocation 
approaches. In simulated experiments all parameter values are known a priori which allows us 
to analyze the performance of the heuristic exactly. We manipulate all factors which are 
contained in the dynamic profit maximization problem on which our simulation experiment is 
based in order to obtain generalizable results about the performance of the included allocation 
rules. Afterwards, we reconduct our simulation experiment by imposing an error on all 
parameters of interest which are unobservable in a realistic setting in order to analyze the 
sensitivity of the different rules to estimation error. Finally, we estimate some meta-models to 
identify the factors which influence the robustness and the convergence properties of the rules 
by regressing the performance outcomes on the simulation factors (Kleijnen and Groenendaal 
1992, 149 et seq.). 
We find that the “Percentage of Sales” rule outperforms a naïve solution of equal distribution, 
but that the solutions provided by the rule by Fischer et al. are far superior to the other rules 
and are robust to all changes in the simulation design. In the scenarios in which we assume 
that the unobservable parameters are not affected by estimation error the rule by Fischer et al. 
provides already after the first application solutions which deviate only 2% from the 
theoretical optimum on average and converges afterwards fast to optimality, while the 
solutions of “Percentage of Sales” diverge about 10%, and of the equal distribution about  
20% from the optimal solution. Further, if we expose the unobservable demand parameter to 
estimation error the performance of the rule by Fischer et al. is only affected marginally. 
Compared to numerical optimization, we see that in most scenarios the rule may even 
outperform this mathematical optimization solution which is exposed to biased parameters as 
well, but appears to be much more sensitive to noisiness in the parameters. This finding also 
contradicts conventional wisdom which holds that, by using simpler heuristics than numerical 
optimization the allocation solution are achieved at the expense of poorer profit performance 
(Blackburn and Millen 1980). Similarly, the allocation solutions based on the rule by Fischer 
et al. are in all scenarios significantly better than the application of the simpler rules of equal 
distribution and “Percentage of Sales” which do not incorporate any unobservable demand 
parameters and therefore are not exposed to estimation error.  
In summary, we find strong support for the application of the heuristic by Fischer et al. 
because it provides consistently far superior solutions in terms of profit maximization 
compared to simpler rules, such as equal distribution or “Percentage of Sales”, on the one side, 
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Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung:  
Was wissen wir darüber? 
Autor: Nils Wagner 
Unter Begutachtung (2.Runde): Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten von Unternehmen wurde in der Marketingforschung 
intensiv und breit untersucht. Empirische Untersuchungen weisen darauf hin, dass die 
Bestimmung des Marketingbudgets einem komplexen Entscheidungsprozess folgt und von 
einer Vielzahl von Determinanten beeinflusst wird. Grundsätzlich offenbaren Umfragen unter 
Managern, dass das Marketingbudget nach simplen Budgetierungsmethoden, wie z. B. 
Prozent-vom-Umsatz, bestimmt wird. Allerdings kann die Zusammensetzung von 
Marketingbudgets nur zum Teil auf diese Methoden zurückgeführt werden. So konnte für eine 
Vielzahl von Faktoren ein direkter Einfluss auf die Höhe und die Verteilung des 
Marketingbudgets nachgewiesen werden. Zusätzlich haben viele Determinanten auch einen 
indirekten Einfluss auf die Marketingbudgetierung, indem sie die Wahl der angewendeten 
Budgetierungsmethode beeinflussen. In dieser Studie werden die Ergebnisse der empirischen 
Forschung zum Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten zusammengeführt, systematisch dargestellt 
und kritisch betrachtet. Im Besonderen lässt sich an den existierenden Studien kritisieren, dass 
diese das Budgetierungsverhalten nicht strukturell, sondern nur über ad hoc formulierte 
Beziehungsgeflechte, abbilden und dabei wesentliche Aspekte der Budgetierung ignorieren. 
Abstract 
The marketing budgeting process in companies is analyzed extensively in marketing research. 
Empirical studies indicate that the determination of marketing budgets follows a complex 
decision process which is influenced by a multitude of different factors. Basically, surveys 
among managers identify simple budgeting methods, such as percentage-of-sales, which are 
applied for determining the marketing budget. But these methods cannot explain fully the 
final budget decisions. Instead, we see a significant impact on the level and the allocation of 
the marketing budget by multiple factors. Further, we observe that most of these factors have 
as well an indirect impact as they influence the choice of the applied budgeting method. But 
the empirical results with regard to marketing budgeting behavior are very fragmented which 
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complicates a total view on what influences the determination of marketing budgets. 
Therefore, this study aggregates the results of empirical research to provide an overview of 
empirical findings regarding determinants in marketing budgeting behavior and gives 
suggestions for future research. 
1 Einführung 
Jedes Unternehmen steht vor der Herausforderung, sein Produktangebot mit einem 
geeigneten und optimal abgestimmten Marketingprogramm zu unterstützen. Die Frage der 
optimalen Höhe und Verteilung des Marketingbudgets ist dabei angesichts teilweise rapide 
wachsender Marketingbudgets von großer Bedeutung für den Unternehmenserfolg. 
Zusätzlich rücken steigende Marketingkosten, verschärfende Wettbewerbsbedingungen und 
ein besserer Zugang zu Daten den Fokus zunehmend auf ein effizientes und effektives 
Management der Werbeinvestitionen. Dennoch zeigt sich in den Ergebnissen der MAX 
Studie der American Association of Advertising Agencies, dass der 
Marketingbudgetierungsprozess von vielen Managern noch immer als ein komplexer, 
schlecht strukturierter und risikobehafteter Prozess angesehen wird (Farris, Shames und 
Reibstein 1998). 
Empirische Untersuchungen bestätigen, dass die Höhe und Verteilung von Marketingbudgets 
in den meisten Unternehmen nach theoretischen Überlegungen suboptimal ist (z. B. 
Manchanda, Rossi und Chintagunta 2004). Gleichzeitig lässt sich beobachten, dass es 
zwischen Unternehmen, selbst innerhalb der gleichen Branche, große Variationen bei der 
Höhe des Marketingbudgets gibt (Balasubramanian und Kumar 1990). Es stellen sich daher 
die Fragen, wie Marketingbudgets in der Praxis bestimmt werden und welche Faktoren ihre 
Höhe determinieren. 
Seit über 40 Jahren widmet sich die Forschung in deskriptiven Studien diesen Fragen 
(Ramaseshan 1990). In Abgrenzung zur normativen Literatur, die bestrebt ist, 
Marketingbudgetierung zu optimieren (z. B. Fischer et al. 2011), versucht die deskriptive 
Literatur nur das tatsächliche Budgetierungsverhalten, dass in Unternehmen beobachtet wird, 
zu beschreiben. Die Motivation dieser Studien basiert auf der Annahme, aus dem 
Budgetierungsverhalten erfahrener Manager generelle Implikationen für die Praxis ableiten 
zu können (Lilien und Little 1976). Manager lernen mit der Zeit die Bedeutung kritischer 
Determinanten und entwickeln daraus teilweise unbewusste Modelle, die es ihnen 
ermöglichen, auf Veränderungen im Markt, Unternehmen oder Produktportfolio zielführend 
zu reagieren. Im Besonderen schafft die Beschreibung gemeinhin genutzter Praktiken für 
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Manager eine gute Grundlage um das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten ihrer Wettbewerber 
besser zu verstehen und das Budget der Wettbewerber zu schätzen (Stewart 1996). 
Gleichzeitig liefern diese Studien einen deutlichen Beitrag zur Entwicklung empirischer 
Modelle in der Forschung, da die Erkenntnisse dazu beitragen können, Marketingvariablen in 
Modellen zu identifizieren und auf diese Weise den Realitätsgehalt zu steigern und 
Verzerrungen von Parametern zu vermeiden (Manchanda, Rossi und Chintagunta 2004). 
Zusätzlich sehen wir eine vermehrte Anwendung von Strukturgleichungsmodellen in der 
empirischen Forschung, die auf teilweise sehr restriktiven Annahmen über Unternehmens- 
bzw. Managerverhalten basieren. Deskriptive Studien helfen dabei, die Rechtfertigung dieser 
Annahmen zu überprüfen. 
Die Analyse des Budgetierungsverhaltens von Managern ist weit verbreitet und wurde mit 
vielschichtigen Methoden, wie z. B. Umfragen unter Managern oder ökonometrischen 
Studien zur Erklärung der beobachteten Verteilung von Marketingbudgets, untersucht. 
Allerdings hat dies die Entwicklung verschiedener Erklärungsmodelle des 
Budgetierungsprozesses begünstigt und zu sehr heterogenen empirischen Ergebnissen 
bezüglich der Determinanten des Marketingbudgetierungsverhaltens geführt. Versuche in der 
Literatur, den Budgetierungsprozess mithilfe eines einfachen Modells zu erklären 
(Balasubramanian und Kumar 1990), konnten in späteren Studien widerlegt werden (z. B. 
Ailawadi, Farris und Parry 1994). Es bleibt das Bild eines komplexen 
Budgetierungsprozesses, der in der Praxis durch eine Vielzahl von Entscheidungsträgern 
sowie exogener Faktoren beeinflusst wird, bestehen. 
Aus diesem Grund führt dieser Beitrag die weitgehend fragmentierte empirische Forschung 
zum tatsächlichen Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten zusammen und systematisiert die 
empirisch nachgewiesene Wirkung von Determinanten auf die Marketingbudgetierung, mit 
dem Ziel die folgenden Fragen zu beantworten: 
- Nach welchen Methoden und Verfahren werden Marketingbudgets in der Praxis 
verteilt? 
- Welche Einflussfaktoren auf die Bestimmung der Höhe und Verteilung von 
Marketingbudgets sind empirisch validiert? Welche Wirkungsrichtung weisen sie auf 
und wie lassen sich Unterschiede in empirischen Befunden erklären? 
- Wie sind die existierenden Arbeiten hinsichtlich ihrer Aussagefähigkeit zu beurteilen? 
In welchen Bereichen besteht weiterer Forschungsbedarf? 
Einzelne Arbeiten thematisieren bereits den empirischen Forschungsstand zu Einzelaspekten 
des tatsächlichen Marketingbudgetierungsverhaltens. So liefern Farris und Albion (1981) 
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einen frühen ersten, aber sehr eingeschränkten Einblick über Einflussfaktoren der 
Marketingbudgetierung. Bigné (1995) liefert einen systematischen Überblick über Studien 
zur Anwendung von Budgetierungsmethoden, nimmt jedoch keine Untersuchung der 
Determinanten der Wahl der Methode vor. Andere Artikel verfolgen das Ziel den Stand der 
empirischen Forschung darzustellen, weisen allerdings einen sehr starken Praxisbezug auf, so 
dass kaum allgemeingültige Erkenntnisse abgeleitet werden können (z. B. Reinecke und 
Fuchs 2003). Die hier vorliegende Untersuchung erweitert diesen Erkenntnisstand im 
Besonderen in zweierlei Hinsicht: Erstens schafft diese Arbeit erstmals einen systematischen 
Überblick über alle Aspekte der Marketingbudgetierung, die in der Marketingforschung 
untersucht wurden. Zweitens hat sich die Datengrundlage deutlich vergrößert. Während 
Farris und Albion (1981) nur auf 7 Beiträge zurückgreifen können, werden im Rahmen dieser 
Arbeit knapp 90 Studien der vergangenen 40 Jahre verarbeitet, so dass eine wesentlich 
breitere Perspektive auf die Einflussfaktoren der Marketingbudgetierung ermöglicht wird. 
Eine systematische Untersuchung empirischer Ergebnisse zu den Determinanten der Wahl 
der Budgetierungsmethode erfolgt im Rahmen dieser Arbeit sogar erstmalig. 
2 Untersuchungsmethode 
2.1 Konzeptioneller Bezugsrahmen der Untersuchung 
Basis für die Analyse der empirischen Forschung zur Marketingbudgetierung bildet ein 
konzeptioneller Bezugsrahmen. Bei der Untersuchung der verschiedenen empirischen 
Arbeiten wird auf diesen Bezugsrahmen zurückgegriffen mit dem Ziel einer systematischen 
Darstellung der Einflussfaktoren der Marketingbudgetierung.  
Grundsätzlich ergibt sich im Rahmen der Bestimmung der Marketingbudgets ein komplexer 
Entscheidungsprozess zur Bestimmung der Marketingbudgets, der sich aus dem internen 
Wettbewerb der Manager eines Unternehmens um die verfügbaren Ressourcen ergibt (Piercy 
1986). Gleichzeitig stehen Unternehmen vor der Herausforderung, ihr Marketingbudget im 
komplexen Umfeld dynamischer Märkte für ein breites Produktportfolio und einen 
vielfältigen Marketing-Mix möglichst optimal zu bestimmen und zu verteilen (Fischer et al. 
2011). Es stellt sich daher die Frage, wie Unternehmen in der Praxis ihre Budgets letztlich 
bestimmen. Die Literatur identifiziert die Verwendung von einfachen Regeln, sogenannten 
Budgetierungsheuristiken, die von Managern zur Bestimmung ihrer Budgets angewendet 
werden, da sie das komplexe Optimierungsproblem deutlich vereinfachen (Bigné 1995). 
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Abbildung 1. Konzeptioneller Bezugsrahmen der Untersuchung 
 
Darüber hinaus wird die Bestimmung der Höhe und Verteilung des Marketingbudgets durch 
eine Vielzahl weiterer Faktoren beeinflusst. In einer Managerumfrage identifiziert Mitchell 
(1993) neben den üblichen organisationalen und strukturellen Einflüssen die folgenden fünf 
Haupttreiber des Budgetierungsverhaltens: Produkt, Wettbewerb, Marktcharakteristika, Preis 
und zeitliche Effekte. Die empirische Forschung hat für eine Vielzahl dieser Faktoren einen 
direkten Einfluss auf das Marketingbudgetierungsverhaltens nachweisen können. Ebenso 
zeigt sich ein indirekter Einfluss vieler Faktoren auf die Bestimmung des Marketingbudgets 
über deren Wirkung auf die Wahl der angewendeten Budgetierungsheuristik. 
2.2 Methodik der inhaltlichen Auswertung 
Die Erarbeitung eines systematischen Überblicks über die Ergebnisse empirischer Studien 
und die sich daraus ergebende Ableitung von empirisch verallgemeinerbaren Erkenntnissen 
basiert auf der Auszählung signifikanter und insignifikanter Studienergebnisse. Ein empirisch 
verallgemeinerbarer Zusammenhang wurde identifiziert, wenn mindestens drei Studien einen 
Zusammenhang untersucht haben und bei mindestens 80% dieser Studien eine entsprechende 
Wirkrichtung festgestellt wurde, oder wenn zwei Studien einen Zusammenhang untersucht 
haben und bei beiden die gleiche Wirkrichtung festgestellt wurde. Sollte Heterogenität in den 
Ergebnissen vorliegen, werden im Rahmen dieser Studie mögliche Ursachen, z.B. durch 
Unterschiede in den Modellen, diskutiert. Eine genauere Auswertung mittels einer Meta-
Analyse konnte aufgrund fehlender Informationen zu Datengrundlagen und 
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Modellspezifikation bei einer Vielzahl von Studien, die eine Vereinheitlichung empirischer 
Ergebnisse, z.B. über Elastizitäten, verhindern, nicht durchgeführt werden.1 
2.3 Auswahl der empirischen Arbeiten 
Der Fokus dieser Studie liegt in der systematischen Aufbereitung empirischer Studien, die 
den tatsächlichen Marketingbudgetierungsprozess analysieren. Dies umfasst Beiträge, die 
direkte oder indirekte Einflussfaktoren auf das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten untersuchen. 
Gleichwohl finden auch Studien mit einem anderen Forschungsfokus, die ebenfalls 
bedeutsame empirische Ergebnisse zum Marketingbudgetierungsprozess beisteuern, 
Berücksichtigung, um ein möglichst breites Erkenntnisspektrum bieten zu können. Es sei 
aber darauf hingewiesen, dass im Rahmen dieser Studie ausschließlich Beiträge der 
Marketingforschung verarbeitet werden. Dies blendet im Besonderen weitestgehend 
verhaltenswissenschaftliche Ansätze der Erklärung des Budgetierungsprozesses in der 
Accountingliteratur aus. Gleichzeitig grenzt sich diese Studie von Beiträgen mit starkem 
Praxisbezug ab, da diese aufgrund ihrer Untersuchungsmethode meist keine 
verallgemeinerbaren Ergebnisse zulassen. 
Für die Literaturrecherche wurde auf die drei führenden betriebswirtschaftlichen 
Datenbanken „ABI/INFORM Global (ProQuest)“, „Business Source Premier (Ebsco)“ und 
„Wiso Wissenschaften: Wirtschaftswissenschaften“ zurückgegriffen und zur Schaffung einer 
Ausgangsbasis Beiträge herausgefiltert, die im Titel, in der Zusammenfassung oder bei den 
Schlagwörtern die Begriffe „Budgetierungsmethoden“, „Budgetierungspraktiken“ sowie 
„Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung“ bzw. „-intensität“ (bzw. in entsprechender 
englischer Übersetzung) aufweisen. Anschließend wurde mittels Querverweisen nach 
weiteren Beiträgen gesucht, so dass insgesamt knapp 90 empirische Studien identifiziert und 
in dieser Studie berücksichtigt wurden. 
3 Grundlagen der Marketingbudgetierung 
3.1 Definition der Marketingbudgetierung 
Grundsätzlich bezeichnet die Budgetierung die systematische Planung, Koordination und 
Kontrolle der Unternehmensressourcen. Marketingbudgetierung im Speziellen umfasst die 
Formulierung quantifizierbarer Aktivitäts- und Leistungsniveaus der absatzpolitischen 
Entscheidungseinheiten eines Unternehmens, die in regelmäßigen Abständen neu festgelegt 
                                                 
1
 Aufgrund der teilweise sehr frühen Veröffentlichung einiger Artikel konnte auch keine Nacherhebung der 
fehlenden Daten bei den Autoren erfolgen. 
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werden (Barzen 1990, 90 f.). Der Begriff des Marketingbudgets umfasst damit alle 
regelmäßig neu festgelegten Kosten absatzpolitischer Maßnahmen, wie z.B. 
Verkaufsaußendienst, Werbung, Kundendienstkosten oder kundenspezifischer 
Produktmodifikationen. Infolge der wichtigen Bedeutung, den der Posten der 
kommunikationspolitischen Maßnahmen innerhalb des Marketingbudgets zukommt, legen 
einige Studien einen besonderen Fokus auf die Untersuchung abgegrenzter Anteile des 
Budgets. So findet sich eine abgegrenzte Untersuchung des Werbebudgets, d.h. alle Kosten 
von Werbemaßnahmen, die über Medien verbreitet werden, des Außendienstbudgets, in dem 
alle Kosten, die durch Außendiensttätigkeiten anfallen, zusammengefasst werden, sowie des 
Werbe- und Promotionsbudgets, das allgemein alle kommunikationspolitischen Maßnahmen 
umfasst.  
Aufgrund der regelmäßigen Planungszyklen des Marketingbudgets ergibt sich ein besonderer 
Fokus auf den betriebswirtschaftlichen Planungsprozess der Budgetaufstellung im Marketing, 
der auch vornehmlicher Untersuchungsgegenstand der empirischen Forschung ist. 
3.2 Prozess der Marketingbudgetierung 
Der Marketingbudgetierungsprozess beschreibt den Entscheidungsprozess zur Bestimmung 
der Höhe und der Verteilung des Marketingbudgets. Lilien und Little (1976) sehen diesen 
Prozess als ein zweistufiges Verfahren, bei dem im ersten Schritt über die Höhe des 
Marketingbudgets und in einem zweiten Schritt über dessen Verteilung auf die 
Planungseinheiten der Organisation, d. h. Produkte, Länder, Marketinginstrumente, 
Zeitperioden usw., entschieden wird. Mitchell (1993) erweitert diesen Prozess um die 
vorgelagerte Entscheidung, ob überhaupt geworben werden soll. Obgleich die Forschung 
belegen konnte, dass die Allokation des Marketingbudgets auf den Unternehmenserfolg eine 
wesentlich stärkere Wirkung hat als die eigentliche Höhe (Chintagunta 1993), zeigt sich bei 
Managern ein anderes Meinungsbild. Daraus ergibt sich in der Praxis eine wesentlich höhere 
Bedeutung, die der Bestimmung des absoluten Marketingbudgets zugemessen wird (Mitchell 
1993). 
Grundsätzlich gilt in vielen Unternehmen, dass das Management zunächst eine 
übergeordnete allgemeine Strategie entwickelt und daraus Marketingziele abgeleitet werden. 
Anschließend wird auf der Basis von Prognosen und Zielen der finanzielle Spielraum für die 
nächste Planungsperiode abgesteckt und in diesem Rahmen die Budgets bestimmt, die nach 
Managementbeurteilung und analytischen Modellen zur Zielerreichung führen sollen. Der 
erste Budgetvorschlag wird dann dem Topmanagement präsentiert und in gegenseitiger 
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Absprache angepasst und beschlossen (Low und Mohr 1999). Die prozessuale 
Entscheidungsrichtung variiert jedoch nach Organisationsform und Philosophie eines 
Unternehmens. Eine Prozessstruktur, nach der die Entscheidung über Höhe und Verteilung 
des Marketingbudgets vor allem beim Topmanagement verbleibt und Manager von 
Untereinheiten (z. B. Produktmanager) nur noch ausführende Aufgaben übernehmen, wird 
als Top-Down-Prozess bezeichnet. Wenn die Produktmanager hingegen die Kompetenz 
besitzen über ihr Marketingbudget zu entscheiden, so liegt eine Bottom-Up-Prozessstruktur 
vor. Die Vorteile des Top-Down-Ansatzes liegen in der Möglichkeit, den 
unternehmensstrategischen Fokus bei der Budgetplanung zu berücksichtigen und auf diese 
Weise den Gesamtgewinn des Portfolios zu maximieren. Zusätzlich können zeitintensive 
Abstimmungsprozesse vermieden werden. Allerdings stoßen Vorgaben aus dem 
Topmanagement eher auf Akzeptanzschwierigkeiten bei den nachgeordneten 
Hierarchieebenen. Der Bottom-Up-Ansatz zieht vor allem Vorteile aus der Markt- und 
Kundennähe der Produktmanager, die ihnen eine bessere Schätzung des optimalen Budgets 
ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig fördert die Partizipation im Entscheidungsprozess die 
Mitarbeitermotivation. Allerdings lässt sich beobachten, dass Manager zu opportunistischem 
Verhalten in der Form zu hoher Budgetwünsche neigen und der Koordinationsaufwand 
deutlich zunimmt (Prendergast, West und Shi 2006).  
Der Gedanke, die Vorteile beider Prozessformen zu kombinieren, hat in der Praxis zur 
Verbreitung von Mischformen geführt. Hanmer-Loyd und Kennedy (1981) zeigen, dass 
knapp 90% aller Unternehmen kombinierte Prozessformen anwenden, bei der in 
gegenseitiger Partizipation die Unternehmensziele und –strategien festgelegt und über das 
Budget entschieden wird. Dadurch ergibt sich in den meisten Unternehmen das Bild eines 
komplexen Verhandlungsprozess an dem eine Vielzahl von Abteilungen innerhalb eines 
Unternehmens beteiligt sind und der infolge unterschiedlicher Ziele und Perspektiven der 
einzelnen Abteilungen viele Reibungspunkte aufweist. Im Besonderen sind hier 
Kommunikationsschwierigkeiten zwischen Finanz- und der Marketingabteilung sowie 
zwischen oberen und unteren Hierarchieebenen zu nennen. Im ersten Fall bestehen 
unterschiedliche Auffassungen über Marketing als Kosten- oder als Investitionsfaktor, und 
im zweiten Fall stehen gesamtunternehmerische Interessen Abteilungsinteressen gegenüber 
(Low und Mohr 1999). 
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4 Normative ökonomische Theorie der optimalen Marketingbudgetierung 
Erste Einblicke in die Marketingbudgetierung liefert die normative Literatur zur optimalen 
Bestimmung von Marketingbudgets, indem sie Aussagen trifft, wie das Marketingbudget 
optimalerweise gesetzt werden sollte. Die Grundlage hierfür liefert das Dorfman-Steiner-
Theorem (Dorfman und Steiner 1954), das besagt, dass eine optimale Marketingbudgetierung 
erreicht ist, wenn sich Grenzertrag des Marketing und negative Preiselastizität entsprechen, d. 
h. je effektiver das Marketing, desto größer ist das optimale Marketingbudget. Fortführende 
Studien haben dieses Theorem weiterentwickelt, so dass sich auf der Basis normativer 
Aussagen die folgenden Ergebnisse bezüglich Determinanten zusammenfassen lassen, die 
verstärkte Marketinginvestitionen begründen: 
- höhere Effektivität des Marketing (Dorfman und Steiner 1954). 
- stärkerer Carry Over-Effekt in Bezug auf den  Marketingstock (Nerlove und Arrow 
1962) 
- größere Profitabilität eines Produkts (Cable 1972). 
- niedrige Kapitalkosten des Unternehmens (Nerlove und Arrow 1962). 
- größerer Umsatz eines Produkts (Dorfman und Steiner 1954). 
- hohes Wachstumspotenzial eines Produkts (Fischer et al. 2011). 
Die normativen Aussagen bleiben damit insgesamt übersichtlich, geben aber einen ersten 
Einblick in die Bestimmung von Marketingbudgets. Inwieweit sich die normativen Aussagen 
im tatsächlichen Budgetierungsverhalten widerspiegeln, muss allerdings in empirischen 
Studien untersucht werden. 
5 Budgetierungsmethoden 
5.1 Konzept der Budgetierungsmethoden 
Umfragen unter Managern zeigen, dass in der Praxis vor allem vereinfachende Methoden, 
sogenannte Budgetierungsheuristiken, für die Bestimmung von Marketingbudgets 
angewendet werden. Trotz der enormen Bedeutung der Budgetierung für den 
Unternehmenserfolg handelt es sich hierbei meist um einfache Regeln, die die komplexe 
Budgetierungsentscheidung auf der Basis weniger Kennzahlen festlegen und auf diese Weise 
übersichtlich und greifbar machen (Farris, Shames und Reibstein 1998). 
Tabelle 1 fasst die nach Managerumfragen am weitesten verbreiteten 
Budgetierungsmethoden zusammen. Während in frühen Studien die Prozent-vom-Umsatz-
Regel (Percentage of Sales) und der finanzkraftorientierte Ansatz (Affordable) am häufigsten 
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genannt werden (z. B. San Augustine und Foley 1975), lässt sich über die Zeit eine 
wesentlich breitere Anwendung der differenzierteren Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel (Objective 
and Task) beobachten (z. B. Hung und West 1991). Diese Tendenz erfasst zunächst die 
größeren Unternehmen der Konsumgüterindustrie und breitet sich anschließend auch auf 
Unternehmen mittlerer Größe und anderer Branchen aus. Lynch und Hooley (1990) 
vergleichen dies mit einem Diffusionsprozess, der in der Literatur als Weiterentwicklung des 
Budgetierungsprozesses hin zu fortschrittlicher Budgetierungspraxis gewertet wird. Dennoch 
wecken einige Studien Zweifel an dieser Schlussfolgerung, da ein detaillierter Blick auf die 
Budgetbestimmung darauf hin deutet, dass die Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel nicht im 
eigentlichen Sinne Anwendung findet (Martenson 1989). Stattdessen ist anzunehmen, dass 
sie lediglich als ein Werkzeug zur Legitimierung und Rechtfertigung einflussreicher Akteure 
eingesetzt wird, um eigene Ziele durchzusetzen (Piercy 1987a). Bei kleineren Unternehmen 
wird die Entscheidung über das Marketingbudget hingegen meist direkt vom 
Topmanagement getroffen, die das Budget überwiegend auf der Basis ihrer eigenen 
Erfahrung (Arbitrary), d. h. nach subjektiven Kriterien, festlegen. Die anderen genannten 
Methoden haben schließlich einen eher ergänzenden Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Budgets. 
So handelt es sich bei dem Fortschreibungsansatz (Previous Budget) nicht um eine bewusst 
eingesetzte Regel, sondern sie ist vielmehr Ausdruck des politischen Einflusses der 
jeweiligen Manager (Piercy 1986). Nach dem wettbewerbsorientierten Ansatz  (Competitive 
Parity) werden Anpassungen des Budgets als Reaktion auf Marketingausgaben der 
Konkurrenz vorgenommen. Wissenschaftliche Methoden der Allokationsoptimierung (für 
einen Überblick siehe Shankar 2008) werden schließlich auch in neueren Umfragen kaum 
genannt (Bigné 1995). 
5.2 Kritik am Konzept der Budgetierungsmethoden 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Umfragen müssen allerdings grundlegend hinterfragt werden, da sie 
auf der Annahme eines einfachen und direkten Budgetierungsprozesses beruhen, bei dem 
politische Prozesse innerhalb einer Organisation ausgeblendet werden (Mitchell 1993). 
Tatsächlich streben Manager allerdings ein Lösung an, die gegenüber den Vorgesetzten 
gerechtfertigt, den Gleichgestellten vermittelt und an die Untergebenen weitergeleitet werden 
kann, so dass diese die Lösung logisch und akzeptabel finden und nach ihr handeln (Piercy 
1986). Daher haben Manager ihre Budgetentscheidung unter Berücksichtigung von Routinen, 
Präzedenzfällen sowie sozialen und politischen Druck zu treffen und entsprechend nur wenig  
 
  
Tabelle 1. Übersicht über Budgetierungsmethoden 
Budgetierungsmethode Definition Vorteile Nachteile Verbreitung1 
Managementerfahrung Willkürliche Entscheidung durch Manager, 
nur auf Basis ihrer Erfahrungswerte 
• Einfach • Keine theoretische od. 
empirische Validierung 




Budgetentscheidung auf der Basis der zur 
Verfügung stehenden freien finanziellen 
Mittel 
• Kostendeckung 
• Gute Kommunizierbarkeit 
ggü. Finanzabteilung  
• Prozyklische Wirkung 33,1 % 
Prozent-vom-Umsatz Bestimmung des Budgets als relativer oder 
absoluter Anteil des erwarteten oder 
vergangenen Umsatzes 
• Kostendeckung 
• Gute Kommunizierbarkeit 
ggü. Finanzabteilung 
• Zusammenhang zw. 
Umsatz und Marketing 
• Kausalzusammenhang 
zwischen Umsatz und 
Marketing vertauscht 
• Zukunftspotenziale 




Festlegung des Budgets proportional zu den 
Marketingausgaben der Wettbewerber zur 
Verteidigung der eigenen Marktposition 
• Abschreckende Wirkung 
auf Konkurrenz  
• Starker Fokus auf 
Konkurrenz ineffizient bei 
großen Unterschieden 
16,3 % 
Fortschreibungsansatz Marketingbudget wird auf der Basis der 
Budgets der Vorjahre fortgeschrieben 
• Vereinfachung politischer 
Prozesse 




Ziele-und-Aufgaben Aufstellung von Kommunikationszielen und 
Planung des Budgets, das für die Erreichung 
der Ziele benötigt wird 
• Gibt die Natur des 
Marketing zur Erreichung 
von Absatzzielen wider 
• Basiert auf der 
Marginalanalyse der 
ökonomischen Theorie 
• Erfordert hohen Grad an 
analytischen Fähigkeiten 
und eine genaue Kenntnis 




Budgetierungsmodelle, die sich direkt aus 
theoretischen Optimierungsmodellen 
ableiten lassen 
• Optimale Bestimmung des 
Budgets zur Maximierung 
des Shareholder Values 
• Kompliziert umzusetzen 
• Erfordert sehr gute 
Kenntnis aller Treiber 
8,4 % 
1 Die Verbreitung gibt an, wie viele der Manager bei Umfragen unter der Möglichkeit von Mehrfachnennungen angaben, diese Methode anzuwenden (Gewichtetes arithmetisches 
Mittel über Studienergebnisse nach Anzahl befragter Manager). 
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Möglichkeiten, Best Practice anzuwenden (Prendergast et al. 2006). Dementsprechend schätzen 
Manager die Bedeutung politischer Betrachtungen auch höher ein als finanzielle Betrachtungen 
(Farris, Shames und Reibstein 1998). Piercy (1987b) rechnet den politischen Faktoren sogar 
einen deutlich größeren Erklärungsbeitrag zur Ausgestaltung des Marketingbudgets zu als den 
Budgetierungsmethoden. Es ist daher anzunehmen, dass eine ausschließliche Erklärung durch 
Budgetierungsmethoden eine zu große Vereinfachung darstellt und die Bestimmung des 
Marketingbudgets von einer Vielzahl weiterer Faktoren erklärt wird. 
6 Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung 
6.1 Untersuchungsrahmen 
Grundsätzlich wird in der empirischen Forschung mittels regressionsanalytischer Methoden die 
Wirkung von Faktoren auf die Marketingbudgetierung über deren Einfluss auf die Höhe und 
Verteilung des Budgets untersucht. Allerdings variieren die Studien hinsichtlich Form und 
Definition der abhängigen Variablen sowie dem Aggregationsniveau. 
Form der abhängigen Variablen: Die meisten Studien verwenden die relative 
Marketingintensität, d. h. das Verhältnis der Marketingausgaben zum Umsatz, als abhängige 
Variable in der Regressionsgleichung. Dies geht vermutlich auf die Nähe zu allgemeinen 
Budgetierungspraktiken (z. B. Prozent-vom-Umsatz-Regel) zurück, wonach Unternehmen ihr 
Budget als bestimmten Prozentsatz vom Umsatz planen (Farris und Albion 1981). Ailawadi, 
Farris und Parry (1994) ergänzen, dass bereits Nerlove und Arrow (1962) gezeigt haben, dass 
unter gewissen Annahmen ein bestimmter Prozentsatz vom Umsatz dem optimalen 
Marketingbudget entspricht, so dass sich auch normative Aussagen aus der deskriptiven 
Analyse der Einflussfaktoren auf die Höhe der Marketingintensität ableiten lassen könnten. 
Dennoch ist die Verwendung dieser Kennzahl keineswegs allgemein akzeptiert, da Prozent-
vom-Umsatz als eine der am wenigsten differenzierten Methoden gilt und eine stärkere 
Rationalität in der Budgetierung gefordert wird. Entsprechend lässt sich insbesondere in neueren 
Studien die Betrachtung des absoluten Marketingbudgets beobachten (z. B. Shankar 2009). Dies 
erschwert einen übergreifenden Vergleich der Ergebnisse, da auftretende Skaleneffekte zu 
Verzerrungen in den Ergebnissen führen können (Farris und Albion 1981). 
Einige Studien widmen sich zusätzlich der Untersuchung der zweiten Stufe des 
Budgetierungsprozess - der Budgetallokation. Die abhängige Variable wird hier analog zur 
ersten Stufe als relative oder als absolute Kennzahl definiert. Entweder gilt diese als Relation 
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 13 
 
 
der Ausgaben eines Marketinginstruments zum gesamten Marketingbudget (z. B. Lilien und 
Little 1976) oder direkt als absolute Ausgaben dieses Instruments (z. B. Shankar 2009). 
Definition der abhängigen Variablen: Gleichzeitig variieren die Studien hinsichtlich der 
Definition der abhängigen Variablen, d. h. des zu untersuchenden Budgets, da nur einige 
Studien alle absatzpolitischen Maßnahmen im Budget berücksichtigen. Stattdessen wird infolge 
der besonderen Bedeutung, der dem Posten absatzpolitischer Maßnahmen innerhalb des 
Marketingbudgets zukommt, in vielen Studien nur eine Untersuchung des Werbebudgets (z. B. 
Farris und Albion 1981), des Budgets für Außendiensttätigkeiten (z. B. Gönül et al. 2001), oder 
des Budgets aller kommunikationspolitischen Maßnahmen (z. B. Farris und Buzzell 1979) 
vorgenommen. Eine weitere Variation ergibt sich durch unterschiedliche Auffassungen über die 
Zusammensetzung der jeweiligen Ausgabengruppen. Blasko und Patti (1984) schätzen, dass bis 
zu einem Drittel des in den Daten erfassten Marketingbudgets falsch verbucht worden ist. 
Dementsprechend ist anzunehmen, dass die Rechnungslegungspraktiken der Unternehmen zu 
einem starken Grad Differenzen in den Marketingintensitäten erklären (Martenson 1989). 
Aggregationsniveau: Bezüglich des Aggregationsniveaus des Untersuchungsgegenstands 
beziehen sich Studien meist auf die Ebene einer Unternehmung, d. h. es werden die 
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung eines Unternehmens analysiert. Der Zweig der 
Industrial-Organization-Forschung untersucht hingegen Einflussfaktoren ganzer Industrien. 
6.2 Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung 
Ein Vergleich der Ergebnisse der empirischen Studien ermöglicht allgemeingültige Aussagen zu 
der Wirkung einer Vielzahl von Determinanten auf das Marketingbudget, die im folgenden 
Abschnitt dargestellt werden. Teilweise lässt sich allerdings auch eine große Heterogenität in 
den Ergebnissen beobachten, die jedoch meist auf methodische Variationen in den Studien 
zurückgeführt werden können und daher erklärbar sind. Tabelle 2 bietet hierzu einen 
zusammenfassenden Überblick zu den Aussagen empirischer Studien hinsichtlich der 
Wirkungsrichtung einzelner Determinanten auf die Höhe des Marketingbudgets. 
6.2.1 Produktdeterminanten 
Qualität: Ein Vergleich empirischer Studien zeigt, dass hochqualitative Produkte von einem 
umfangreicheren Marketingprogramm unterstützt werden. Dies ist vermutlich eine Folge der 
höheren Effektivität von Marketingmaßnahmen, wenn diese eine überlegene Qualität  
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Tabelle 2: Anzahl der Studien, die einen signifikanten Einfluss durch die Determinanten 
auf die Höhe des Marketingbudgets feststellen 
  Einfluss auf die Höhe des Marketingbudgets 















Qualität  5 (80%)    1 (20%) 
Einzigartigkeit Produziert auf Bestellung  5 (100%)    
 „Hidden Values“ 2 (33%)    4 (67%) 
Kauffrequenz   5 (72%)  1 (14%) 1 (14%) 
Preis Absoluter Preis 1 (13%) 4 (50%)  1 (13%) 2 (25%) 
 Relativer Preis 1 (100%)     
Profitabilität Profitmarge (Firma) 4 (100%)     
 Profitmarge (Branche) 5 (63%) 2 (25%)   1 (13%) 
 Höhe Free Cash Flow 2 (100%)     
Marktgröße Gesamtumsatz  4 (80%)   1 (20%) 
 Regionaler Marktbezug  1 (100%)    
Marktwachstum  5 (29%) 2 (12%)   10 (59%) 
Anzahl Kunden  7 (88%)    1 (13%) 
Marktdominanz  7 (44%) 8 (50%)   1 (6 %) 
Marktkonzentration 5 (19%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 9 (35%) 7 (26%) 
Anzahl Wett-
bewerber 
Auf gleichem Markt 8 (67%) 3 (25%)   1 (8%) 
Multimarktkontakte  2 (100%)    
Marketingausgaben  
Wettbewerb 
5 (83%) 1 (17%)    
Produktlebens-
zyklus 
Zeit im Markt  8 (57%)   6 (43%) 
Markteintritts- 
reihenfolge 





 2 (100%)    
Macht 
Marketingabteilung 





2 (50%)    2 (50%) 
Partizipation am 
Geschäftserfolg 
Höhe d. Besitzanteils  1 (33%) 2 (67%)   
Langfristigkeit d. 
Belohnung 
2 (100%)     
Anmerkung: Die Angaben in Klammern zeigen, wie viele der Studien, die diese Determinante untersucht haben, einen 
entsprechenden Effekt gemessen haben. Für Detailinformationen zu den empirischen Ergebnisse siehe die Tabellen 6 
a-f und 7 a/b im Appendix. 
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kommunizieren können (Tellis und Fornell 1988). Entsprechend lässt sich im Besonderen eine 
Steigerung des Werbebudgets beobachten, um eine stärkere Verbreitung einer auf der hohen 
Qualität des Produkts basierenden Werbebotschaft sicherzustellen (Lilien und Little 1976). 
Einzigartigkeit eines Produkts: Die Einzigartigkeit eines Produkts wurde in der empirischen 
Literatur mit zwei verschiedenen Konstrukten untersucht. Zum einen konnte bei Produkten, die 
auf Bestellung produziert werden, eine geringere Marketingintensität nachgewiesen werden. 
Begründet wird dies damit, dass diese Produkte meist eine künstlerische Komponente für den 
Kunden besitzen, so dass Marketing nur von nachrangiger Bedeutung ist und der direkte 
Kontakt zwischen Kunde und Anbieter wichtiger wird (Lilien 1979). Es kann daher vermutet 
werden, dass die Senkung der Werbeausgaben parallel mit einem Anstieg der Ausgaben für den 
Verkaufsaußendienst verbunden ist (Farris und Buzzel 1979). Hierfür gibt es aber keine 
empirische Validierung. 
Das zweite Konstrukt basiert auf der Existenz von „Hidden Values“, d. h. Eigenschaften, die 
sich erst nach mehrmaligem Gebrauch des Produkts für den Konsumenten erschließen. Ein 
Vergleich der Studien zeigt grundsätzlich einen eher positiven, jedoch keinen einheitlich 
signifikanten Effekt auf die Marketingintensität, was offenbar auf die unterschiedlichen 
untersuchten Marketingmaßnahmen zurückzuführen ist. Insgesamt liegt die Vermutung nahe,  
dass bei Produkten mit „Hidden Values“ vor allem der Außendienst intensiviert wird, der 
Kunden direkt in die Besonderheiten des Produkts einführen kann (Farris und Buzzel 1979). 
Kauffrequenz: Bei der Kauffrequenz eines Produkts zeigt sich über alle Studien ein negativer 
Zusammenhang mit der Marketingintensität, d. h. je häufiger ein Produkt gekauft wird, desto 
geringer ist das Marketingbudget. Ursache hierfür ist vermutlich, dass Produkte mit einer hohen 
Kauffrequenz meist standardisierte Produkte des Alltags sind, bei denen sich der Konsument eher 
auf seine Erfahrung verlässt, während bei selten gekauften Produkten zur besseren 
Werteinschätzung meist mehr Informationen benötigt werden (Zif, Young und Fenwick 1984). 
Ein differenzierteres Bild liefern jedoch Keown et al. (1989), die auch auf Nichtlinearität testen 
und einen invertiert U-förmigen Zusammenhang feststellen. Produkte mit mittlerer Kauffrequenz 
haben demnach die größten Marketingbudgets, gefolgt von selten gekauften Produkten. Die 
kleinsten Budgets zeigen sich bei Produkten mit hoher Kauffrequenz. 
6.2.2 Preisdeterminanten 
Preis: Bei der Untersuchung des Preises als Determinante der Marketingintensität stellt sich 
insgesamt ein uneinheitliches Bild dar, das auf gegenläufige Effekte zurückgeführt werden kann. 
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So stellen teure Produkte eher riskante Käufe dar, bei denen sich Kunden weniger auf das 
Marketing als primäre Informationsquelle verlassen und ihre Kaufentscheidung verstärkt auf 
Testergebnisse, Erfahrungen, Ratschläge von Freunden u.ä. stützen (Farris und Buzzel 1979). 
Andererseits besteht bei hochpreisigen Gütern die Notwendigkeit, mittels erhöhter 
Marketingaufwendungen ein Bild von hoher Qualität und Prestige aufrecht zu erhalten (Rizzo 
1999). Gönül et al. (2001) erklären die widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse zusätzlich durch 
gegenläufige Interaktionseffekte zwischen Preis und Marketing. Höhere Marketinginvestitionen 
verhelfen auf der einen Seite zu einer besseren Produktdifferenzierung und damit geringerer 
Preiselastizität. Allerdings wird durch das verstärkte Marketing auch die Vergleichbarkeit 
zwischen den Produkten verbessert und auf diesem Weg die Preissensitivität der Konsumenten 
erhöht. Farris und Buzzell (1979) gelingt es, die gegenläufigen Effekte zu trennen, indem sie 
sowohl den relativen Preis (innerhalb einer Produktklasse) als auch den absoluten Preis im 
Modell berücksichtigen. Wie erwartet, zeigt sich beim relativen Preis ein positiver und beim 
absoluten Preis ein negativer Einfluss auf die Marketingintensität. 
Eine Untersuchung der Budgetallokation bei hochpreisigen Produkten zeigt des Weiteren, dass 
hier vor allem markenaufbauende Werbung eingesetzt wird, die das überlegene Image des 
Produkts vermitteln soll, während Promotion-Maßnahmen, z. B. durch Preisreduktionen, den 
unerwünschten Effekt einer Senkung des Referenzpreises bei den Kunden herbeiführen (Low 
und Mohr 2000). 
Profitabilität: Nach der mikroökonomischen Theorie hat die Profitabilität einen großen 
Einfluss auf die Bestimmung der Höhe der Marketingbudgets (Ailawadi, Farris und Parry 1994). 
Eine höhere Profitmarge führt demnach zu einer höheren optimalen Marketingintensität. 
Empirisch konnte dieser Zusammenhang sowohl für die Messung der Profitabilität als relative 
Größe (Profitmarge), wie auch als absolute Größe (Höhe des Free Cash Flows) bestätigt werden. 
Dieses Ergebnis deckt sich auch mit den Umfragen zu Budgetierungsheuristiken, nach der viele 
Manager ihr Budget auf der Basis der Höhe der frei verfügbaren finanziellen Mittel bestimmen. 
Es zeigt sich in diesem Sinne sogar, dass Firmen, die über viel freies Kapital verfügen, dazu 
neigen, mehr für Marketing aufzuwenden, als notwendig oder wünschenswert wäre (Tellis 
1998). Die Kostendeckung der Marketingausgaben besitzt demnach eine hohe Priorität bei 
Managern (Wagner und Fischer 2011). 
Eine Untersuchung der Profitabilität auf Industrieebene bestätigt grundsätzlich dieses Bild. 
Allerdings lässt sich hier eine größere Heterogenität in den Ergebnissen beobachten. Eine 
Ursache dieser unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse könnte in der Interaktion mit der Produktkategorie 
liegen. So zeigt sich bei Industriegütern eher ein negativer Effekt, d. h. je höhere Profitmargen 
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eine Industrie allgemein aufweist, desto weniger Marketing betreiben die Unternehmen, 
während im Konsumgüterbereich eher positive Effekte zu beobachten sind (Lee 2002). Eine 
Ursache hierfür könnte die traditionell wichtigere Rolle des Marketing im Konsumgüterbereich 
sein, die Unternehmen eher dazu verleitet, freies Kapital in Marketing zu investieren. Allerdings 
ist hier noch weiterer Forschungsbedarf notwendig. 
6.2.3 Marktdeterminanten 
Marktgröße: Bei der Untersuchung der Marktgröße zeigt sich das einheitliche Bild einer 
geringeren Marketingintensität in großen Märkten. Dieser Effekt ist vermutlich auf 
Skaleneffekte im Marketing zurückzuführen. Gleichzeitig findet sich in der Studie von Rundfelt 
(1973) ein positiver Einfluss auf die Höhe des Werbebudgets durch die Reichweite des Markts, 
d. h. Unternehmen, die nur einen regionalen und damit kleineren Markt bedienen, betreiben 
weniger Werbung. Ursache für diese widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse ist offenbar die größere 
Reichweite klassischer Werbeträger, so dass regionale Unternehmen eher auf andere 
Marketinginstrumente ausweichen. Um dies validieren zu können, sind allerdings weitere 
Studien notwendig, die auch andere Marketingausgaben mit einbeziehen. 
Marktwachstum: Grundsätzlich ist anzunehmen, dass beständiges und systematisches 
Wachstum verstärktes Marketing rechtfertigt, da es auf einen noch weitestgehend unbedienten 
Markt hindeutet, der das Produkt bisher kaum wahrgenommen hat. Und tatsächlich werden die 
allgemeinen Marktbedingungen von Managern häufig als wichtige Determinante angegeben 
(Jobber 1980). Dennoch zeichnen die meisten empirischen Studien nur einen insignifikanten 
Effekt durch das Marktwachstum auf. Dies könnte eine Folge gegenläufiger negativer Effekte 
durch fehlende gewinnbringende Investitionsmöglichkeiten in niedrig wachsenden Märkten sein 
(Supanvanij 2005). Die Vermutung liegt allerdings näher, dass der Effekt des Marktwachstums 
generell eher gering auf das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten ist, da die Variable schnell 
insignifikant wird, sobald andere Variablen, wie z. B. Produktlebenszyklus, im Modell 
berücksichtigt werden (Farris und Albion 1981). 
Anzahl Kunden: Die Anzahl der Kunden im Markt hat einen eindeutig positiven Einfluss auf 
die Marketingintensität. Dies gilt im Besonderen bei Marketingmaßnahmen, die eine breite 
Kundenerreichung haben (Lilien 1983). Zurückführen lässt sich dieser Effekt vermutlich auf die 
höhere Marketingeffektivität bei größerem Publikum sowie auf ein höheres Marktpotenzial bei 
vielen Endkonsumenten (Farris und Buzzell 1979). Stewart (1996) identifiziert die Anzahl der 
Kunden, die angeben, das Produkt nochmals zu kaufen (Wiederkaufrate), sogar als 
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bedeutsamste Variable zur Erklärung der Marketingintensität. Er vermutet, dass dies auf einen 
stärkeren Fokus des Marketings auf die Bindung der Kunden an das Unternehmen 
zurückzuführen ist. Übereinstimmend zeigt sich auch ein negativer Zusammenhang mit der 
Kundenkonzentration, d. h. dem Anteil des Umsatzes, der auf die größten Kunden entfällt 
(Lilien 1979). 
6.2.4 Wettbewerbsdeterminanten 
Marktdominanz: Die Marktdominanz eines Unternehmens, d. h. dessen relative Größe im 
Markt, meist gemessen als Marktanteil, gilt in der Literatur als einer der bedeutsamsten Treiber 
zur Erklärung der Marketingintensität. Dominante, umsatzstarke Produkte haben 
übereinstimmend größere Marketingbudgets; betrachtet man jedoch die relativen Kennzahlen 
zeigt sich einheitlich ein Rückgang der Marketingintensität mit zunehmender Marktdominanz 
(Lilien und Little 1976). Dies ist eine Folge von Skaleneffekten im Marketing. Der Wertbeitrag 
des Marketing nimmt mit zunehmenden Budget ab, so dass das Marketingbudget nicht 
proportional zum Umsatz bzw. Marktanteil mit ansteigt (Fischer et al. 2011). 
Marktkonzentration: Obwohl das Meinungsbild zur Wirkung der Marktkonzentration in der 
Literatur sehr heterogen ist, scheint sich doch bei einem Vergleich der Studien ein invertiert U-
förmiger Wirkungszusammenhang zu bestätigen. Die Ursache liegt offenbar in den 
gegenläufigen Effekten auf das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten. So trägt nach der 
ökonomischen Theorie Marketing zur Abgrenzung von Konkurrenzprodukten bei und erhöht so 
Eintrittsbarrieren und damit auch die Marktkonzentration (Farris und Buzzell 1979). Zusätzlich 
lässt sich eine größere Marketingeffektivität in konzentrierten Märkten feststellen (Bowman und 
Gatignon 1996). Auf der anderen Seite kann in konzentrierten Märkten die Neigung zu 
kooperativen Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten beobachtet werden, die niedrigere 
Marketingintensitäten zur Folge haben (Ramaswamy, Gatignon und Reibstein 1994). Es ist 
daher anzunehmen, dass kooperatives Verhalten erst möglich wird, wenn sich nur sehr wenige 
Teilnehmer im Markt befinden (Willis und Rogers 1998) und sich der negative Effekt auf die 
Marketingintensität daher erst in hoch konzentrierten Märkten entfaltet. Insgesamt wurde 
allerdings in den bisherigen Studien zu selten auf Nicht-Linearität getestet, so dass dieser 
Befund noch nicht als empirisch gesichert angesehen werden kann. Zudem besteht in der 
Forschung die Überzeugung, dass es sich bei der Marktkonzentration um eine eher unwichtige 
Determinante des Marketingbudgetierungsverhaltens handelt, insbesondere wenn weitere 
Variablen im Modell berücksichtigt werden (Farris und Albion 1981). 
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Anzahl Wettbewerber: Nach der Wettbewerbstheorie steigt mit zunehmender Anzahl der 
Teilnehmer im Markt die Marketingintensität (Scherer und Ross 1990, 594 ff.). Dies scheint 
sich auch in empirischen Studien zu bestätigen, die mehrheitlich eine positive Korrelation der 
Anzahl an Wettbewerbern mit der Marketingintensität feststellen und damit auf eine starke 
Wettbewerbsorientierung der Manager hindeuten (Lilien 1979). Insgesamt bleibt allerdings ein 
heterogenes Bild über die Studien, das sich erst durch einen Blick auf die Budgetallokation 
aufklärt. Bei Marketinginstrumenten, die vor allem zu einer Erweiterung des Marktes beitragen, 
lässt sich mit zunehmender Anzahl an Wettbewerbern Free-Rider-Verhalten, d. h. reduzierte 
Marketinginvestitionen, beobachten. Die Ausgaben in Marketinginstrumenten mit Business-
Stealing-Effekt nehmen hingegen zu (Iizuka 2004). 
Eine weitere signifikante Wirkung auf die Marketingintensität haben die sogenannten 
Multimarktkontakte, d. h. die Anzahl der Märkte auf denen zwei Firmen mit ihrem 
Produktportfolio in Konkurrenz stehen. Es zeigt sich dabei, dass je mehr Multimarktkontakte 
existieren und je ähnlicher sich die Märkte sind, desto geringer ist das Marketingbudget, da die 
Angst vor Vergeltung zu höherer Rücksichtnahme führt (Chen 1996). 
Marketingausgaben der Wettbewerber: Der Einfluss des Wettbewerbs auf die 
Marketingbudgetierung ist bereits durch die wettbewerbsorientierte Budgetierungsmethode 
offensichtlich und bestätigt sich auch in empirischen Studien. Unter der Annahme 
gewinnoptimalen Verhaltens lassen sich häufig deutliche Überreaktionen auf Marketingaktionen 
der Konkurrenz beobachten (Chintagunta und Desiraju 2005). Es scheint die Verbesserung der 
eigenen Position im Vordergrund zu stehen - auch wenn dies zu Lasten des Gewinns geht 
(Chintagunta, Kadiyali und Vilcassim 2006). Eine Ursache hierfür könnte in der Heranziehung 
von Erfolgsgrößen liegen, die in Relation zur Konkurrenz stehen. Ebenso können sie als 
Strafaktion gedacht sein, um die Konkurrenz abzuschrecken (Lynn 1987). Allerdings wurden 
auch Fälle von kooperativen Wettbewerbsverhalten beobachtet (Chintagunta und Desiraju 2005). 
In diesen Fällen steht die Absicht im Vordergrund, Marketingkriege vermeiden zu wollen, so 
dass eine angemessene Reaktion gescheut wird. Die unterschiedlichen Ergebnisse lassen sich 
vor allem auf zwei Interaktionseffekte zurückführen. Zum einen wird die Art der Reaktion 
wesentlich von der Unternehmensgröße beeinflusst. Dominantere Marken werden stärker als 
Bedrohung wahrgenommen, da sie über die notwendigen Ressourcen für einen Marketingkrieg 
verfügen. Die Reaktion auf Aktionen dominanter Marken fällt daher deutlich verhaltener aus 
(Dekimpe und Hanssens 1999). Zum anderen zeigt sich eine geringere Aggressivität in späteren 
Phasen des Produktlebenszyklus, da die Aussicht auf geringe Gewinne in der Reifephase 
Vergeltungsmaßnahmen nicht rechtfertigen (Chen 1996). 




Produktlebenszyklus: Nach der mikroökonomischen Theorie ist es bei einer 
Produktneueinführung zunächst notwendig, intensives Marketing zu betreiben, um mittels 
Carry-Over-Effekten einen hohen Bekanntheitsgrad für das Produkt aufzubauen (Ailawadi, 
Farris und Parry1994). Tatsächlich konnte in vielen empirischen Studien gezeigt werden, dass 
die Marketingintensität bei der Produkteinführung am höchsten ist und in den anschließenden 
Phasen des Produktlebenszyklus kontinuierlich abnimmt. Dementsprechend finden sich in den 
frühen Phasen des Lebenszyklus vor allem Werbemaßnahmen, die die Wahrnehmung der Marke 
erhöhen und auf diese Weise den Diffusionsverlauf beschleunigen sollen (Iizuka 2004). In den 
späteren Phasen wechseln Manager aufgrund zunehmenden Wettbewerbsdrucks auf Promotion-
Maßnahmen (Shankar 2009). Gleichwohl werden in vielen Studien auch insignifikante Effekte 
gemessen, was eine Folge gegenläufiger Effekte sein kann. So gilt in der Wachstumsphase, dass 
Firmen sich zu Free-Riding ermuntert fühlen, während in der Reifephase, ein erhöhter 
Marketingaufwand nötig wird, um in dem wettbewerbsintensiven Markt seine Position 
verteidigen zu können. 
Markteintrittsreihenfolge: Die Eintrittsreihenfolge der Produkte in den Markt wurde bisher 
nur selten empirisch getestet. Es zeigt sich dennoch, dass Pioniere und frühe Folger höhere 
Marketingbudgets aufweisen (Iizuka 2004), was sich vermutlich auf die höhere Effektivität des 
Marketing bei Pionieren zurückführen lässt (Shankar, Carpenter und Krishnamurthi 1998). 
6.2.6 Organisationsdeterminanten 
Organisationsform: Die Studien von Piercy (1987a,b) zeigen einen deutlichen Einfluss der 
Organisationsform auf das Budgetierungsverhalten. Insgesamt lässt sich bei Bottom-Up-
Prozessen eine stärkere Marketingintensität beobachten, die wahrscheinlich auf die geringere 
Kontrolle durch das Topmanagement und die Finanzabteilung, die ein stärkeres Interesse an 
einer Begrenzung des Marketingbudgets haben, zurückzuführen ist. Zusätzlich zeigen 
verschiedene politische Faktoren einen Einfluss auf die Höhe des Budgets. Dieses ist desto 
höher, je politischer der Prozess insgesamt geprägt ist. Ein einheitlicher direkter Einfluss durch 
die Macht der Marketingabteilung konnte hingegen nicht bestätigt werden. 
Budgetierungsmethode: Die Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode auf das Budgetierungsverhalten 
wurde in mehreren Studien untersucht, dennoch konnte sich kein einheitliches Bild durchsetzen. 
Grundsätzlich scheint allerdings die gewinnorientierte Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Methode eine 
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stärkere Marketingintensität zu bewirken (Gilligan 1977), während die Budgets bei Anwendung 
kostenorientierter Ansätze deutlich kleiner sind (Piercy 1987a). 
Partizipation am Geschäftserfolg: Die Effekte auf das Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten 
durch die Partizipation der Manager am Unternehmenserfolg wurde in der empirischen 
Forschung mit zwei unterschiedlichen Konstrukten untersucht. Zum einen wurde gezeigt, dass 
der Zusammenhang der Marketingintensität mit der Höhe des Besitzanteils der Manager am 
Unternehmen einem invertiert U-förmigen Zusammenhang folgt. Diese Beobachtung ist im 
Einklang mit der Agency-Theorie, nach der zwei gegenläufige Effekte auftreten. Zum einen 
konvergieren mit zusätzlichem Besitzanteil die Interessen von Management und Eigentümer 
und führen zu geringerer Marketingintensität, was unter der Annahme des häufig zu 
beobachteten ‚Overspendings’ mit einem effizienteren Marketingeinsatz vergleichbar ist. Zum 
anderen treten allerdings nicht-lineare Entfremdungseffekte auf, die zu suboptimalen Effekten 
und zu hohen Ausgaben führen (z.B. Empire Building). Die Entfremdungseffekte sind bei sehr 
niedrigem Besitzanteil kaum vorhanden, da Marktdisziplin den Manager zu optimalem 
Verhalten nötigt. Mit wachsendem Einfluss der Manager neigen diese jedoch zu suboptimalem, 
ihren Interessen folgendem, Verhalten. Durch die Überlagerung überwiegen bei geringem 
Besitzanteil die positiven Effekte, bei mittlerem die negativen und bei hohem wieder die 
positiven Effekte. 
Zum anderen wird anhand des Bonussystems der Managerbelohnung gezeigt, dass je mehr der 
Wohlstand eines Managers an den langfristigen Unternehmenserfolg anstatt den kurzfristigen 
Gewinn gebunden ist, desto mehr wird für Marketing ausgegeben (Corfman und Lehmann 
1994). So führen kurzfristige Kompensationen, z. B. Gehalt und Bonus, zu einer Reduktion der 
Marketingintensität, während hingegen eine langfristige Kompensation durch Optionen die 
Marketingintensität erhöht, auch um die Volatilität des Aktienkurses des Unternehmens und 
damit den Wert der Option zu erhöhen (Supanvanij 2005). 
6.3 Zusammenfassung 
Zusammenfassend lassen sich damit die folgenden wichtigen empirischen Generalisierungen zu 
Einflussfaktoren der Marketingbudgetierung festhalten:  
- Produkte von höherer Qualität weisen eine stärkere Marketingintensität auf, was eine 
bessere Kommunikation der Vorteile des Produkts ermöglicht. 
- Häufig gekaufte Produkte werden weniger stark beworben, da es sich hier wohl meist 
um standardisierte Produkte des Alltags handelt, bei denen sich der Konsument in seiner 
Kaufentscheidung verstärkt auf seine eigene Erfahrung stützt. 
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- Freies verfügbares Kapital, z. B. infolge einer hohen Profitabilität, wird (teilweise) in 
verstärktes Marketing investiert. 
- Bei Unternehmen, die einen großen Markt bedienen bzw. eine dominante Marktstellung 
besitzen, finden sich geringere Marketingintensitäten, während eine breite Kundenbasis 
gleichzeitig die Marketingintensität erhöht. 
- Grundsätzlich lässt sich eine starke Wettbewerbsorientierung der Manager feststellen, 
die zu einer stärkeren Marketingintensität bei einer größeren Anzahl an Wettbewerbern 
bzw. bei größeren Marketinginvestitionen durch die Konkurrenz führt. 
- Ein Unternehmen investiert desto weniger in das Marketing, je stärker der Einfluss des 
Topmanagements im Budgetierungsprozess ist und je kurzfristiger geplant wird. 
7 Determinanten der Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode 
7.1 Untersuchungsrahmen 
Allgemein untersucht die empirische Literatur Determinanten der Wahl der 
Budgetierungsmethode über eine Analyse von Zusammenhängen zwischen Manageraussagen zu 
angewendeten Methoden sowie gleichzeitig erhobenen exogenen Faktoren, z. B. Markt- oder 
Unternehmenseigenschaften. Hier lassen sich zwei Untersuchungsansätze identifizieren. Der 
erste analysiert direkt Korrelationen zwischen Präferenzen für einzelne Regeln und exogenen 
Faktoren. Dabei existiert in vielen Studien ein Fokus auf der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel, um 
Determinanten zu identifizieren, die die Anwendung differenzierter Budgetierungsmethoden 
fördern. Beim zweiten Ansatz werden Unternehmen auf der Basis ihrer Angaben zu 
verwendeten Methoden hinsichtlich ihres Komplexitätsgrads im Budgetierungsverhalten 
bewertet und dieses Maß in Relation zu exogenen Faktoren untersucht. Aus dem Ergebnis 
lassen sich ebenfalls Determinanten identifizieren, die eine bessere Budgetierungspraxis fördern. 
Einen anderen Weg gehen Wagner und Fischer (2011), die die Kritik aufgreifen, dass 
Managerumfragen infolge verschiedener Verzerrungseffekte und Ungenauigkeiten, wie z. B. 
dem Key Informant Bias, nur begrenzt aussagefähig sind (Armstrong und Overton 1973). Aus 
diesem Grund untersuchen sie anstelle des in Umfragen geäußerten Willens von Managern das 
tatsächliche Budgetierungsverhalten. Dazu werden die Budgetierungsmethoden formalisiert, ihr 
Einfluss auf die Bestimmung der Marketingbudgets geschätzt und anschließend die Wirkung 
exogener Faktoren auf den Einfluss der einzelnen Methoden analysiert. 
  
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 23 
 
 
7.2 Determinanten der Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode 
Die Anzahl der empirischen Studien, die Einflussfaktoren auf die Wahl der 
Budgetierungsmethode untersuchen, ist eher gering, so dass eine Ableitung allgemeingültiger 
Aussagen aus  einem Vergleich dieser Studien mit Vorsicht zu betrachten ist. Dennoch lassen 
sich bei den meisten Determinanten deutliche Muster erkennen, die im Folgenden diskutiert 
werden. Tabelle 3 bietet dazu einen Überblick über Ergebnisse empirischer Studien hinsichtlich 
der Wirkung von Faktoren auf die Anwendung komplexer Budgetierungsmethoden, d. h. im 
Besonderen auf eine Anwendung der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel. 
Tabelle 3: Anzahl der Studien, die einen signifikanten Einfluss durch die Determinanten 
auf die Anwendung komplexer Budgetierungsmethoden feststellen 
  Einfluss auf die Anwendung komplexer 
Budgetierungsmethoden 
  Linear Nicht linear 
Determinante Konzeptualisierung Positiv Negativ Positiv Negativ Nicht 
signifikant 
Produktkategorie Konsumgüter 6 (55%)    5 (45%) 
 Langlebigkeit des 
Produkts 
1 (50 %) 1 (50 %)    
Profitabilität  6 (86%)    1 (14%) 
Marktdominanz  7 (70%)    3 (30%) 
Marktkonzentration 2 (100%)      
Marktwachstum  2 (67%)    1 (33%) 
Produktlebens-
zyklus 
Zeit im Markt  1 (100%)    
Markteintritts-
reihenfolge 










  1 (100%)   
Langfristigkeit d. 
Belohnung 
3 (100%)     
Anmerkung: Die Angaben in Klammern zeigen, wie viele der Studien, die diese Determinante untersucht haben, 
einen entsprechenden Effekt gemessen haben. Für Detailinformationen zu den empirischen Ergebnissen siehe die 
Tabellen 8a/b sowie 9 im Appendix. 
7.2.1 Produktdeterminanten 
Produktkategorie: Managerumfragen identifizieren die Produktkategorie als eine der 
wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren bei der Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode (Mitchell 1993). 
Konsumgüterhersteller haben dabei am schnellsten auf die Veränderungen eines stärkeren 
Wettbewerbs und sich wandelnder Marktbedingungen reagiert und bereits früh komplexere 
Budgetierungsmethoden übernommen. Industriegüterhersteller sowie Dienstleister wendeten 
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hingegen länger einfache Regeln an, übernehmen aber nun verzögert ebenfalls zunehmend 
komplexere Budgetierungsmethoden (Miles, White und Munilla 1997); obgleich die 
finanzkraftorientierte Regel noch immer die stärkste Verbreitung findet. Dies mag an der 
traditionell wichtigeren Rolle des Marketing zur Stimulierung der Nachfrage bei Konsumgütern 
liegen. Der Trend zu komplexen Budgetierungsmethoden scheint bei langlebigen Konsumgütern 
besonders stark ausgeprägt zu sein (Ramaseshan 1990), während bei FMCG einfache Methoden, 
wie der finanzkraft- oder der wettbewerbsorientierte Ansatz stärker verwendet werden (West 
und Hung 1993). Insgesamt findet sich allerdings in zu vielen Studien ein insignifikanter 
Einfluss der Produktkategorie, als dass die beobachteten Effekte als empirisch generalisierbar 
angesehen werden könnten. 
7.2.2 Preisdeterminanten 
Profitabilität: Die Profitabilität eines Unternehmens gilt als ein Schlüsseltreiber der 
Anwendung komplexer Budgetierungsmethoden (Lynch und Hooley 1990). Insbesondere die 
Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Methode findet bei profitablen Unternehmen breite Anwendung (Parry, 
Parry und Farris 1991). Die Ursache mag in den größeren Ressourcen profitabler Firmen liegen, 
die ihnen die Anwendung differenzierter Methoden erleichtern (West und Crouch 2007). 
Angesichts höherer Profitmargen ist auch der Anreiz, komplexere Methoden anzuwenden, 
größer, da bei einer Ausweitung der Nachfrage der zu erwartende Gewinn umso stärker steigt. 
7.2.3 Marktdeterminanten 
Marktwachstum: In einer Umfrage von Prendergast, West und Shi (2006) gab die Mehrzahl 
der befragten Manager an, dass sie ihre Budgetierungsmethode wechseln, wenn sie im 
Angesicht von geringen Wachstums- bzw. Schrumpfungsraten des Marktes unter 
Profitabilitätsdruck geraten. Während bei hohem Wachstum der Strategiefokus auf 
Ausschöpfung der Möglichkeiten liegt, die eine vermehrte Anwendung der Ziele-und-
Aufgaben-Regel zur Folge hat, konzentrieren sich Unternehmen bei niedrigem Wachstum oder 
Schrumpfung auf Kostenkontrolle bzw. Verteidigung der Marktposition durch z. B. die Prozent-
vom-Umsatz-Regel bzw. den wettbewerbsorientierten Ansatz (Mitchell 1993). Auch wenn sich 
dies in empirischen Studien grundsätzlich bestätigt, ist hier noch weiterer Forschungsbedarf 
notwendig. 
7.2.4 Wettbewerbsdeterminanten 
Marktdominanz: Die empirische Literatur stimmt mehrheitlich darin überein, dass große und 
dominante Firmen mehrheitlich komplexere Budgetierungsmethoden anwenden, im Besonderen 
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die Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel (Hung und West 1991). Dies würde die Prämisse unterstützen, 
dass größere Unternehmen ein stärkeres Interesse in Best Practice haben. Vermutlich lässt sich 
dies auf die breitere Verfügbarkeit umfangreicher Datensätze sowie die Existenz eines 
Operations Department, das zur Entwicklung und Schätzung von quantitativen Modellen 
benötigt wird, zurückführen (Parry, Parry und Farris 1991). Gleichzeitig besteht die Möglichkeit, 
dass eine in vielen größeren Unternehmen vorherrschende Produktvielfalt die Anwendung 
fortschrittlicher Budgetierungspraktiken ergibt. Dennoch finden sich in einigen Studien 
insignifikante Effekte, die eventuell darauf zurückzuführen sind, dass mit der Zeit vermehrt 
auch Unternehmen mittlerer Größe die Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel anwenden (Miles, White und 
Munilla 1997). 
Marktkonzentration: Die empirische Literatur offenbart eine Präferenz für differenzierte 
Methoden in hoch konzentrierten Märkten, während bei vielen Wettbewerbern eher einfache 
Regeln angewendet werden. Aufgrund des offensichtlichen Zusammenhangs der 
Marktkonzentration mit der Größe der Unternehmen ist dies vermutlich auf die gleichen Effekte 
wie bei der Marktdominanz zurückzuführen, wonach große Unternehmen die notwendigen 
Ressourcen für die differenzierte Bestimmung von Budgets besitzen (Parry, Parry und Farris 
1991). 
7.2.5 Zeitdeterminanten 
Produktlebenszyklus: Über die Hälfte der befragten Manager in der Studie von Mitchell (1993) 
bestätigen, dass sie bei neu eingeführten Produkten andere Budgetierungsmethoden anwenden 
als bei etablierten. Es zeigt sich dabei eine verstärkte Anwendung der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-
Regel in den späteren Phasen des Lebenszyklus, die darauf hindeutet, dass Produkte während 
ihrer Reifephase mit einem differenzierten Marketingprogramm begleitet werden. Hintergrund 
ist vermutlich ein erhöhter Konkurrenzdruck infolge einer stagnierenden oder sinkenden 
Marktgröße (Wagner und Fischer 2011). Es bedarf hier jedoch noch weiterer empirischer 
Forschung um generalisierbare Ergebnisse ableiten zu können. 
Markteintrittsreihenfolge: Die Anwendung differenzierter Budgetierungsmethoden findet sich 
eindeutig häufiger bei Pionieren. Dies wird auf die eher marktdominierende Position früher 
Markteintritte zurückgeführt, die infolge ihrer Größe auf die notwendigen Ressourcen eines 
komplexen Budgetierungsverfahrens zurückgreifen können (Wagner und Fischer 2011). 
Allerdings besteht hier ebenfalls noch weiterer Forschungsbedarf. 
  




Organisationsform: Es zeigt sich deutlich, dass bei einem starken Einfluss durch das 
Topmanagement bei einem eher Top-Down geprägten Prozess einfache Methoden wie die 
managementerfahrungsbasierte oder die finanzkraftorientierte Regel den Budgetierungsprozess 
dominieren. Gleichzeitig findet sich bei einer Bottom-Up-Prozessstruktur und einem stärkeren 
Einfluss der Marketingabteilungen eine vermehrte Anwendung der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-
Methode. Durch die verstärkte Interaktion mehrerer Abteilungen entsteht eine differenziertere 
Budgetallokation (Prendergast, West und Shi 2006). Parry, Parry und Farris (1991) weisen 
allerdings darauf hin, dass der Einfluss der Prozessstruktur insignifikant wird, sobald im Modell 
politische Faktoren berücksichtigt werden. Vermutlich ist daher der gemessene Effekt eher den 
bei diesen Organisationsformen typischen politischen Einflüssen zuzuschreiben. Daraus lässt 
sich auch ableiten, dass je stärker ein Prozess durch politische Einflussnahmen geprägt ist, desto 
eher wird die Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel angewendet. Dieses Ergebnis ist im Einklang mit der 
Vermutung, dass diese Methode vor allem als Instrument einflussreicher Akteure verwendet 
wird, um eigene Ziele durchzusetzen (Piercy 1987a). 
Budgetierungsmethode: Korrelationsanalysen offenbaren, dass Methoden häufig in 
Kombination Anwendung finden. Sehr häufig zeigt sich dabei die Kombination der Anwendung 
von der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Methode mit der finanzkraftorientierten Regel (Lynch und Hooley 
1990) oder mit wissenschaftlichen Optimierungsmethoden (Parry, Parry und Farris 1991). 
Ebenso findet sich auch eine verstärkte gemeinsame Anwendung des wettbewerbsorientierten 
Ansatzes mit Optimierungsmethoden (Miles, White und Munilla 1997). 
Partizipation am Geschäftserfolg: Empirisch wurde bestätigt, dass die Anwendung komplexer 
und differenzierter Budgetierungsmethoden verbreiteter ist, wenn das Management langfristiger 
orientiert ist, z. B. durch ein gesteigertes Bewusstsein für die langfristige Werbung des 
Marketing und die Orientierung am langfristigen Unternehmenserfolg (Low und Mohr 1999). 
Zusätzlich zeigen Joseph und Richardson (2002) in ihrer Studie, dass die Annahmen der 
Agency-Theorie in Bezug auf die Wirkung des Grads des Besitzanteils von Managern am 
Unternehmen auch auf die Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode zutreffen. So finden sich 
gegenläufige Konvergenz- und Entfremdungseffekte, die dazu führen, dass die Neigung 
differenziertere Methoden anzuwenden, bei mittlerem Grad am Besitzanteil am höchsten ist, 
während bei niedrigem oder hohem Grad eher kostenorientiert budgetiert wird. 
  




Zusammenfassend lassen sich damit die folgenden wichtigen empirischen Generalisierungen zu 
Einflussfaktoren der Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode festhalten:  
- Profitablere Unternehmen wenden mehrheitlich komplexere Budgetierungsmethoden an, 
was sich vermutlich auf die Verfügbarkeit einer breiteren Ressourcenbasis, die für eine 
komplexe Budgetierungspraxis notwendig ist, sowie höherer Anreize durch die größere 
Profitmarge zurückführen lässt. 
- Bei (großen) Unternehmen in hochkonzentrierten Märkten findet sich eine breitere 
Anwendung komplexer Budgetierungsmethoden, was vermutlich ebenfalls auf die 
breitere Ressourcenbasis zurückgeführt werden kann. 
- Je stärker ein Budgetierungsentscheidungsprozess Bottom-Up orientiert ist und je stärker 
dieser durch politische Einflussnahme geprägt ist, desto mehr findet die Ziele-und-
Aufgaben-Regel Anwendung. 
8 Kritische Würdigung der empirischen Forschung 
8.1 Inhaltliche Kritik 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich im Rahmen des zugrunde gelegten konzeptionellen Bezugsrahmens 
festhalten, dass ein umfangreicher Erkenntnisstand über die Einflussfaktoren der 
Marketingbudgetierung besteht. Dennoch lassen sich folgende Kritikpunkte festhalten, die 
Ansatzpunkte für die zukünftige Forschung liefern. 
8.1.1 Budgetierungsmethoden 
Berücksichtigung politischer Einflussfaktoren: Greift man das Ergebnis von Piercy (1987b) 
auf, wonach politische Faktoren einen deutlich größeren Erklärungsbeitrag zur Ausgestaltung 
des Marketingbudgets liefern als die reinen Budgetierungsmethoden, sind die 
Umfrageergebnisse zur Anwendung von Budgetierungsheuristiken nur begrenzt aussagefähig 
und unterliegen der Gefahr einer Verzerrung. Ein stärkerer Fokus auf politische und strukturelle 
Faktoren und dessen Berücksichtigung in Managementbefragungen könnten einen Beitrag zur 
Entwicklung eines umfassenden Erklärungskonzepts des Budgetierungsverhaltens liefern, aus 
dem sich auch der theoretische Unterbau eines Modells zur empirischen Analyse der 
Marketingintensität bzw. -allokation ableiten ließe. 
Untersuchung der Wirkung des Einsatzes von Budgetierungsmethoden auf 
Erfolgskennzahlen: Die deskriptive Analyse des Marketingbudgetierungsverhaltens besitzt den 
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Anspruch aus dem beobachtbaren Verhalten von (erfolgreichen) Unternehmen Richtlinien und 
Implikationen für eine erfolgreiche Budgetierung ableiten zu können. Eine direkte 
Untersuchung des Budgetierungsverhaltens auf verschiedene Erfolgskennzahlen ist bisher 
allerdings noch nicht vorgenommen worden, obgleich sich hieraus wesentlich deutlicher 
Erfolgsfaktoren der Marketingbudgetierung identifizieren ließen. So ist zu beobachten, dass 
Marketingbudgetentscheidungen Kapitalmarktreaktionen auslösen (Srinivasan und Hanssens 
2008). Daher könnte eine Untersuchung der kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkungen am 
Kapitalmarkt durch bestimmte Budgetierungspraktiken einen wesentlich tieferen Einblick 
liefern. 
8.1.2 Determinanten der Marketingintensität 
Unzureichende theoretische Fundierung: Die Modelle in den empirischen Untersuchungen 
sind selten mit einer theoretischen Basis verknüpft. Das ist im Besonderen verwunderlich, da die 
Theorie zur Marketingbudgetierung zahlreiche Anknüpfungspunkte liefert. In der Konsequenz 
unterbleiben damit meist eine Überprüfung theoretischer Ergebnisse sowie eine systematische 
Darstellung der empirischen Einzelbefunde. 
Unvollständigkeit von Untersuchungsmodellen: Der konzeptionelle Bezugsrahmen stellt 
verschiedene mögliche Einflussfaktoren auf die Marketingbudgetierung dar. Eine auch nur 
annähernd vollständige Untersuchung zu den Erfolgsfaktoren, d. h. ein interdependentes 
Gesamtmodell, liegt jedoch bisher nicht vor. Daher muss kritisch hinterfragt werden, ob 
aufgezeigte Einflussfaktoren auf die Budgetierung nicht durch unberücksichtigte Variablen 
(Omitted Variable Bias) verzerrt dargestellt werden (Ailawadi, Farris und Parry 1994). 
Generalisierbarkeit der empirischen Ergebnisse: Die meisten der diskutierten Determinanten 
der Marketingintensität können durch die Ergebnisse mehrerer empirischer Studien als 
generalisierbar angesehen werden. Dennoch lässt eine zu hohe Heterogenität in den Ergebnissen 
oder ein zu geringer Untersuchungsumfang Unsicherheiten über die Wirkung einiger Faktoren. 
Im Besonderen bei den Faktoren „Hidden Values“, Profitabilität auf Industrieebene sowie 
Marketingausgaben der Wettbewerber lassen sich heterogene Ergebnisse beobachten. Ursache 
könnten unterliegende moderierende Effekte oder nicht-lineare Wirkungszusammenhänge sein, 
die es zu erforschen gilt. Der Einfluss eines regionalen Marktbezugs sowie der 
Organisationsform ist hingegen noch sehr wenig erforscht worden, so dass mangels einer 
ausreichenden Anzahl empirischer Ergebnisse nur bedingt allgemeingültige Aussagen abgeleitet 
werden können. 
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Konzeptualisierung von Faktoren: Die Fähigkeit, die Wirkung exogener Einflüsse auf das 
Marketingbudgetierungsverhalten zu schätzen, ist immer begrenzt durch die Fähigkeit, diese zu 
konzeptualisieren. So zeigt ein Vergleich der einzelnen Studien, dass die Effekte, die im 
Rahmen der empirischen Untersuchungen abgebildet werden sollen, unterschiedlich 
operationalisiert werden. Bisweilen findet sich sogar eine weitere Aufgliederung der Effekte in 
Teilfaktoren, die verschiedene Aspekte des Effekts innerhalb eines Modells abbilden. Ebenso 
findet sich eine Mischung von Faktoren, bei der mehrere Effekte durch eine Variable dargestellt 
werden (Farris, Shames und Reibstein 1998). Wiederum bei anderen Einflüssen, z. B. der 
Marktstruktur, ist noch überhaupt kein Faktor gefunden worden, dem eine hinreichende 
Abbildung gelingen würde (Lee 2002). Aus diesem Grund bedarf das Modell einer gründlichen 
Spezifikation, um aus den mathematischen Ergebnissen die wahren empirischen 
Zusammenhänge und Beziehungen zu identifizieren. 
Untersuchung nicht-linearer Kausalzusammenhänge: Einige frühere Studien haben nicht-
lineare Wirkungszusammenhänge einzelner Determinanten auf die Bestimmung der 
Marketingbudgets festgestellt (z. B. Keown et al. 1989). Es ist überraschend, dass diese 
Ergebnisse mit Ausnahme der Marktkonzentration in späteren Studien nicht mehr aufgegriffen 
werden, obwohl sie teilweise einen sinnvollen Beitrag zur Erklärung von widersprüchlichen 
Ergebnissen liefern. Weiterführende Studien sollten daher auch nicht-lineare Zusammenhänge 
untersuchen, um bereits gefundene Ergebnisse zu validieren oder ähnliche Verläufe bei weiteren 
Determinanten festzustellen. 
Aufgliederung der Preiseffekte auf die Marketingintensität: Die Ergebnisse zum Preis als 
Erklärungsfaktor der Marketingintensität sprechen dafür, in zukünftigen Modellen mit 
produktübergreifenden Datensätzen, ähnlich wie bei Farris und Buzzell (1979), sowohl den 
relativen Preis als auch den absoluten Preis des Produkts zu berücksichtigen um die 
widersprüchlichen Effekte separat abbilden zu können. Dies könnte mögliche 
Verzerrungseffekte vermeiden und die Ergebnisse von Farris und Buzzell (1979) validieren. 
8.1.3 Determinanten der Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode 
Generalisierbarkeit der empirischen Ergebnisse zu Determinanten der Wahl der 
Budgetierungsmethode: Insgesamt ist das Feld der Einflussfaktoren auf die Wahl der 
Budgetierungsmethode noch zu wenig erforscht. Einige der im Rahmen dieses Beitrags 
diskutierten Ergebnisse zu den einzelnen Determinanten lassen sich auf nur ein oder zwei 
Studien zurückführen. Dies gilt im Besonderen für die Aussagen zu den Effekten der 
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Langlebigkeit eines Produkts, dem Produktlebenszyklus, der Markteintrittsreihenfolge sowie der 
Partizipation des Managements am Unternehmenserfolg, bei denen nur eine geringe Anzahl 
empirischer Ergebnisse vorliegt. Hier besteht noch dringender weiterer Forschungsbedarf. 
Ebenso bleiben regionale Einflüsse auf die Wahl der Budgetierungsmethode undurchsichtig, da 
Studien widersprüchliche oder insignifikante Effekte feststellen. Bigné (1995) führt dies auf 
Fehler bei der Datengrundlage zurück, da zu viele multinationale Unternehmen die Effekte 
verzerren. 
8.2 Methodische Kritik 
Einheitlichkeit der Forschungsmethode bei Untersuchung der Budgetierungsmethoden: 
Studien zur Anwendung von Budgetierungsmethoden in Unternehmen sollten eine 
einheitlichere Forschungsmethode anwenden, um die Vergleichbarkeit zwischen den Studien zu 
erhöhen und Trends besser erkennen zu können. So lassen sich teilweise große Unterschiede 
hinsichtlich der Methodik der Datensammlung, dem Fragebogendesign, der befragten 
Grundgesamtheit und abgefragten Budgetierungsmethoden finden, was eine mögliche Erklärung 
für die Heterogenität in den Studienergebnissen sein könnte. Darüber hinaus ist es nicht möglich, 
den Einfluss der einzelnen angewendeten Regeln auf den Marketingbudgetierungsprozess zu 
identifizieren (Mitchell 1993). Dies impliziert auch eine Untersuchung der genauen Umsetzung 
einzelner Regeln, da insbesondere bei der Ziele-und-Aufgaben-Regel Unsicherheit über eine 
genaue Anwendung durch die Manager besteht.  
Key Informant Bias: Die Umfrageergebnisse zum Budgetierungsverhalten eines 
Unternehmens basieren ausschließlich auf den Aussagen eines Unternehmensrepräsentanten, der 
meist dem Topmanagement angehört. Allerdings partizipieren unzählige Manager auf 
verschiedenen Hierarchieebenen und in verschiedenen Abteilungen am Budgetierungsprozess. 
Es kann daher davon ausgegangen werden, dass je nach Unternehmensposition und –funktion 
sowie je nach Kenntnisstand die Einstellung zur Marketingbudgetierung variiert. Diese 
unterschiedlichen Perspektiven innerhalb eines Unternehmens werden durch den Key Informant 
Bias nicht abgebildet.  
Berücksichtigung des mehrstufigen Charakters des Budgetierungsprozesses: Studien zum 
Budgetierungsverhalten ignorieren mit wenigen Ausnahme (z. B. Iizuka 2004) den mehrstufigen 
Charakter des Budgetierungsprozesses. So wird die erste Stufe, d. h. ob das Produkt überhaupt 
beworben werden soll, nicht modelliert. Es wäre ratsam, diesem Wesenszug des Prozesses 
Rechnung zu tragen, indem z. B. die erste Stufe mittels eines Logit-Modells abgebildet wird. 
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Daraus ließen sich weitere Einsichten zu den Determinanten des Budgetierungsprozesses und 
ihren Einfluss in den einzelnen Schritten der Budgetbestimmung sammeln. 
Berücksichtigung von Endogenität: Ein methodisches Problem stellt die Simultanität 
zwischen dem Marketingbudget und vielen Einflussfaktoren dar. So konnte bereits ein 
Endogenitätsproblem für den Zusammenhang von der Höhe des Marketingbudgets und der 
Profitabilität eines Unternehmens empirisch gezeigt werden (Amadi 2005). Eine Nicht-
Berücksichtigung dieses Problems hat verzerrte Schätzergebnisse zur Folge. Da nur sehr wenige 
Studien sich diesem Problem angenommen haben, besteht daher die Gefahr, dass die im 
Rahmen dieses Beitrags diskutierten Ergebnisse der Verzerrung unterliegen. Weitere Studien 
müssten mögliche Simultanitäten identifizieren, so dass diese in zukünftigen 
Budgetierungsstudien berücksichtigt werden können (Moorthy und Zhao 2000). 
Beschreibung der Datengrundlage: Die Ergebnisse von Blasko und Patti (1984) deuten auf 
einen hohen Grad der Ungenauigkeit bei der Abgrenzung von Marketingbudgets hin. Es ist 
anzunehmen, dass Widersprüche und Unterschiede in den Ergebnisse auch eine Folge von 
Ungenauigkeiten bei der Datenerfassung sein können. Es ist daher dringend anzuraten, dass die 
Datengrundlage von Studien genauer beschrieben wird, um Rückschlüsse und Erklärungen für 
mögliche Widersprüche in den Ergebnissen zu finden. 
 




Ailawadi, Kusum L., Paul W. Farris und Mark E. Parry (1994): Share and Growth are Not Good 
Predictors of the Advertising and Promotion/Sales Ratio, Journal of Marketing, 58(1), 86-97. 
Amadi, Confidence W. (2005): Advertising Expenditure and Firm Profitability: An Investigation, 
Academy of Marketing Studies Journal, 9(1), 3-19. 
Armstrong, J. Scott und Terry S. Overton (1973): Estimating Non-response Bias in Mail Surveys, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 14(3), 396-402. 
Balasubramanian, Siva K. und Vinay Kumar (1990): Analyzing Variations in Advertising and 
Promotional Expenditures: Key Correlates in Consumer, Industrial and Service Markets. Journal 
of Marketing, 54(2), 57-68. 
Barzen, Dietmar (1990): Marketing-Budgetierung, Frankfurt am Main et al., Peter Lang. 
Bigné, J. Enrique (1995): Advertising Budget Practices: A Review, Journal of Current Issues 
and Research in Advertising, 17(2), 17-31. 
Blasko, Vincent J. und Charles H. Patti (1984): The Advertising Budgeting Practices of 
Industrial Marketers, Journal of Marketing, 48(4), 104-110. 
Bowman, Douglas und Hubert Gatignon (1996): Order of Entry as a Moderator of the Effect of 
Marketing Mix on Market Share, Marketing Science, 15(3), 222-242. 
Cable, John (1972): Market Structure, Advertising Policy, and Intermarket Differences in 
Advertising Intensity, in: Keith Cowling (Hrsg.): Market Structure and Corporate Behavior, 
London, Gray-Mills, 107-124. 
Chen, M. (1996): Competitor analysis and interfirm rivalry: Toward a theoretical integration, 
Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 100-134. 
Chintagunta, Pradeep K. (1993): Investigating the Sensitivity of Equlibrium Profits to 
Advertising Dynamics and Competitive Effects, Management Science, 38(3), 287-306. 
Chintagunta, Pradeep K. und Ramarao Desiraju (2005): Strategic Pricing und Detailing Behavior 
in International Markets, Marketing Science, 24(1), 67-80.  
Chintagunta, Pradeep K., Vrinda Kadiyali und Naufel J. Vilcassim (2006): Endogeneity and 
Simultaneity in Competitive Pricing and Advertising: A Logit Demand Analysis, Journal of 
Business, 79(6), 2761-2787. 
Corfman, Kim P. und Donald R. Lehmann (1994): The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Role of 
Information in Setting Advertising Budgets, Journal of Advertising, 23(2), 35-47. 
Dorfman, Robert und Peter O. Steiner (1954): Optimal Advertising and Optimal Quality, 
American Economic Review, 44(5), 826-836. 
Dekimpe, M. und Dominique M. Hanssens (1999): Sustained spending and persistent response: 
A new look at long-term marketing profitability, Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 397-412. 
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 33 
 
 
Farris, Paul W. und Mark S. Albion (1981): Determinants of the Advertising-to-Sales Ratio, 
Journal of Advertising Research, 21, 19-27. 
Farris, Paul W. und Robert D. Buzzell (1979): Why Advertising and Promotional Costs Vary: 
Some Cross-Sectional Analyses, Journal of Marketing, 43, 112-122. 
Farris, Paul W., Shames, Ervin R. und David J. Reibstein (1998): Advertising Budgeting: A 
Report from the Field, New York, American Association of Advertising Agencies. 
Fischer, Marc, Sönke Albers, Nils Wagner und Monika Frie (2011): Dynamic Marketing Budget 
Allocation across Countries, Products, and Marketing Activities, Marketing Science, 30(4), 568-
585. 
Gilligan, Colin (1977): How British Advertisers Set Budgets, Journal of Advertising Research, 
17(1), 47-49. 
Gönül, Füsun F., Franklin Carter, Elina Petrova und Kannan Srinivasan (2001): Promotion of 
Prescription Drugs and Its Impact on Physicians’ Choice Behavior, Journal of Marketing, 65(3), 
79-90. 
Hanmer-Loyd, Stuart und Sheryl Kennedy (1981): Setting and Allocating the Communications 
Budgets, Cranfield Business School: Marketing Communications Research Centre. 
Hung, C.L. und Douglas C. West (1991): Advertising Budgeting Methods in Canada, the UK 
and the US, International Journal of Advertising, 10(3), 239-250. 
Iizuka, Toshiaki (2004): What Explains the Use of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs?, Journal of Industrial Economics, 52(3),349-379. 
Jobber, D. (1980): Advertising Budgeting – How Industrial Goods Companies Decide, 
Management Decision, 18(5), 276-279. 
Joseph, Kissan und Vernon J. Richardson (2002): Free Cash Flow, Agency Costs, and the 
Affordability Method of Advertising Budgeting, Journal of Marketing, 66(1), 94-107. 
Keown, Charles F., Nicolas E. Synodinos, Laurence W. Jacobs und Reginald Worthley (1989): 
Transnational Advertising-to-Sales Ratios: Do They Follow the Rules?, International Journal of 
Advertising, 8, 375-382. 
Lee, Chang-Yang (2002): Adverting, Its Determinants and Market Structure, Review of 
Industrial Organization, 21, 89-101. 
Lilien, Gary L. (1979): Advisor 2: Modelling the Marketing Mix Decision for Industrial Products, 
Management Science, 25(2), 191-204. 
Lilien, Gary L. (1983): A Descriptive Model of the Trade-Show Budgeting Decision Process, 
Industrial Marketing Management, 12, 25-29. 
Lilien, Gary L. und John D. C. Little (1976): The Advisor Project: A Study of Industrial 
Marketing Budgets, Sloan Management Review, 17(3), 17-33.  
Low, George S. und Jakki J. Mohr (1999): Setting Advertising and Promotion Budgets in Multi-
Brand Companies, Journal of Advertising Research, 39(1), 67-78. 
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 34 
 
 
Low, George S. und Jakki J. Mohr (2000): Advertising vs sales promotion: a brand management 
perspective, Journal of Product & Brand Management, 9(6), 389-414. 
Lynn, Robert A. (1987): Anticipating competitive reaction: Marketing strategy in the 1980s, 
Journal of Consumer Marketing, 4(1), 5-12. 
Lynch, James E. und Graham J. Hooley (1990): Increasing Sophistication in Advertising Budget 
Setting, Journal of Advertising Research, 30(1), 67-75. 
Manchanda, Puneet, Peter E. Rossi und Pradeep K. Chintagunta (2004): Response Modeling 
with Nonrandom Marketing-Mix Variables, Journal of Marketing Research, 41(4), 467-478. 
Martenson, Rita (1989): International Advertising Budgeting Practices, Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 5(2), 137-147. 
Miles, Morgan P., John B. White und Linda S. Munilla (1997): Advertising Budgeting Practices 
in Agribusiness: The Case of Farmer Cooperatives, Industrial Marketing Management, 26, 31-40. 
Mitchell, Lionel A. (1993): An Examination of Methods of Setting Advertising Budgets: 
Practice and the Literature, European Journal of Marketing, 27(5), 5-21. 
Moorthy, Sridhar und Hao Zhao (2000): Advertising Spending and Perceived Quality, Marketing 
Letters, 11(3), 221-223. 
Nerlove, Marc und Kenneth J. Arrow (1962): Optimal Advertising Policy under Dynamic 
Conditions, Economica, 29(114), 129-142. 
Parry, Mark, Arthur E. Parry und Paul W. Farris (1991): Marketing Budgeting in Nonprofit 
Hospitals, Journal of Health Care Marketing, 11(2), 2-13. 
Piercy, Nigel (1986): The Politics of Setting an Advertising Budget, International Journal of 
Advertising, 5(4), 281-305. 
Piercy, Nigel (1987a): Advertising Budgeting: Process and Structure as Explanatory Variables, 
Journal of Advertising, 16(2), 34-40. 
Piercy, Nigel (1987b): The Marketing Budgeting Process: Marketing Management Implications, 
Journal of Marketing, 51, 45-59. 
Prendergast, Gerard, Douglas West und Yi-Zheng Shi (2006): Advertising Budgeting Methods 
and Processes in China, Journal of Advertising, 35(3), 165-176. 
Ramaseshan, B. “Ram” (1990): Research Note: Marketing Budgeting Practices of Retailers, 
European Journal of Marketing, 24(8), 40-45. 
Ramaswamy, Venkatram, Hubert Gatignon und David J. Reibstein (1994): Competitive 
Marketing Behavior in Industrial Markets, Journal of Marketing, 58(2), 45-55. 
Reinecke, Sven und Dion Fuchs (2003): Marketingbudgetierung – State of the Art, 
Herausforderungen und Lösungsansätze, Controlling & Management, Sonderheft 1, 22-31. 
Rizzo, John A. (1999): Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The 
Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, Journal of Law and Economics, 42(1), 89-116. 
Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 35 
 
 
Rundfelt, Rolf (1973): Advertising Costs in Sweden: Structure and Determinants, Stockholm, 
Almqvist & Wiksell. 
San Augustine, Andre J. und William F. Foley (1975): How Large Advertisers Set Budgets, 
Journal of Advertising Research, 15(5), 11-16. 
Scherer, F.M. und David Ross (1990): Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3. 
Auflage, Boston: MA, Rand McNally. 
Shankar, Venkatesh, Gregory S. Carpenter und Lakshman Krishnamurthi (1998): Late Mover 
Advantage: How Innovative Late Entrants Outsell Pioneers, Journal of Marketing Research, 
35(1), 54-70. 
Shankar, Venkatesh (2008): Strategic Allocation of Marketing Resources: Methods and 
Managerial Insights, MSI Report: 08-107, Marketing Science Institute, Cambridge: MA. 
Shankar, Venkatesh (2009): Marketing Expenditures over the Product Life Cycle: Asymmetrics 
between Dominant and Weak Brands, Arbeitspapier: Mays Business School, Texas A&M 
University. 
Srinivasan, Kannan und Dominique M. Hanssens (2008): Marketing and Firm Value: Metrics, 
Methods, Findings, and Future Directions, Journal of Marketing Research, 46(3), 293-312. 
Stewart, David (1996): Allocating the promotional budget: revisiting the advertising and 
promotion-to-sales ratio, Marketing Intelligence & Planning, 14(4), 34-38. 
Supanvanij, Janikan (2005): Does the Composition of CEO Compensation Influence The Firm’s 
Advertising Budgeting?, The Journal of American Academy of Business, 7(2), 117-123. 
Tellis, Gerard J. (1998): Advertising and Sales Promotion Strategy, Upper Saddle River, Prentice 
Hall. 
Tellis, Gerard J. und C. Fornell (1988): The relationship between advertising and product quality 
over the product life cycle: A contingency theory, Journal of Marketing Research, 25(1), 64-71. 
Wagner, Nils and Marc Fischer (2011): An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Practitioner Rules 
for Setting the Product Marketing Budget, Arbeitspapier. 
West, Douglas und Geoffrey J. Crouch (2007): Advertising Budgeting Practices in Australia and 
New Zealand, Australasian Marketing Journal, 15(3), 21-34. 
West, Douglas C. und C.L. Hung (1993): The Organizational Budget Process of Top Advertisers 
in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., Journal of Euromarketing, 2(3), 7-22. 
Willis, Michael S. und Richard T. Rogers (1998): Market Share Dispersion among Leading 
Firms as a Determinant of Advertising Intensity, Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 495–508.  
Zif, Jehiel, Robert F. Young und Ian Fenwick (1984): A Transnational Study of Advertising- to-
Sales Ratios, Journal of Advertising Research, 24(3), 58-63. 




Determinanten der Marketingbudgetierung: Was wissen wir darüber? 37 
 
 
Tabelle 4. Umfrageergebnisse der Studien zur Anwendung von Budgetierungsmethoden 
 % der befragten Manager geben an, folgende 














































































































San Augustine/Foley (1975)a 2 6 50 14 / / 30 12 26 
San Augustine/Foley (1975)b 4 10 28 16 / / 26 34 10 
Permut (1977)a 13 15 58 33 / / 43 18 3 
Permut (1977)b 0 10 20 5 / / 63 50 15 
Gilligan (1977)a 0 10 38 31 / 5 8 / 8 
Gilligan (1977)b 4 4 52 28 / 2 4 / 6 
Jobber (1980) 5 62 25 13 / 15 / / 13 
Patti/Blasko (1981) 51 63 53 20 / 24 20 4 / 
Lancester/Stern (1983) 20 80 53 20 3 38 13 / 12 
Blasko/Patti (1984) 3 74 16 23 / 21 33 13 / 
Hooley/Lynch (1985)a / 43 56 / / 29 51 / 14 
Hooley/Lynch (1985)b / 36 29 / / 19 42 / 7 
Ortega (1986) / 43 13 / / / / 32 / 
Piercy (1986) 1 41 25 11 / / 34 / 8 
Lynch/Hooley (1987) / 40 33 / / 10 54 / 7 
Piercy (1987b) 1 39 23 6 / 2 31 / 5 
Lynch/Hooley (1989) / 51 21 / / 6 49 / 17 
Martenson (1989) / 42 32 / / / 14 / 12 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)a / 73 38 / 11 22 24 46 5 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)b / 54 33 / 16 0 5 51 10 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)c / 68 38 / 13 8 3 8 0 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)d / 36 36 / 21 33 30 27 15 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)e / 69 31 / 6 33 25 8 0 
Filiatrault/Chebat (1990) / 58 69 / 80 17 49 / / 
Lynch/Hooley (1990)a / 53 33 / / 10 49 / 23 
Lynch/Hooley (1990)b / 44 22 / / 10 53 / 23 
Ramaseshan (1990)a / 5 5 30 / / 35 25 / 
Ramaseshan (1990)b / 42 30 6 / / 2 20 / 
Ramaseshan (1990)c / 5 34 7 / / 24 29 / 
Parry/Parry/Farris(1991) 11 63 3 / / 12 68 19 7 
Hung/West (1991)a / 61 31 14 / 33 47 / / 
Hung/West (1991)b / 75 21 11 / 46 39 / / 
Hung/West (1991)c / 50 42 6 / 36 36 / / 
Mitchell (1993) / 40 27 8 / / / / 19 
Miles/White/Munilla (1997) / 67 24 26 52 12 48 / / 
Reinecke/Reibstein (2002)a / / 33 27 47 7 / 53 18 
Reinecke/Reibstein (2002)b / / 45 27 42 8 / 45 24 
Francois (2003) / 27 14 / / 5 27 31 / 
Prendergast/West/Shi (2006) 3 39 44 28 / 26 62 27 / 
West/Crouch (2007) 0 24 21 4 / 7 18 4 18 
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Tabelle 5: Eigenschaften der Studien zur Anwendung von Budgetierungsmethoden 





San Augustine/Foley (1975)a Konsum US G 25 
San Augustine/Foley (1975)b Industrie US G 25 
Permut (1977)a Konsum US/Europa G/M 41 
Permut (1977)b Industrie US/Europa G/M 49 
Gilligan (1977)a Industrie UK G/M 39 
Gilligan (1977)b Konsum UK G/M 53 
Jobber (1980) Industrie UK G 55 
Patti/Blasko (1981) Kons./Dienstl. US G 54 
Lancester/Stern (1983) Konsum US G 60 
Blasko/Patti (1984) Industrie US G 64 
Hooley/Lynch (1985)a Konsum UK G/M/K 572 
Hooley/Lynch (1985)b Dienstl. UK G/M/K 558 
Piercy (1986) Allgemein UK M 130 
Ortega (1986) Kons./Ind./Dienstl. E G 168 
Lynch/Hooley (1987) Industrie UK G/M/K 560 
Piercy (1987b) Kons./Ind. UK G/M 141 
Lynch/Hooley (1989) Industrie UK G/M/K 536 
Martenson (1989) Allgemein S G/M/K 126 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)a Konsum UK G 37 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)b Konsum DK G 39 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)c Konsum F G 40 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)d Konsum S G 33 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989)e Konsum D G 36 
Filatrault/Chebat (1990) Dienstl. CDN / 293 
Lynch/Hooley (1990)a Konsum UK G/M/K 399 
Lynch/Hooley (1990)b Dienstl. UK G/M/K 269 
Ramaseshan (1990)a Konsum3 / / 1265 
Ramaseshan (1990)b Konsum4 / / 1265 
Ramaseshan (1990)c Dienstl. / / 1265 
Parry/Parry/Farris (1991) Krankenhäuser US / 130 
Hung/West (1991)a Konsum CDN G/M 36 
Hung/West (1991)b Konsum UK G/M 28 
Hung/West (1991)c Konsum US G/M 36 
Mitchell (1993) Allgemein UK G/M 52 
Miles/White/Munilla (1997) Industrie US G/M 43 
Reinecke/Reibstein (2002)a Allgemein US G/M 234 
Reinecke/Reibstein (2002)b Allgemein D/CH G/M 418 
Francois (2003) Industrie B G/M/K 102 
Prendergast/West/Shi (2006) Allgemein CHN G/M/K 206 
West/Crouch (2007) Kons./Ind. AUS/NZ G 71 
Anmerkungen: 
1
 Kons.: Konsumgüter/Ind.: Industriegüter/Dienstl.: Dienstleistungen 
2 G: Groß/M: Mittel/K: Klein 
3
 Langlebige Konsumgüter 
4
 Kurzlebige Konsumgüter 
5
 Die Studie von Ramaseshan (1990) umfasst über alle Produktkategorien insgesamt 126 Beobachtungen.
  
Tabelle 6a: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Produktdeterminanten 





Linear   Nicht-linear   
Keine Wirkung Positiv Negativ  U-förmig Invertiert U-förmig 
Qualität  • Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Tellis/Fornell 1988  
• Iizuka 2004 
• Huskamp et al. 2008 
• Shankar 2009 






 • Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Lilien 1979 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 
• Zellner 1989  
• Francois 2003 
    




    • Lilien 1979 
• Meisel 1979 
• Lilien/Weinstein 
1984 
• Francois 2003 
Kauffrequenz   • Albion 1976 
• Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 
• Keown et al. 1989 
• Francois 2003 

























































Tabelle 6b: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Preisdeterminanten 





Linear  Nicht-linear   
Keine Wirkung Positiv Negativ  U-förmig Invertiert U-förmig 
Preis Absoluter Preis • Rizzo 1999 • Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 
• Gönül et al. 2001 
• Narayanan/Desiraju/ 
Chintagunta 2004 
  • Keown et al. 1989 • Albion 1976 
• Hurwitz/Caves  
1988 
 




• Rundfelt 1973 
• Comanor/Wilson 1974 
• Albion 1976 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 




• Strickland/Weiss 1976 
• Martin 1979 
• Buxton/Davies/Lyons 
1984 
• Willis/Rogers 1998 
• Lee 2002K 
• Lee 2002 I 
• Misra 2010 
   • Zellner 1989 
Höhe Free Cash 
Flow 
• Amadi 2005 
• Supanvanij 2005 
     












































Tabelle 6c: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Marktdeterminanten 





Linear  Nicht-linear   
Keine Wirkung Positiv Negativ  U-förmig Invertiert U-förmig 
Marktgröße Gesamtumsatz  • Rundfelt 1973 
• Albion 1976 
• Brush 1976 
• Misra 2010 
   • Willis/Rogers  
1998 




• Lilien/Little 1976 
• Strickland/Weiss 1976 
• Zellner 1989 
• Balasubramanian/ 




Kumar 1990 K 
• Supanvanij 2005 
 
   • Greer 1971 
• Cable 1972 
• Comanor 
/Wilson 1974 
• Brush 1976 
• Farris/Buzzell 
 1979 





• Stewart 1996 





• Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Lilien 1979 
• Martin 1979 
• Meisel 1979 
• Lilien 1983 
• Lilien/Weinstein 1984 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 
    • Francois 2003 

















































Tabelle 6d: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Wettbewerbsdeterminanten I  





Linear   Nicht-linear   
Keine Wirkung Positiv Negativ  U-förmig Invertiert U-förmig 
Markt-
dominanz 
Marktanteil • Lilien 1979 
• Lilien 1983 
• Balasubramanian/ 
Kumar 1990 K,I 
• Corfman/Lehmann1994 
• Metwally 1997 
• Bhattacharyya 2005 
• Supanvanji 2005 
• Rundfelt 1973 
• Lilien/Little 1976 
• Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Zif/Young/Fenwick 
1984 
• Keown et al. 1989 
• Balasubramanian/ 
Kumar 1990 D 
• Ailawadi/Farris/Parry 
1994 
• Francois 2003 






• Martin 1979 
• Zellner 1989 
• Lee 2002 I 
• Misra 2010 
• Primeaux 1981 
• Ramaswamy/Gatignon/  
Reibstein 1994 
• Shankar 2009 
• Connor/Weimer  
1976W 
• Willis/Rogers 1998 
• Greer 1971 
• Cable 1972 
• Rundfelt 1973 
• Sutton 1974 
• Connor/Weimer1976NW 
• Strickland/Weiss 1976 




• Lee 2002 K 
• Comanor 
/Wilson 1974 
• Reekie 1975 
• Albion 1976 
• Brush 1976 
• Ornstein 1976 






Anmerkungen:K: Für Konsumgüterhersteller, I: Für Industriegüterhersteller, D: Für Dienstleister 









































Tabelle 6e: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Wettbewerbsdeterminanten II 





Linear  Nicht-linear  






• Cable 1972 
• Albion 1976 
• Lilien 1979 
• Leffler 1981 
• Connor/Weimer 1986 
• Zellner 1989 
• Azoulay 2002 
• Shankar 2009 
• Meisel 1979 
• Iizuka 2004 
• Bhattacharyya 2005 
 




 • Shankar 1999 
• Shankar 2009 







• Leeflang/Wittink 1996 
• Marks/Albers 2001 















































Tabelle 6f: Übersicht der Ergebnisse empirischer Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität–Zeit- & Organisationsdeterminanten 





Linear  Nicht-linear  
Keine Wirkung Positiv Negativ  U-förmig Invertiert U-förmig 
Produktlebens-
zyklus 
Zeit im Markt  
 
• Lilien/Little 1976 
• Farris/Buzzell 1979 
• Lilien 1979 
• Meisel 1979 
• Lilien 1983 
• Lilien/Weinstein 1984 
• Iizuka 2004 




• Stewart 1996 
• Azoulay 2002 
• Francois 2003 




 • Iizuka 2004 
• Huskamp et al. 2008 






 • Piercy 1987a 
• Piercy 1987b 
    
Macht der 
Marketingabteilung 





• Piercy 1987a 
• Gilligan 1977 
    • San Augustine 
/Foley 1975 















• Corfman/Lehmann  
1994 
• Supanvanji 2005 
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Tabelle 7a: Eigenschaften der Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität I 





Ailawadi/Farris/Parry (1994) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W&P/U 
Albion (1976) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Amadi (2005) Haushaltsprod. US Unternehmen W 
Azoulay (2002) Pharma US Unternehmen W 
Balasubramanian/Kumar (1990) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W&P/U 
Bhattacharyya (2005) Pharma US Unternehmen W 
Brush (1976) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Buxton/Davies/Lyons (1984) Übergreifend UK Industrie W/U 
Cable (1972) Übergreifend UK Industrie W/U 
Caves/Whinston/Hurwitz (1991) Pharma US Unternehmen M 
Chintagunta/Desiraju (2005) Pharma US/UK/F/I/G  Unternehmen A 
Chintagunta/Kadiyali/Vilcassim 
(2006) 
Übergreifend US Unternehmen W 
Comanor/Wilson (1974) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Connor/Weimer (1986) Lebensmittel US Unternehmen M/U 
Corfman/Lehmann (1992) Experiment US - - 
Esposito/Esposito/Hogan (1990) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Farris/Buzzell (1979) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W&P/U 
Francois (2003) Industriegüter B Unternehmen M/U 
Gilligan (1977) Übergreifend UK Unternehmen M 
Gönül et al. (2001) Pharma US Unternehmen A 
Greer (1971) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Hurwitz/Caves (1988) Pharma US Unternehmen A/U 
Huskamp et al. (2008) Pharma US Unternehmen M 
Iizuka (2004) Pharma US Unternehmen W 
Joseph/Richardson (2002) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W 
Keown et al. (1989) Übergreifend Global Unternehmen W/U 
Lee (2002) Bier US Unternehmen W/U 
Leeflang/Wittink (1996) FMCG NL Unternehmen M 
Lilien (1979) Industriegüter US Unternehmen W, M 
Lilien (1983) Industriegüter US Unternehmen A 
Lilien/Little (1976) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W/U, M/U 
Lilien/Weinstein (1984) Übergreifend US/Europa Unternehmen M 
Mann/Henning/Meeham (1967) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Marks/Albers (2001) Experiment G - - 
Martin (1979) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Meisel (1979) Bedarfsartikel US Industrie W/U 
Metwally (1997) Konsumgüter/
Dienstl. 
AUS Unternehmen W 
Misra (2010) Konsumgüter/
Dienstl. 
IND Industrie W/U 
Narayanan/Desiraju/Chintagunta 
(2004) 
Pharma US Unternehmen W, A 
Piercy (1987a) Übergreifend UK Unternehmen W/U 
Piercy (1987b) Übergreifend UK Unternehmen W/U 
Primeaux (1981) Energie US Unternehmen W&P/U 
Anmerkungen: 
1 A: Außendienst/P: Promotion/U: Umsatz/W: Werbebudget
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Tabelle 7b: Eigenschaften der Studien zur Untersuchung der Marketingintensität II 







Übergreifend US Unternehmen A 
Reekie (1975) Konsumgut UK Industrie W/U 
Rizzo (1999) Pharma US Unternehmen A 
Rundfelt (1973) Übergreifend S Industrie W/U 
San Augustine/Foley (1975) Übergreifend US Unternehmen M 
Shankar (1999) Pharma US Unternehmen M 
Shankar (2009) Pharma US Unternehmen W, A 
Stewart (1996) Automobilind. CDN Unternehmen W&P/U 
Strickland/Weiss (1976) Übergreifend US Industrie W/U 
Supanvanji (2005) Übergreifend US Unternehmen W 
Sutton (1974) Übergreifend UK Industrie W/U 
Tellis/Fornell (1988) Konsumgut US Unternehmen W 
Willis/Rogers (1998) Lebensmittel US Industrie W/U 
Zellner (1989) Lebensmittel US Industrie W/U 
Zif/Young/Fenwick (1984) Übergreifend US/CDN/Europa Industrie M/U, W/U, 
A/U 
Anmerkungen: 
1 A: Außendienst/P: Promotion/U: Umsatz/W: Werbebudget 
  





Wirkung auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit differenziertere Budgetierungsmethoden anzuwenden 
Positiv Negativ Kein Zusammenhang Sonstiges 
Produkt-
kategorie  
Konsumgüter • San Augustine/Foley 1975 
• Gilligan 1977 
• Permut 1977 
• Blasko/Patti 1984 
• Hooley/Lynch 1985 
• Lynch/Hooley 1990 
 • Gilligan 1977 
• Lynch/Hooley 1987 
• Lynch/Hooley 1989 
• Miles/White/Munilla 1997 




• Ramaseshan 1990 • Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs 
1989 
 • West/Hung 1993 (Wettbe-
werbsorientierter Ansatz -) 
Profitabilität  • Hooley/Lynch 1985 
• Lynch/Hooley 1989 
• Lynch/Hooley 1990 
• Parry/Parry/Farris 1991 
• West/Crouch 2007 
• Prendergast/West/Shi. 
2006 
 • Hung/West 1991 
 
• Prendergast/West/Shi 2006 




• Patti/Blasko 1981 
• Hooley/Lynch 1985 
• Lynch/Hooley 1987 
• Lynch/Hooley 1990 
• Hung/West 1991 
• Parry/Parry/Farris 1991 
• Piercy 1987a 
 • Jobber 1980 
• Lynch/Hooley 1989 





• Parry/Parry/Farris 1991 
• Wagner/Fischer 2011 




• Hung/West 1991 
• Mitchell 1993 
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• Piercy 1986 
• Piercy 1987a 
• Piercy 1987b 
• Parry/Parry/Farris1991 
• West/Hung 1993 
• Francois 2003 
• Prendergast/West/Shi 2006 




   • Hung/West 1991, Lynch/ 
Hooley 1990  
(Ziele & Aufgaben/ 
Finanzkraftorientiert +) 












• Miles/White/Munilla 1997 
• Low/Mohr 1999 
• Prendergast/West/Shi 2006 
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Tabelle 9: Eigenschaften der Studien zur Untersuchung der Anwendung von 
Budgetierungsmethoden 
Studie Branche Land Untersuchte Variable 
Blasko/Patti (1984) Industriegüter US Korrelation von Methoden 
Wagner/Fischer (2011) Pharma Europa Marketingbudget 
Francois (2003) Industriegüter B Korrelation von Methoden 
Gilligan (1977) Übergreifend UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Hooley/Lynch (1985) Übergreifend UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Hung/West (1991) Übergreifend US/UK/CDN Korrelation von Methoden 
Jobber (1980) Industriegüter UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Joseph/Richardson (2002) Übergreifend US Marketingbudget 
Low/Mohr (1999) Konsumgüter US Korrelation von Methoden 
Lynch/Hooley (1987) Industriegüter UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Lynch/Hooley (1989) Industriegüter UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Lynch/Hooley (1990) Übergreifend UK Korrelation von Methoden 
Miles/White/Munilla (1997) Landwirtschaft US Korrelation von Methoden 
Mitchell (1993) Übergreifend UK Manageraussagen 
(Umfrage) 
Parry/Parry/Farris (1991) Krankenhäuser US Korrelation von Methoden 
Patti/Blasko (1981) Übergreifend US Korrelation von Methoden 
Permut (1977) Übergreifend Europa Korrelation von Methoden 
Piercy (1986) Übergreifend UK Marketingbudget 
Piercy (1987a) Übergreifend UK Marketingintensität 
Piercy (1987b) Übergreifend UK Marketingintensität 
Prendergast/West/Shi (2006) Übergreifend CHN Komplexität 
Ramaseshan (1990) Einzelhandel AUS Korrelation von Methoden 
San Augustine/Foley (1975) Übergreifend US Korrelation von Methoden 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs 
(1989) 
Übergreifend Global Korrelation von Methoden 
West/Crouch (2007) Übergreifend AUS Komplexität 
West/Hung (1993) Übergreifend US/UK/CDN Korrelation von Methoden 
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Abstract 
The marketing budget allocation process receives great attention within a company. Surveys 
among managers identify that some budgeting rules, such as “Percentage of Sales” or 
“Objective and Task”, are predominantly used in companies for the determination of a 
product’s marketing budget. But due to some serious methodological flaws the insights into 
the budgeting process based on these survey results are limited. This study extends the 
knowledge about budgeting behavior by conducting a descriptive study in which we analyze 
the application of rules in the budgeting process of companies. Specifically, we develop a 
marketing budget model that relates three dominant budgeting rules to the observed marketing 
budget outcome. This allows the identification of each rule’s impact on the budget decision 
for each brand and company contained in our dataset. Additionally, we analyze moderating 
effects which influence the application of single budgeting rules. Our results show that the 
budgeting rules are indeed applied by practitioners, but the application differs across market 
and life-cycle conditions. Our results indicate that sales-oriented methods, such as 
“Percentage of Sales”, are more widely used. Contrary, sophisticated profit-oriented methods, 
such as “Objective and Task”, are less widespread than expected based on manager surveys. 
Finally, competition-oriented methods, such as “Competitive Parity”, have only a marginal 
impact in the budgeting process on average. 
1 Introduction 
The marketing budget allocation is one of the most critical but least understood aspects of the 
management process (Miles, White and Munilla 1997). Researchers and practitioners attach a 
high importance to this subject, as competitive pressure and marketing expenditures have 
increased substantially over the last years. The CMO Council Report (2007) underlines this 
relevance by emphasizing the quantification, measurement, and improvement of the value of 
marketing investments and resource allocation as the number-one challenge for most chief 
marketing officers. Due to this need to deeply understand the marketing resource allocation 





process and its drivers for practitioners and academics alike, the attention of marketing budget 
allocation in marketing literature has been extensive. Marketing research provided 
practitioners with various allocation optimization models based on the analysis of marginal 
returns to improve the budgeting process in companies (see Mantrala 2002). But interviews 
with managers show that practitioners do not accept these analytic approaches. Reasons 
include that they are too complex in implementation (Fischer et al. 2011), the database is 
insufficient for good parameterization (Little 1970) and the budget setting process is highly 
exposed to political influences (Piercy 1986).2 Instead, manager surveys (e.g., Bigné 1995) 
indicate that marketing budgets are determined by the application of simple budgeting rules 
which base the budget decision on single key performance numbers, such as the “Percentage 
of Sales” or “Competitive Parity” method. These surveys offer a good first insight into the 
budgeting process of companies, but they lack validity as they ignore the high complexity of 
the budget setting process caused by organizational policy (Armstrong and Overton 1973). 
Hence, survey results are likely to be very subjective and fragmented. They do not provide 
detailed information about how much and to what extent managers follow budgeting rules and 
under which conditions they change these rules. 
Besides manager interviews, another research stream emerged which tries to explain budget 
setting behavior by the empirical analysis of the impact of relevant factors on the observable 
size and allocation of the marketing budget in order to identify determinants of budget setting 
(e.g., Lilien and Little 1976; Balasubramanian and Kumar 1990). However, prior studies did 
not include practitioner budgeting rules, which were identified by manager surveys as 
predominant drivers of the budgeting process. Hence, the informational value of these studies 
remains limited as important structural variables may be missing from model specification. In 
summary, our knowledge about whether and how managers apply common budgeting 
methods is very limited based on prior research. 
A comprehensive understanding of budgeting behavior is important for several reasons. First, 
it contributes to allocation practice. Studies have indicated that management decision makers 
come to good decisions on average, although they do not always take the optimal decision. 
Thus, a descriptive analysis may provide reasonable guidelines for budgeting practices (Lilien 
and Little 1976). In addition, it allows managers to understand competitor’s budgeting 
behavior and the prediction of the size of competitor’s marketing budgets (Stewart 1996). 
Second, it contributes to theory as a full knowledge of factors that influence budgeting 
                                                 
2
 This is confirmed by marketing response studies which show that budgets are determined suboptimal in most 
companies (Naik, Raman and Winer 2005; Manchanda, Rossi and Chintagunta 2004).  
 





behavior may help to identify marketing variables in empirical models. This may increase 
model validity and avoid biases in parameter estimates. Third, we have been experiencing the 
rise of the structural modeling approach for several years, which seems to become the 
dominant modeling approach in marketing research. These models rely on sometimes very 
restrictive assumptions about firm behavior. Descriptive studies help to inform to what extent 
these assumptions are justified or not (Albers 2011).  
This motivates our project in which we address the existing research gap by an explorative 
study of the application of rules in companies’ budgeting process. In particular, we want to 
give some insights into the budgeting behavior by answering the following questions: 
- Which budgeting rules are frequently used?  
- How much do these rules explain in observed variance in product budgets?  
- Are there differences in the application of rules across products? 
- Under which conditions is a rule more preferred? 
Building on previous research, we develop a conceptual framework, which relates the 
observed marketing budget of a brand to the most frequently used practitioner rules identified 
by the survey literature. Therefore, we formalize these rules and integrate them into our model 
in order to explain the determination of observed marketing budgets. This approach enables 
us to describe the real marketing budget setting behavior and to identify the degree to which 
the marketing budgeting rules are used by companies. In particular, for each product, we are 
able to identify which rules are applied and which impact the respective rules have on the 
final budget decision. Furthermore, we integrate a set of factors as moderators in order to 
identify the conditions which favor the use of a rule over other factors. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of practitioner rules on the marketing budget with 
aggregate data at the brand level in the pharmaceutical market. As this market is very 
marketing-intense (Berndt 2001) and subject of many empirical studies, it is an appropriate 
dataset for our purpose. Our study is based on 518 prescription drugs in four different product 
segments covering 12 years from the five most important European markets: Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
relevant empirical research on application of budgeting methods. In section 3 we discuss 
possible moderator effects on the preference for the application of particular methods. We 
then present our model, estimation-related issues, and the data. The results of our analysis are 
displayed in the penultimate section, and the paper concludes with a discussion of the findings, 
implications, and the limitations of the study. 





2 Budgeting practices 
Surveys among managers indicate that the budgeting process is dominated by the application 
of simple budget decision rules. Many of these rules overlap with one another; however we 
may classify the methods into a few major groups (Martenson 1989). Specifically, we identify 
the following three major classes: 
1. Sales-oriented methods, 
2. Competition-oriented methods, and 
3. Profit-oriented methods. 
The sales-oriented methods are widely accepted in companies (e.g., Patti and Blasko 1981). 
According to these budgeting rules, the marketing budget is determined proportional to the 
(anticipated) sales volume of a product. The most common approach of sales-oriented 
methods is the “Percentage of Sales” rule which proposes to set the budget as a percentage of 
past or anticipated sales. Another popular approach is the “Affordable” rule, which limits the 
marketing budget to the disposable resources of a company. The most important limitation is 
the sales level of the product. 
Several advantages of these methods may explain their acceptance by management. First of 
all, they provide budgeting solutions which are very easy to understand. Second, they help 
recovering marketing cost, because the marketing spending is linked to the amount of sales 
and associated profits. Hence, budget decisions are easy to communicate to financial 
executives by ensuring that a firm with limited resources is not spending too heavily. Third, 
they may lead to a certain stability of advertising within the industry, if it is also used by 
competitors (Aaker and Myers 1982, 65). Nevertheless, sales-oriented methods have some 
serious flaws. In particular, the marketing budget is determined by sales and therefore 
marketing receives less budget when the company is less successful, i.e. sales deteriorate, but 
more effort would be needed to stimulate demand. Further, the methods reveal some problems 
in dynamic situations, e.g., the introduction of new products, repositioning moves, or 
competitor’s actions (Fischer et al. 2011). For example, they lead to exorbitant marketing 
budgets for large established brands or over-the-hill brands but only low budgets in the 
introductory stage of a product when it is necessary to generate awareness. Finally, 
competitive activities as well as exogenous effects are ignored by sales-oriented methods. 
The competition-oriented methods focus on the preservation of the own market position by 
avoiding the loss of market share. Correspondingly, marketing budgets are adjusted according 
to past or expected competitive activities. The most common rule is the “Competitive Parity” 
rule, which proposes a budget allocation proportional to competitive marketing investments. 





Another approach is the “Share of Voice” rule, which is similar as it focuses on keeping a 
fixed share of voice in the relevant market. In general, these methods are based on the 
assumption of a zero-sum competition, i.e. the gain of one company is the loss of the others in 
case of a stable market size (Yoo and Mandhachitra 2003). Hence, the objective of own 
marketing effort is to neutralize or to diminish the substitutive effect of competitive marketing 
activities. 
One advantage of this rule is that it allows a company to react promptly on competitors’ 
activities, so that retaliatory actions can be applied which may lead to the prevention of 
marketing wars (Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy 1992, 279). Nevertheless, it is not 
recommendable to orientate too strongly on competitive marketing budgeting because firm 
characteristics probably vary strongly across an industry. Bigné (1995) supposes that 
competition-oriented methods are rather applied complementary which may lead to the 
assumption that their impact on the final budget decision is lower than others, such as sales-
oriented methods. 
The profit-oriented methods are rather complex rules which allocate the budget according to 
managerial assumptions about marketing efficiency by focusing on the maximization of firm 
profit. The “Objective and Task” approach, which requires that either sales or 
communications objectives are established by management, is the most popular approach. 
According to this rule, the marketing budget is determined and allocated to effectively 
achieve the objectives defined by management (Lilien and Little 1976; Aaker and Myers 1982, 
67). Previous studies identify a broad range of key numbers which are considered as 
marketing objectives by managers, e.g., sales, market share, awareness etc. (e.g., Reinecke 
and Reibstein 2002). But as all of these numbers can be considered to be sub-goals derived 
from the objective profit maximization, we may conclude that the application of “Objective 
and Task” results in an effective use of marketing in order to maximize the firm profit. Even 
more sophisticated but similar in approach is “Scientific Modeling” which gives optimal 
budget solutions based on mathematical derivation.  
As profit-oriented methods are close to marginal analysis they have been advocated as the 
most theoretically sound and logical (Mitchell 1993). They provide great flexibility, but can 
be difficult to apply (Martenson 1989). In particular, a precise consideration of the effects of 
marketing on sales and therefore comprehensive abilities in measuring the marketing 
performance are needed (Riordan and Morgan 1979). 
Other methods finally contain unsophisticated methods which mostly reflect political 
influences within an organization. Very popular in smaller companies is the “Arbitrary” rule 





which bases the marketing budget decision only on managerial experience. For this reason, 
budget decisions are highly exposed to the influence of the top management (Piercy 1986). 
Another approach is the “Previous Budget” rule which reflects political influences within the 
company as it sets the marketing budget according to the budget of previous planning periods 
and so exhibits the power of the corresponding department manager. This rule may be not 
formally recognized in many companies which explain why it is not mentioned in most 
survey studies. But as the budget of the previous period is mostly taken as starting point in the 
budget planning process it can be expected that the previous budget has a strong impact on the 
final budget decision (Low and Mohr 1999; Farris, Shames and Reibstein 1998). 
A comparison of survey results, which are summarized in Table 1, indicates that the group of 
sales-oriented methods, such as “Percentage of Sales” and “Affordable”, is most often applied 
in the marketing budget process. In summary, it is applied by more than 80% of managers. 
But budget determination evolves towards more advanced techniques. “Objective and Task” 
becomes one of the dominant budgeting rules in most survey studies published since the 80’s. 
On average, approximately 50% of managers declare that they apply “Objective and Task”. In 
academic literature, this trend is interpreted as an increased degree of sophistication in 
budgeting (e.g., Ramaseshan 1990). But this is controversial as a detailed look on marketing 
budgeting behavior indicates that “Objective and Task” is not correctly applied by 
practitioners (Martenson 1989). Most companies seem to have fairly stable marketing budgets 
over time which supports the idea of a more comprehensive use of the percentage rules as 
these lead to a smoothed evolution of the marketing budget. In addition, recent surveys do not 
support the hypotheses of a more frequently use of the “Objective and Task” method (e.g., 
Francois 2003; West and Crouch 2007). Finally, competition-oriented methods are less 
widely-used as it is mentioned by only 20 % of managers and it appears that it is only applied 
complementary. 
Insights into the application of budgeting rules based on survey studies should be considered 
with high caution for several reasons. First, survey results are highly exposed to key 
informant biases as they are based on information given by single managers that are to 
represent the whole company. Second, they may not be able to differentiate between “what 
people say and what they do” as budgets and allocation are considered sensitive by 
management and thus could be biased (Armstrong and Overton 1973). Third, all survey 
studies differ in the methodology of the data collection, survey design, and sample selection 
which makes the results hardly comparable. More specifically, all survey studies consider a  





Table 1. Survey results about application of budgeting rules 
 % of respondents applying the  
following budgeting rule 








































































San Augustine/Foley (1975) 39 15 28 / / 8 3 
Permut (1977) 37 18 54 / / 12 6 
Gilligan (1977) 46 29 6 3 / 7 2 
Jobber (1980) 25 13 / 15 / 62 5 
Patti/Blasko (1981) 53 20 20 24 / 63 51 
Lancester/Stern (1983) 53 20 13 33 5 80 20 
Blasko/Patti (1984) 16 23 33 21 / 74 3 
Hooley/Lynch (1985) 43 / 47 10 14 40 / 
Ortega (1986) 13 / / / / 43 / 
Piercy (1986) 25 11 34 / / 41 1 
Lynch/Hooley (1987) 33 / 54 4 6 40 / 
Piercy (1987b) 23 6 31 / 2 39 1 
Lynch/Hooley (1989) 21 / 49 6 / 51 / 
Martenson (1989) 32 / 14 / / 42 / 
Synodinos/Keown/Jacobs (1989) 35 / 17 18 / 60 / 
Filiatrault/Chebat (1990) 69 / 49 17 / 58 / 
Lynch/Hooley (1990) 29 / 51 10 / 49 / 
Ramaseshan (1990)a 23 14 20 / / 17 / 
Parry/Parry/Farris (1991) 3 / 68 12 / 63 11 
Hung/West (1991) 32 10 41 38 / 61 / 
Mitchell (1993) 27 8 / / / 40 / 
Miles/White/Munilla (1997) 24 26 48 12 / 67 / 
Reinecke/Reibstein (2002) 41 27 / 8 / / / 
Francois (2003) 14 / 27 5 / 27 / 
Prendergast/West/Shi (2006) 44 28 62 26 / 39 3 
West/Crouch (2007) 21 4 18 7 / 24 0 
Average response (rule)a 31.6 17 35.6 14.9 6.8 44.3 8.8 
Average response (category)b 84.2 21.7 53.1 
Notes: Multiple responses possible. 
a) Average manager response of a rule across surveys (unweighted) 









different scope of budgeting rules and lack a clear definition for the rules included. This may 
explain the considerable differences in the survey results and decreases the insights obtained 
by these surveys in general. Finally, the budget setting process is not as simple as implied by 
survey studies (Mitchell 1993). Marketing budgets are the result of an annually recurring 
budget meeting process in which several managers participate. These managers have different 
agendas and belong to different hierarchical levels of the company (Piercy 1987a). Thus, most 
firms are likely to use more than one method to determine the marketing budget which leads 
us to suppose a more complex pattern of decision-making, one that includes basic and 
complementary methods (Bigné 1995). This complicates the identification of the impact each 
rule has on the final budget decision (Bigné 1995). 
Our analysis approach addresses these limitations of survey research and takes into account 
the complex pattern of decision-making by simultaneously analyzing more than one rule. This 
avoids biased estimation results due to single source bias or subjective management 
sensitivity for budgeting issues. Further, we take into consideration that budgeting rules may 
be applied differently across companies and may have a different impact on the final budget 
decision. By giving clear definitions of each budgeting method we are able to identify the 
influence of each rule on the marketing outcome for all products in our dataset. 
3 Determinants Affecting the Use of Budgeting Rules 
Survey results indicate that multiple rules are applied simultaneously in the budgeting process. 
But their application seems to vary across companies and over time (Mitchell 1993). Hence, 
we want to understand under which conditions the three major classes of budgeting methods 
are more preferred. 
Empirical studies about budgeting methods choice behavior are scarce and thus the insights 
about factors which influence the application of budgeting rules are limited. In this study, we 
want to shed some light on this issue by studying the impact of four potential key drivers: (1) 
market concentration as a measure of competitive intensity, (2) the time in the market as a 
measure for life cycle, (3) the order of entry of a product, and the (4) patent status which is 
very important in pharmaceutical markets as a patent expiration changes the competitive 
situation dramatically (Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef 2010). 
3.1 Sales-oriented methods 
Market concentration. Highly concentrated markets are dominated by only a few large 
companies. Previous studies (e.g., Lynch and Hooley 1990) indicate that these companies, 





which generally have to manage a broad portfolio, need some key indicators, such as sales, to 
make the complex allocation decision manageable. Instead, the allocation decision of 
companies in less concentrated markets, which are predominantly small companies, are highly 
influenced by top management decisions and therefore rely more on their managerial 
judgment. For this reason, we assume that sales-oriented methods are rather preferred by 
companies in highly concentrated markets. 
Stage in life cycle. Due to lower expected profits in the future, products in the later stage of 
the life cycle are focused more on cost recovery than on claiming a market position which 
promises high future potential. Thus, we expect a higher preference for the application of 
sales-oriented budgeting methods in the later stages of the product life cycle. 
Order of entry. As later entrants have to compensate brand disadvantages, they cannot focus 
as much on cost recovery as pioneers can. This may reduce the preference for the application 
of sales-oriented methods for later entrants. So we expect that the preference for the 
application of sales-oriented budgeting methods is higher for pioneers. 
Patent status. A factor of particular importance in the pharmaceutical industry is the patent 
status. Patent protection avoids generic entry so that firms are less threatened by competition 
and may have a stronger focus on cost recovery. Therefore, we expect that the preference for 
the application of sales-oriented budgeting methods is higher when the product is patent 
protected. 
3.2 Competition-oriented methods 
Market concentration. Previous studies show a higher degree of relational behavior in more 
concentrated markets (e.g., Ramaswamy, Gatignon and Reibstein 1994). This effect has been 
explained by a higher threat of competitive moves for the few large firms competing in a 
highly concentrated market which results in a higher competition orientation in budgeting 
(Besanko et al. 2007). Consequently, we expect that competition-oriented budgeting methods 
are more preffered in concentrated markets. 
Stage in life cycle. Pharmaceutical products follow a life cycle (e.g., Fischer, Leeflang, 
Verhoef 2010). In the early stages of the life cycle, it is of particular importance to create 
awareness and to obtain distribution channels (Ailawadi, Farris and Parry 1994). Companies 
need to get a fixed share of voice in the market to achieve market penetration which may 
result in a stronger competitive orientation. But in later stages of the life cycle the degree of 
competition increases due to slower market growth or downturn which complicates the 





defense of the own market position. This results in an increased focus on competition. 
Because of these contradicting effects we cannot predict the impact of life cycle effects on the 
preference for competition-oriented methods and consider it as an empirical issue. 
Order of entry. Studies of pharmaceutical markets identified time advantages of pioneers as 
well as a higher return of marketing for early entrants due to habit persistence of doctors 
keeping them by the same drugs, which are most likely pioneer drugs (Coscelli 2000). This 
allows early entrants a stronger focus on their own business. In addition, due to these effects 
early entrants generally become dominant player with greater market shares and larger 
marketing budgets (Berndt et al. 1995) so that the threat due to marketing activities of later 
(and smaller) entrants is rather low. Contrary, late entrants face brand disadvantages 
compared to pioneers which they need to compensate in order to improve their position in a 
mature market. This demands an increased focus on competitors to be able to oppose 
competitive campaigns. Thus, we expect an increase in application of competition-oriented 
methods for later entrants. 
Patent status. The loss of patent protection in pharmaceutical markets allows for generic entry 
which results in a significant increase of competition intensity. This threat of rising 
competition may strengthen the focus on competitive activities. Contrary, an increase in price 
elasticity due to generic entry decreases the threat of competitive marketing because in a 
market of highly comparable products the price becomes the most important driver. As a 
result of these opposite effects we cannot provide a prediction about the effect of patent status 
on the application of competition-oriented methods. 
3.3 Profit-oriented methods 
Market concentration. Profit-oriented methods need to solve a complex profit maximization 
problem which has to take account of several factors, such as competition. Due to less 
competitiveness in highly concentrated markets profit maximization is easier to achieve (e.g., 
Fischer et al. 2011) so that the allocation solution derived from profit-oriented methods is less 
complex and more reliable. Further, previous studies indicate that companies in highly 
concentrated rather fulfill the prerequisites for sophisticated budgeting because they are by 
definition, on average, larger. They obtain more data which is necessary for estimation of 
quantitative models, and they possess the operations departments, which are necessary for the 
development of analytic methods (Patti and Blasko 1981; Lynch and Hooley 1987; Hung and 
West 1991).  Finally, as companies in concentrated markets are generally characterized by a 
larger variety in the product portfolio the need for sophisticated budgeting approaches like the 





profit-oriented methods increases. For all of these reasons, we expect a more intense 
application of profit-oriented methods in higher concentrated markets. 
Stage in life cycle. While in the beginning of the product life cycle managers mainly focus on 
improving their market position, this focus changes to exploiting the product’s profit potential, 
i.e. maximizing profits, in later stages of the life cycle (e.g., cash cows). Further, a reliable 
estimation of the marketing performance, which is a prerequisite for the application of profit-
oriented methods, is rather possible when products stay in the market for a longer time period 
and a larger database is available. For these reasons, we expect that the preference for 
applying profit-oriented budgeting methods is higher in the later stages of the product life 
cycle. 
Order of entry. Later entrants suffer from brand disadvantages when entering a market. To 
overcome these weaknesses in competition, they are not able to focus as much on profit 
maximization than pioneers. Contrary, early entrants benefit from time advantages leading to 
a larger marketing responsiveness and a superior market position (Coscelli 2000). Hence, 
pioneers are much more focused on profit maximization because they have a larger 
knowledge about own marketing performance and the resources necessary for sophisticated 
budgeting, such as “Objective and Task”. Therefore, we expect that the preference for the 
application of profit-oriented budgeting methods is higher for pioneers. 
Patent status. We see an increase in competition intensity due to patent expiration which may 
enhance the need for sophisticated budgeting methods, such as “Objective and Task”. But 
simultaneously, lower profit margins after patent expiration reduce the market attractiveness 
significantly so that the benefit of the application of profit-oriented budgeting is decreasing. 
These opposite effects do not allow for a prediction on the effect of patent expiration on the 
application of profit-oriented methods. 
3.5 Summary 
We provide a summary of the expected effects of our included determinants on the choice of 
budgeting methods in Table 2. Herein we also report the operationalization of these variables 
which we discuss in the next section in more detail. 
We do not expect that the preference for the different budgeting rules is stringent substitutive, 
i.e. there may be arguments which may provide reasons for the application of all three of the 
budgeting rules included in our study. Further keep in mind, that there are still some rules, in 
section 2 named as other rules, which are not considered in our empirical analysis.  





4 Empirical model formulation and estimation 
We first specify the marketing budgeting model that incorporates the most common budgeting 
practices, sales-oriented, competition-oriented, and profit-oriented rules. We then specify the 
demand model, which provides marketing budget elasticity estimates.  
4.1 Marketing budgeting model  
4.1.1 Formalization of budgeting methods 
Sales-oriented methods. Let  denote sales of product i that is anticipated in year t and Mit 
denote the marketing budget to be allocated to product i in t. The idea of the “Percentage of 
Sales” rule is to spend a specific percentage of expected product sales on marketing. If this 
percentage does not change from period to period the change in marketing budget is 




 ∙  ,     (1) 
where 
  is a proportionality factor that measures how “closely” the marketing budget 
follows expected sales. It is 1 if the rule is applied in its pure sense, i.e. the percentage does 
not change over time. However, due to diminishing returns to scale the marginal profit of 
marketing investments decreases with higher budgets, which suggests that managers rather 
adopt a disproportionate rule (Lilien and Little 1976). For this reason, we expect 0  
̅ 
1, where 
̅  is the average proportionality factor. Solving the differential equation (1), 
leads to the following relation between budget and expected sales: 
ln 	 
 ∙ ln  ,         (2) 
where IC represents the integration constant. 
Competition-oriented methods. Competition-oriented methods are based on the principle that 
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Table 2.Variable definition and expected direction of effects 
  Expected Effect on the preference for… 






Market Concentration Average Herfindahl index of the product category during our 
data interval 
+ + + 
Stage in Life Cycle Mean of the elapsed time since launch of the product during 
our data interval 
+ +/- + 
Order of Entry Count variable that counts the entry rank of a new chemical 
entity into the product market 
- + - 
Patent Status Dummy variable: 1 = product was under patent protection in 
more than 50% of observed time periods; 0 otherwise.  





























































where #  represents the expected expenditures by i’s competitors, 
 !" is the associated 
proportionality factor, and all other terms are defined as earlier. If management has adopted a 
fully counteractive reaction behavior, it follows that 
 !" 	 1. However, research (e.g., 
Leeflang and Wittink 1994) has shown that managers may overreact, i.e. 
 !" $ 1 , 
underreact, i.e. 0 % 
 !" % 1 , do not react at all, i.e. 	
 !" 	 0 , or show an 
accommodating behavior, i.e. 
 !" % 0. The most frequent reaction seems to be no reaction, 
but since counteractive behavior appears to be more widespread (Leeflang and Wittink 1994), 
we expect that 0  
̅ !"  1. 
From the differential equation of (3), it follows: 
ln 	 
 !" ∙ ln#             (4) 
Profit-oriented methods. Profit-oriented methods encompass scientific modeling approaches 
and the “Objective and Task” rule. Managers may set sales or communication objectives that 
determine the marketing agenda of the company and thereby the allocation of the marketing 
budget (Lilien and Little 1976). Consistent with economic theory, we assume that these 
objectives contribute to the ultimate goal of profit maximization.  
Usually, the firm’s overall marketing budget is limited. The allocation literature provides 
guidance on how to allocate a fixed marketing budget across products in an optimal way 
(Doyle and Saunders 1990; Fischer et al. 2011). Basically, these approaches suggest 
allocating the budget according to a proportionality rule:   
∗ 	
(
∑ (**+, -, ∀	0 ∈  
   with (∗ 	 ∑ 2!∗  ∙ 3 ∙! 4 ∙ ∗ ∙ 56 ,                                   (5) 
where M* denotes the optimal budget, A is an allocation weight that measures the 
attractiveness of a product for receiving more budget, and I is the index set of products. εm is 
the elasticity of marketing activity m, p is the product price, d is the contribution margin (in 
percent), MS is the market share, and PD is the primary demand. The star indicates that 
variable values correspond to the optimal solution for the marketing budget. Under a fixed 




78 9 ∙ :;: ,           (6) 





78 9  denotes the proportionality factor, (  measures the anticipated optimal 
allocation weight and all other terms are defined as earlier. But, it is difficult to predict the 
magnitude of the proportionality factor because the budget change not only depends on the 
allocation weight for i but also on the weights for the other products in the portfolio. Because 
the allocation is basically a zero sum game, we expect that 0  
̅78 9  1
.
 
We may simplify equation (6) as the primary demand is equal for products across the 
portfolio in the same product category The contribution margin for pharmaceutical products 




78 9 ∙ ∑ 2! ∙ 3 ∙! #           (7) 
Finally, we solve the differential equation (7) to obtain: 
ln 	 
78 9 ∙ ∑ 2!!  ∙ 3 ∙ ln#      (8) 
4.1.2 Specification of the marketing budget model 
We use these formalized rules to explain the marketing budget for a product. The marketing 
budget allocation is a complex multi-step process which is influenced by several managers. 
All of them potentially prefer different budgeting practices. Therefore, we consider the final 
marketing budget decision as the result of application of different budgeting rules. Further, we 
apply yearly data to our model as budget decisions are made on an annually recurring budget 
process and therefore budget decisions made for a time period of one year (Albers 2011; 
Lilien 1979):  
ln=>? 	 @  
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# =>																																																												
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Mickzt : Marketing expenditures by brand i of company z in country c  
  and category k and period t; 
it : EUR Sales of brand i in period t; 
# ickt : Aggregated marketing expenditures by brand i’s competitors in 
  country c and category k in period t; 
εim : Elasticity of marketing activity m of brand i; 
# it : Market share of brand i in period t; 
LCTit : Elapsed time since launch of brand i in period t; 
pit : Unit price of brand i in period t; 
OOEi : Entry order of brand i; 
Hi : Herfindahl index of brand i; 
D_PATi : Patent status of brand i; 
τ, υ, u, ξ : Error terms; 
σ
2
 : Error variance; 
θ, δ, η, ω, λ : Parameters to be estimated; 
m     = 1,2,3 (number of marketing activities); 
k = 1,2,…, Nk (number of product categories); 
c = 1,2,…, Nc (number of countries); 
z = 1,2,…, Nz (number of companies); 
i = 1,2,…, Ni (number of brands); 
t = 1,2,…, Ti (number of periods per brand); 
l = Sales, Comp, Profit. 
The heterogeneous random brand constant (@) covers the sum of the integration constants in 
equations (2), (4), and (8), as well as an overall constant term. It controls for the influence of 
other unobserved variables that are time-invariant and brand-specific, such as the application 
for other budgeting rules which are not included in our model. The δ parameters indicate the 
degree to which the brand managers apply the corresponding budgeting rules as described 
above. The heterogeneous distribution of random parameters δ allows the estimation how 
each budgeting rule is applied by each product in our dataset. 
Additionally, we contain the marketing budget of the previous year and the time since launch 
as control variables. As indicated by manager surveys, the marketing budget of the previous 
year has a significant impact on budgeting behavior because it is taken as starting point in the 
budget planning process due to inertia effects (Piercy 1986). By including the previous budget, 
measured as deviations from the group mean to account for heterogeneity, our model adjusts 
for this behavior. Since the transient and persistent effects of marketing decreases over time 
(Osinga, Leeflang and Wieringa 2010), marketing investments are more intense in the 
beginning of the life cycle and being reduced afterwards. We adjust for these effects by 
including the time variable LCT. 




We analyze moderating effects of the application of budgeting rules by specifying a 
heterogeneous mean for the δ  parameters which is influenced by the four factors of order of 
entry, market concentration, elapsed time since launch and patent status as shown in equation 
(10) and discussed in section 3. Since we assume a decreasing influence of the moderators on 
the preference of the budgeting rules, we always take the log of order of entry, Herfindahl 
index, and elapsed time since launch. Specification tests, which we report later, support this 
assumption. 
Finally, the model shows a nested, multilevel error structure, which consists of error 
components that are company-specific, I?, as well as category-specific, J>. We assume these 
errors and the idiosyncratic error, K=>?, to be uncorrelated. As a result, the error variance is 
Var(I?  J>  K=>?). While the brand constant control for the influence of other unobserved 
brand-specific variables, this error structure further account for budgeting related firm-
specific characteristics, e.g. unobservable firm-specific budgeting rules, as well as category-
specific characteristics, e.g. changes in marketing regulations.  
4.1.2 Estimation of the marketing budget model 
We integrate equation (10) into equation (9) and estimate the resulting equation by using a 
two-step simulated maximum likelihood approach. In the first step, we first have to estimate 
the anticipated sales, market share, and competitor spending, respectively, for application of 
the budgeting rules. We obtain the expected values by OLS estimation of reduced-form 
models, i.e. the variables which need to be estimated are regressed on a set of explanatory 
variables. To avoid biased parameter estimates due to simultaneity the explanatory variables 
have to be exogenous (Franses 2005). We obtain the expected market share by regressing the 
log of the market share on the exogenous but related variables of log of number of products in 
the market, the log of order of entry and the log of the average product price in all countries 
except for the focal country as well as the time since launch and the log of time since launch 
representing the life cycle. The corresponding F-value accounts to 382.6. To obtain expected 
sales we regress the log of sales on the log of the average product price in all countries except 
for the focal country and the aggregated category primary demand in the other four countries 
as well as the time since launch and the log of time since launch to represent life cycle effects. 
The corresponding F-value accounts to 154.8. Finally, we regress the marketing spending of 
competitors on the number of products in the market, the Herfindahl index and the aggregated 
category primary demand in the other four countries to obtain the expected competitive 
marketing. The corresponding F-value accounts to 1879.9. 




In the second step, we have to account for the heterogeneity in parameters as the θ and δ  
parameter from equation (9) are specified as random parameters with the heterogeneity 
structure of @ 	 @`  a , respectively 
 	 
  a  for budgeting method l, with 
a~\0, b, while η is specified as fixed parameter. a, b	are error terms, respectively the 
variance-covariance matrix, of the brand-specific parameters. Therefore, we estimate the 
resulting equation of (9) and (10) by simulated maximum likelihood. In terms of its 
econometric properties, the two-step estimator is unbiased and consistent (Greene 2006).  
4.2 Brand sales model 
4.2.1 Specification of the brand sales model 
To estimate model (10) we need to know the elasticities of marketing activities. For this 
purpose, we estimate a parsimonious sales model that relates brand unit sales to relevant 
variables to obtain brand-specific estimates of marketing responsiveness. We apply quarterly 
data to the brand sales model. Following Fischer et al. (2011), we define unit sales of brand i 
and period w as follows:  
ln c=>d 	 e`  eC ∙ ln6OHd  eF ∙ ln 5f(d  eS ∙ lnNOd  eT ∙ ln c=>,dDC 									
 eg ∙ GHd  eh ∙ ln GHd  iC ∙ ln=>d  iF ∙ ln 3d 																			11 	
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(H>
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where 
qickw  : Unit sales of brand i in country c and category k in period w; 
DETiw  : Expenditures on detailing by brand i in period w; 
PJAiw  : Expenditures on professional journal advertising by brand i in period w; 
OMEiw  : Expenditures on other marketing activities by brand i in period w; 
LCTiw  : Elapsed time since launch of brand i in period w; 
MCickw  : Aggregated marketing expenditures by brand i’s competitors in country c and 
     category k in period w; 
piw  : Unit price of brand i in period w; 
D_CATk : Category dummy variable for category k; 
SDse,w : Seasonal dummy variable for quarter se and period w; 
o,σ2 : Error term and error variance; 
α, β, γ : Parameters to be estimated; 
k = 1,2,…, Nk (number of product categories); 




c = 1,2,…, Nc (number of countries); 
i = 1,2,…, Ni (number of brands); 
se = 1,2,…, SE (four quarters); and 
w = 1,2,…, Wi (number of periods per brand). 
We apply the multiplicative interaction model, a standard response model, to explain brand 
unit sales. This functional form has received large empirical support, has been found useful in 
normative applications, and incorporates interaction effects in a parsimonious way (e.g., 
Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 2001, 100). We later test for the functional form and find that 
the multiplicative model is indeed best representing our data (see also Fischer and Albers 
2010; Fischer et al. 2011). 
The parameters eC t eS  can be directly interpreted as elasticities. We categorize the 
marketing expenditures in detailing expenditures, professional journal advertising and other 
marketing expenditures. To allow for dynamics, we include a carryover effect, as it is 
common in the time-series literature on advertising effects (Leone 1995). Again, to account 
for heterogeneity the previous sales units are measured as deviations from the group mean. 
The parameter eT allows us to obtain brand-specific marketing carry-over coefficients. We 
include the elapsed time and the log of the elapsed time since launch of the brand to control 
for brand-life-cycle effects (Brockhoff 1967).  
In equation (11), we account for brand heterogeneity in demand responsiveness (e.g., quality, 
brand equity) via brand-specific slope parameters (Greene 2006). An analysis of data shows 
that product life cycles differ in trend and length. Therefore, we account for heterogeneity in 
the trend variables as well. Finally, we specify a heterogeneous random brand constant (e`) 
for influences of other unobserved, time-invariant variables, such as management luck or 
brand equity (e.g., Berndt et al. 1995; Fischer, Shankar and Clement 2005).  
In addition, the model includes the price of the considered brand as control variable. 
Distribution is less an issue in the response model as all pharmacies are required to list every 
drug in the countries covered by our data. Due to the inclusion of various categories that are 
likely to differ in terms of market size, we include category dummies as non-random variables 
to correct for market-size differences. Dummy variables that represent one of the four quarters 
of the year control for seasonal variation in demand. 
The long-term marketing elasticity ε for brand i which we need for estimation of equation (9) 
is derived from the estimation results by (Fischer et al. 2011): 
2 	 uvwkuvxkuvyCDuvz       (12) 




4.2.2 Estimation of the brand sales model 
The specification of the brand sales model accounts for brand heterogeneity. From equation 
(11) the random parameters are e` t eh with a heterogeneity structure on these parameters of 
e 	 e  { , with {~\0, | . {
 
denote the error terms, and Ω the variance-covariance 
matrix of the brand-specific parameter e. We account for the heterogeneity in the parameters 
by estimating equation (11) by simulated maximum likelihood. 
Our marketing budget model in equation (9) indicates an endogenous relationship between 
marketing expenditures and sales on a yearly basis. So we have to check whether our 
marketing expenditure variables in equation (11) in which we use quarterly data are as well 
subject to endogeneity. Since potential cross-sectional correlation is controlled by including a 
random brand constant, we only have to test for an error correlation of expenditure variables 
over time. Therefore, we apply the Hausman-test to the model in first differences (Greene 
2006) using the variables that are two periods lagged as instruments (Anderson and Hsiao 
1982). We do not find evidence that marketing decision variables are endogenous (p>.5). The 
F-value of the first-stage regression accounts to 363.5 which indicate that we have valid 
instruments. This finding indicates that quarterly changes in marketing expenditures are not 
the result of budgeting methods which is in line with the results of prior studies (e.g., Fischer 
and Albers 2010). 
5 Data 
We estimate our models using data from four prescription drug categories, Hypertension, 
Antidiabetics, Erectile Dysfunction and Antiinfectives. We are provided with data on unit 
sales counted in standard units, revenues (all in EUR), and the date of product launch, which 
we use to obtain order-of-entry and life-cycle information, by IMS Health, Inc. for a time 
period of 12 years (1996-2007). This allows us to account for time variation by using panel 
data (Farris and Buzzel 1979). In addition, we may reduce the level of multicollinearity due to 
more degrees of freedom (Brobst and Gates 1977) and increase the generalizability of our 
results (Balasubramanian and Kumar 1990). We computed prices from revenues and unit 
sales. Via their CAM database, CEGEDIM, S.A. provided information on detailing 
expenditures targeted at general practitioners, specialists, and pharmacists. In addition, we 
possess information on professional journal advertising expenditures (including direct 
mailing), and other expenditures. The subcategories for the classification of the order-of-entry 
are defined according to the corresponding ATC-Class (Coscelli 2000). 




Table 3 shows mean values and standard deviations for the variables used in estimation. In 
total, 18,391 observations are available. The dataset comprises 518 products in the four 
product categories. Note, that we transformed the quarterly data to annual data for estimation 
of the marketing budget model as the budget decision is made in an annually recurring 
budgeting process. This reduces the number of observations to 4,908. 
6 Estimation results 
6.1 Brand sales model 
We present the estimation results for the brand sales model in Table 4. As our main objective 
is to obtain brand-specific estimates of marketing responsiveness, we focus on the estimation 
of marketing elasticities. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Albers, Mantrala and Sridhar 2010; Fischer and Albers 
2010), we find the strongest impact for detailing showing short-term elasticities of about .07 
and long-term elasticities of about .20. Journal advertising and other marketing expenditures 
are considerably less effective with short-term elasticities of about .04 and .02, respectively, 
and long-term elasticities about .10 and .05, respectively. 
In terms of control variables, we find typical life cycle shapes (Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef 
2010), a negative price impact and an average carry-over effect of about .63. Only the impact 
of competitive marketing expenditures is slightly surprising as it is positive. This indicates a 
market-expansive character on average. 
6.2 Marketing budget model 
We present the estimation results for the marketing budget model of equation (9) in Table 5 
and of equation (10) in Table 7. The estimation results in Table 5 indicate how the budgeting 
rules are applied across companies, while the moderating effects as shown in Table 7 give 
insights about which factors have an impact on the preference for the corresponding rules.  
6.2.1 Analysis of “rule-parameter” values 
The estimated coefficients of the “rule-parameters” in Table 5 indicate how the budgeting 
rules are applied on average. For the coefficient of sales-oriented methods, we find a value of 
about .45 on average which is in the range of our expectations. As we have a double-log 
model, the coefficient value corresponds to the elasticity, i.e. budgets do not increase to the 
same amount as expected sales. The coefficient of competition-oriented methods is positive  
  




Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD 
Sales in thousand EUR 4,083.6 5,534.6 
Market share in standard units 8.2 % 17.3 % 
Detailing expenditures in thousand EUR 6,993.9 235.1 
Professional journal advertising 
expenditures in thousand EUR 
27.8 90.6 
Other marketing expenditures in thousand 
EUR 
235.05 792.4 
Price in EUR per standard unit 1.1 4.1 
Elapsed time since launch in quarters 50.2 39.4 
Proportion of drugs under patent-protection 43.0 %  
Order of entry 3.9 2.6 
Herfindahl-Index .12 .23 
# of countries 5  
# of products 518  
# of companies 79  
# of observations (quarterly/yearly) 18,391/4,908  
Table 4. Estimation results of the brand sales model 
Dependent variable Ln(Unit Sales) 








   Constant 6.150 (.017)**  .036 (.001)** 
   Ln(Lagged Unit Sales) .639 (.002)**  .127 (.002)** 
   Ln(Competitive Marketing  
         Expenditures) 
.044 (.001)**    
   Ln(Price) -.381 (.002)**    
   Elapsed Time Since Launch -.006 (.7×10-4)**  .040 (.5×10-4)** 
   Ln(Elapsed Time Since  
         Launch) 
.287 (.003)**  .078 (.4×10-3)** 
      
Marketing variables      
   Ln(Detailing) .073 (.001)**  .066 (.2×10-3)** 
   Ln(Journal Advertising) .037 (.001)**  .036 (.7×10-3)** 
   Ln(Other Marketing     
         Expenditures) 
.017 (.001)**  .005 (.5×10-3)** 
      
Log Likelihood -10,807.1     
Pseudo R² .922     
# of observations 17868     
# of products 518     
Notes: ** p<.01; * p<.05; ns = not significant 
  




and significant on average at a value about .185, i.e. increasing competitive spending results 
in an increase of the own budget size. This confirms that managers are competitor-oriented, 
which results in aggressive reactions (e.g., Leeflang and Wittink 1996). Previous research 
showed that this behavior is very often not driven by rational profit-oriented considerations. 
Instead, managers are more interested in improving their market position compared to their 
competitors (Azoulay 2002). Leeflang and Wittink (1996) argue that the affinity to aggressive 
reaction to competitors marketing spending can be explained by competitor-oriented 
objectives or the evaluation on relative performance measures of brand managers. Our study 
confirms that aggressive reactions can be explained as well by application of competition-
oriented methods. Finally, the estimated coefficient of profit-oriented methods is on average 
significantly below the value of one, but within the expected range (=.717). An explanation of 
this result is that budget changes depend on the allocation weight for all products in the 
portfolio. As allocation is basically a zero sum game, changes in allocation weight generally 
cannot be fully followed (as discussed in section 4.1.1).  
Table 5. Estimation results for the Marketing Budget Model  
Dependent variable Ln(Marketing Expenditures) 








   Constant -.617  (.436) ns  .072  (.028)** 
   Lagged Marketing Budget .185   (.058)**    
   Elapsed Time Since Launch -2.830   (.065)**    
      
Budgeting methods      
   Sales-oriented Method .450   (.112)**  .369  (.004)** 
   Competition-oriented Method .185   (.058)**  .051  (.002)** 
   Profit-oriented Method 
 




Estimation results are shown in Table 7 
 
Error components 
   Firm-specific error component 
   (standard deviation) 







   
   (standard deviation) 
 
     
Log Likelihood -9,737.5     
Pseudo-R² .777     
# of observations 4,390     
# of products 518     
Notes: Nested, multilevel error structure which consists of company- and category-specific error components. ** 
p<.01; * p<.05; ns = not significant 




The covariates have the expected signs. The budget of the previous period has a positive 
impact, which indicates that previous budgets are adopted in the budgeting process, probably 
as they are taken as starting points in budget planning (Farris, Shames and Reibstein 1998). 
The elapsed time since launch has a negative impact on the marketing intensity. This is in line 
with prior studies (e.g., Osinga, Leeflang and Wieringa 2010; Lilien and Little 1976) as 
products first need to generate awareness when entering a market, while they benefit from 
built-up marketing stocks in the later stages of their life cycle (Ailawadi, Farris and Parry 
1994; Farris and Buzzel 1979). 
6.2.2 Analysis of “rule-parameter” distribution 
To identify how many companies apply each of the three dominant budgeting methods we 
analyze the distribution of the “rule-parameters” across brands. Our estimation approach 
provides us with posterior standard deviations for the individual parameters. Therefore, we 
may apply a pseudo t-Test which tests for how many brands the individual parameter value is 
significantly different from zero (p<.05), i.e. has a statistically significant impact on the 
marketing budget decision, and for how many brands the individual parameter value is 
significantly not different from one (p<.05), i.e. the corresponding rule is fully applied. The 
distribution of the three “rule-parameters” is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Application of budgeting methods across brands 
 Applied 
(δ ≠ 0)* 
 Fully-applied 
(δ = 1)* 
   Sales-oriented Methods 81.24%  11.53% 
   Competition-oriented Methods 53.18 %  0.34% 
   Profit-oriented Methods 40.54%  33.56% 
Notes: * p<.05 
The sales-oriented methods are applied most often as they have a significant impact on the 
marketing budget for 81.24% of all brands. This result is consistent with the average response 
across survey studies of 84.2%. that managers state that they apply sales-oriented methods 
(see Table 1). But we only find for 11.53% a statistically significant parameter value of one, 
i.e. a full proportional adjustment to sales, which indicates that most firms apply “Percentage 
of Sales” in a disproportional way. Further, we observe a widespread use of competition-
oriented methods, which are applied to 53.18% of all brands. The mean parameter value 
of .185 (see Table 5) and the fact that only .34% apply this method fully, i.e. have a parameter 
of one, show that competition-oriented methods are rather used complementary. Nevertheless, 
this finding confirms that marketing budgets are widely influenced by competitive marketing 




budgets (Chintagunta und Desiraju 2005; Chintagunta, Kadiyali und Vilcassim 2006) and 
thereby contradicts the results of survey studies according to which only 21.7% of managers 
apply competition-oriented methods. Contrary, profit-oriented methods are applied for only 
40.54% of brands according to our “rule-parameter” values. This points out that “Objective 
and Task” is less widespread than expected based on survey results. But we observe a wide 
range of parameter values close to one, as for 33.56% of products profit-oriented methods are 
fully applied, i.e. about 82% of brands which use profit-oriented methods apply it fully. 
Summarizing our results, managers have a reliable picture of the influence of sales-oriented 
methods on the marketing outcome. But the focus on competition is clearly underestimated as 
changes are much more driven by competitive activities than stated in surveys. On the other 
hand, methods which are derived from profit maximization, i.e. profit-oriented methods, are 
less applied which confirms the assumption of prior studies that managers tend to overstate 
the application of profit-oriented methods (e.g., Martenson 1989). 
6.2.3 Moderator analysis 
The “rule-parameters” show significant variation across brands. Our estimation results of 
moderating effects are shown in Table 7. They provide information about the sources of this 
observed variation. 
We find significant moderator effects for most of the determinants discussed in section 3. Our 
results support most of our expectations as summarized in Table 8. Further, we get insights 
about moderators where we could not hypothesize about their impact due to opposite effects. 
We compare the results of the moderator effects of application of budgeting methods for 
equation (10) in Table 8. 
Table 7. Estimation results for the moderating effects of the Marketing Budget Model 























Market Concentration .0499 (.014)**  -.0083 (.009) ns  .1573 (.010)** 
Later stage in Life Cycle .4883 (.030)**  -.0461 (.018)*  .3211 (.040)** 
Order of Entry -.0391 (.029) ns  -.0090 (.017) ns  -.2483 (.029)** 
Off-patent Status .5336 (.051)**  -.2223 (.030)**  -.9401 (.048)** 
Notes: **p<.01; * p<.05; ns = not significant 
Market Concentration is measured as Herfindahl index. Patent status is a dummy variable coding 0 if patent is 
expired and 1 otherwise. The stage in life cycle is measured as time since product launch. 
  




Table 8. Comparison of expected and estimated results for moderating effects 
 







 Profit-oriented Methods 
 
Expected Estimated*  Expected Estimated* 
 
Expected Estimated* 
Market Concentration + +  + NS  + + 
Later Stage in Life 
Cycle 
+ +  +/- -  + + 
Order of Entry - NS  + NS  - - 
Off-patent Status + +  +/- -  +/- - 
Notes: * p<.05; NS = not significant 
The expected impacts are summarized in Table 2. The estimated results are presented in Table 6. 
Sales-oriented methods. Our estimation results provide support for our expectations that sales-
oriented methods are rather applied in highly concentrated markets, in the maturity stage of a 
product and under patent protection. But our results do not provide evidence that order of 
entry has an impact on the preference for sales-oriented methods. Nevertheless, summarizing 
our results the estimated effects confirm that sales-oriented methods are rather applied by 
dominant firms in the market, as indicated by previous studies (e.g., Lynch and Hooley 1990). 
Competition-oriented methods. We do not find empirical support for our expectation that 
competition-oriented methods tend to be more applied in highly concentrated markets. This is 
surprising due to a higher threat of competitive marketing in oligopoly structured markets. A 
possible explanation for this insignificance could be that larger firms, which can be found in 
highly concentrated markets, generally prefer to apply rather sophisticated budgeting methods, 
such as “Objective and Task”, instead of unsophisticated competition-oriented methods (Parry, 
Parry and Farris 1991; Hung and West 1991). We could not provide a prediction on life cycle 
effects on the application of competition-oriented methods due to opposite effects. The 
estimated negative impact of elapsed time since launch indicates that the need for generating 
awareness in the market after product introduction outweighs the threat of competitors in 
declining markets which results in a higher preference of applying competition-oriented 
methods in the early stage. Our results do not provide evidence that order of entry has an 
impact on the preference for competition-oriented methods. The insignificance of 
competition-oriented methods may be explained by the fact that pioneers are focused on 
defending their market position and therefore react on any competitive activity. Finally, patent 
expiration leads to a decreased application of competition-oriented budgeting methods which 
indicates that the effect of loss in market attractiveness outweighs competition intensification 
after patent expiration, i.e. a more profitable market enhances the focus on competitive 
activities.  




Profit-oriented methods. All of our expectations regarding profit-oriented methods are 
supported by the estimation results, i.e. the preference for applying profit-oriented budgeting 
methods is higher in concentrated markets, in the later stages of a product, and for pioneers. 
Further, we find that patent expiration leads to an increased application of profit-oriented 
budgeting methods which indicate that the effect of competition intensification outweigh the 
negative effect due to a loss in market attractiveness after patent expiration and, therefore, 
increases the need for sophisticated budgeting methods, such as “Objective and Task” 
(Huskamp et al. 2008).  
6.2.4 Robustness Checks 
The Pseudo-R² of the marketing budget model is .78 and .92 for the brand sales model, which 
is quite high and shows that our models provide an appropriate framework for budget setting 
behavior. Further, we checked whether our model specification and estimation is appropriate 
for the data in three ways. First, we checked multicollinearity by estimating the Variance 
Inflation Factor of each variable. As all Factors are close to one, we do not find an indication 
of multicollinearity (Greene 2006). Second, we tested alternative functional forms of the 
moderators in the marketing budget model and the brand sales model as well. In particular, 
we estimated equation (10) as linear model and equation (11) as semi-log and market share 
attraction model. The Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) test for unnested models suggests that 
the proposed specifications are superior to alternative specifications. Third, we tested an 
alternative specification of the “Objective and Task” formalization (see equation (5)) by 
including revenues instead of market share, i.e. ( 	 ∑ 2! ∙! 4 ∙ 	 . Therefore, we 
executed a Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) test which is inconclusive for our data, i.e. the 
two formalizations are not superior to each other. But due to the business stealing character of 
the marketing activities in the European pharmaceutical market (e.g., Narayanan, Desiraju and 
Chintagunta 2004) we assume that practitioners rather focus on market share.  
7 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
Our analysis of 518 brands in the pharmaceutical market reveals important insights about 
budgeting behavior. By formalizing the existing budgeting rules, we developed a model to 
estimate their impact on the observed product marketing budget decision. This allows us to 
find empirical support for the application of all three categories of budgeting rules. But the 
impact on the marketing budget varies significantly across brands. We find that for 81.2% of 
the brands sales-oriented methods, for 53.2% of the brands competition-oriented methods and 




for 40.5% of the brands profit-oriented methods are applied. In summary, managers have a 
good feeling of the influence of sales on the marketing budget, but they underestimate the 
impact of competitive marketing spending, while the application of profit-oriented methods is 
overstated. This finding shows that marketing budgets are generally not based on profit 
maximization approaches, and therefore also contradicts one of the main assumptions of 
structural modeling. 
To explain the variation in application, we further analyzed the moderating effects which 
affect the preference for specific budgeting methods. Our results indicate that sales-, as well 
as profit-oriented methods, are rather applied by dominant firms in the market. Profit-oriented 
methods additionally dominate in highly competitive markets when an expiring patent status 
allow for competition which increases the need for sophisticated budgeting. Contrary, 
competition-oriented methods are preferred in the early stages of the life cycle, i.e. at market 
entry, when a strong focus on competition may allow to generate awareness and to obtain 
distribution in the market. 
In summary, this study offers a new approach for the analysis of the budgeting process in 
companies. Our results provide insights into the budgeting process by analyzing how 
budgeting rules are applied and which moderating effects may influence the application of the 
rules. This provides managers with a deeper understanding of how budgets are set in 
companies and they may help to predict the marketing budget of competitors. Further, our 
results also shed some further light on theory and model development. We find empirical 
evidence that marketing budget decisions are based on budgeting rules which provide some 
explanations for prior studies. This indicates that managers set their marketing budgets 
suboptimal (e.g., Albers, Mantrala and Sridhar 2010). For this reason, assumptions in models 
regarding budgeting behavior should take these results into account. Structural modeling 
approaches base on the assumption of profit maximization by practitioners. But our results 
indicate that this assumption does not hold in general so that the structural modeling approach 
has to change. 
Our study is also subject to limitations. The marketing budget model probably does not 
include all factors which may have a significant impact on the determination of the marketing 
budget. But since we control for many factors by our random constant and the error terms and 
our focus is on the analysis of the application of budgeting rules, we ignore for an exhaustive 
discussion of determinants of marketing budgets. To identify the influence of these controlled 
factors may represent an interesting issue for ongoing research. Finally, the estimation results 
hold for pharmaceutical firms in European markets. It would be interesting to extend the 




analysis to other industries and other regions. This is of particular interest as regional impact 
on budgeting behavior is still unclear (Bigné 1995). Finally, although we analyze the effects 
of some important variables, such as order of entry, stage in life cycle, market concentration, 
and patent status, we do not claim they are the only important moderators for the application 
of budgeting methods. More research should investigate the role of other variables. 
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Abstract 
Previous research on marketing budget decisions has shown that profit improvement from 
better allocation across products or regions is much higher than from improving the overall 
budget. However, despite its high managerial relevance contributions by marketing scholars 
are rare. 
In this paper, we introduce an innovative and feasible solution to the dynamic marketing 
allocation budget problem for multi-product, multi-country firms. Specifically, our decision 
support model allows determining near-optimal marketing budgets at the country-product-
marketing-activity level in an Excel-supported environment each year. The model accounts 
for marketing dynamics and a product’s growth potential as well as for trade-offs with respect 
to marketing effectiveness and profit contribution. The model has been successfully 
implemented at Bayer, one the world’s largest firms in the pharmaceutical and chemical 
business. The profit improvement potential is more than 50% and worth of nearly EUR 500 
million in incremental discounted cash flows. 
1 Introduction 
Determining the marketing budget has been of paramount importance to marketers for many 
decades. Global players such as Procter & Gamble spend around US$ 8.5 billion on 
advertising per year (P&G 2008). Since marketing expenditures are immediately recognized 
as costs on the income statement but their total impact on sales often fully unfolds only in 
future periods they need to be evaluated in terms of an investment decision. In view of limited 
financial resources, the global annual marketing budget of a company is usually set in the 
previous year, i.e. it is fixed. If companies offer a broad product portfolio to customers from 
various countries and use a variety of communication channels they need to break down the 
fixed annual budget into expenditures across countries, products, and communication 
activities. For many firms this task requires determining individual budgets for hundreds of 
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allocation units. As a result, firms face a complex decision problem: they need to allocate a 
fixed budget across a multitude of allocation units by evaluating the impact of these 
investment decisions on future cash flows. Technically, management needs to solve a 
dynamic optimization problem for an investment portfolio under a budget constraint. As 
marketing budgets are set on an annual basis this management challenge recurs on a regular 
basis. 
1.1 State-of-the-art of Marketing Budget Allocation 
Marketing practitioners frequently use heuristic methods when it comes to determining the 
marketing budget. Bigné (1995) reviews 16 studies published between 1975-1991 on actual 
budgeting behavior of North-American and European firms from diverse industries. He finds 
that by far the most often used budget rules are the “percentage-of-sales”, “objective-and-
task”, and “affordability” method. These rules usually yield results that are rather far away 
from the optimal profit-maximizing budget. Analytic methods that are based on the principle 
of marginal returns analysis produce optimal budgets but are only considered by a minority of 
firms. 
The academic literature has been dealing with budget questions for a long time. A large body 
of work focuses on optimizing the budget for a single product in a static environment (for an 
overview see Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 2001). Among the earliest and most influential 
contributions is the work by Dorfman and Steiner (1954). They derive necessary conditions 
that must hold for static profit maximization when optimal levels for several marketing-mix 
variables are set simultaneously. The solution offers important general insights into the 
budgeting problem but does not offer guidance for implementation into marketing practice. In 
addition, it does not consider dynamics and the perspective of a multi-country, multi-product 
firm. 
A large stream of papers takes a dynamic perspective (for an overview see Erickson 2003). 
The recent paper by Naik, Raman and Winer (2005), for example, considers interaction 
effects between advertising and promotion under dynamic oligopolistic competition. The 
focus of these studies, however, remains on single products. They do not inform on how 
budgets are simultaneously set for several products in view of limited financial resources.  
This question can only be answered by an integrated allocation approach. Previous research 
(e.g., Tull et al. 1986) has shown that profit improvement from better allocation across 
products or regions is much higher than from improving the overall budget. However, despite 
its high managerial relevance and profit improvement potential contributions by marketing 
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scholars are rare (Reibstein, Day and Wind 2009).1 An important emerging literature stream 
(e.g., Kumar et al. 2008; Reinartz, Thomas and Kumar 2005) deals with the problem of 
resource allocation across customers. Typically, these approaches require data on individual 
customer behavior and focus on service industries. Other articles focus on problems of sales 
territory design and sales force size (e.g., Skiera and Albers 1998; Zoltners and Sinha 2005) 
but do not address allocation decisions for products in multi-product, multi-country 
businesses. Only a few approaches are based on aggregate market response models that can be 
calibrated with sales and marketing data at the product level, which is the primary data source 
in many industries. Lodish (1988) proposes an allocation algorithm for a specific type of 
market response that has been adopted by a pharmaceutical company. Doyle and Saunders 
(1990) derive a closed-form allocation solution under a budget constraint for the semi-log 
response model and apply it to a British retailer. Albers (1998) generalizes the solution to the 
case of an arbitrary response function and allocation unit. Since a closed-form solution in 
terms of response parameters no longer exists he proposes a heuristic rule and shows via 
simulation that it quickly converges to the optimal numerical solution. While these 
approaches consider trade-offs among products of a portfolio for budget decisions they are 
focused on short-term profit maximization. Marketing decisions, however, need to account for 
dynamics, as well. On the one side, dynamic considerations result from lagged effects that can 
be represented by a marketing stock variable. On the other side, dynamic considerations arise 
from the fact that a portfolio mixes products with different ages and growth opportunities. 
Requirements for marketing support change as the product evolves along its life cycle. To the 
best of our knowledge, a dynamic marketing budget allocation approach for a product 
portfolio has not been suggested so far. 
1.2 Contribution to Allocation Theory and Practice 
In this paper, we propose an allocation method for breaking down a global marketing budget 
into individual budgets at the country-product-marketing-activity level. We take the position 
of an international firm that offers a broad portfolio of products to customers from different 
countries. Products are promoted by various activities including classical advertising, below-
the-line activities, personal selling, etc. Each year the firm sets a global marketing budget that 
is to be spent by the various allocation units in the year ahead. The portfolio is composed of 
products that differ in their life-cycle stage. The firm wishes to maximize the discounted total 
profits of its portfolio. While we propose a method that recommends how to allocate the 
                                                 
1
 We acknowledge other research traditions that deal with allocation problems. For example, international trade 
theory discusses issues of dynamic resource allocation across countries at a macro level (e.g., Wong 1995). 
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annual global budget across countries, products, and marketing activities, we do not address 
the tactical problem of inter-temporal allocation of an individual budget within the year (for a 
summary of this literature see Doganoglu and Klapper 2006). 
We contribute to allocation theory by offering a solution to the dynamic portfolio-profit 
maximization problem. The theoretical solution provides important insights into how 
individual budgets should be set so that they account for differences in profit contribution, 
marketing effectiveness, and growth potential. The optimal budget describes an endogenous 
relationship where various variables need to be in their global optimum. This relationship also 
holds under Nash competition. Under both monopoly and Nash competition, however, it can 
only be solved with numerical methods. Numerical optimization often faces significant 
acceptance barriers in practice, which may be one reason for the frequent use of suboptimal 
budgeting heuristics (Bigné 1995). While the numerical method produces the optimal budget, 
the product manager cannot reproduce the result on its own. Therefore, s/he does not 
understand why the recommended budget level should be optimal for his/her product. 
Hence, our second contribution is to allocation practice. We develop a near-optimal allocation 
rule that addresses the demand for simple allocation rules by practitioners. The rule is directly 
derived from the theoretical solution. It provides insights into the solution structure and can 
be used with a spreadsheet. In a simulation study, we demonstrate that the allocation heuristic 
quickly converges to the optimal solution under varying conditions. While easy to understand 
and to implement, the heuristic goes beyond widespread budgeting rules such as the 
“percentage-of-sales” method (size of the business). Specifically, it integrates and trades off 
information about 
- the size of the business, 
- the profit contribution margin, 
- the (short-term) effectiveness of marketing investments, 
- the carryover-effect of marketing investments, 
- the growth potential, 
- and the time value of money. 
Together with the management of Bayer, we developed and implemented the heuristic for the 
product portfolio of Bayer’s Primary Care business unit. This portfolio includes 36 products 
from four strategic therapeutic areas that are marketed worldwide. Product managers can 
choose among six different types of marketing activities such as detailing or print advertising. 
The project had significant impact on the marketing budgeting practice at Bayer. It initiated 
an important change in the understanding of the allocation task by providing structure and 
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solution to a complex problem. The empirical application revealed a profit improvement 
potential of more than 50% or nearly EUR 500 million of incremental discounted cash flows 
over the next five years. Finally, the project significantly contributed to an organizational 
change that resulted into the creation of a new marketing intelligence unit. One of the main 
tasks of this unit is to support top management in evaluating the financial impact of marketing 
decisions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our analytic 
approach to derive the proposed heuristic allocation rule and the associated simulation study. 
Section 3 provides information about Bayer and the market background. The fourth section 
focuses on the empirical application. We discuss the data, the estimation of the market 
response model and validation issues. Section 5 presents the implementation of the allocation 
heuristic in Excel. We further evaluate the empirical findings and the impact of the project on 
Bayer. We close with limitations and suggestions for future research. 
2 A Heuristic Rule for Dynamic Marketing Budget Allocation 
2.1 Theory 
Assume an international firm that operates across the world and sells several products that 
may belong to the same or different categories. The number of products offered may differ 
across countries. Product management can choose among various marketing activities, such 
as print advertising, personal selling, direct mailing, etc. to enhance current and future sales. 
At the end of each year, marketing investment plans for the next year are developed. We 
assume that the firm wishes to maximize the net present value Π of its product portfolio over 
a planning period T, e.g., five years. We further assume that a total marketing budget R has 
already been set at the firm level. We do not model this process, i.e. R is exogenous. 
Additionally, the total budget is assumed to be constant over the planning horizon. Top 
management, however, may decide to adjust the level during next year’s planning cycle. 
2.1.1 Allocation Solution for an Arbitrary Growth Function. Denote q(t, S, Z) as the sales 
of a product in period t that depends on S, the marketing stock, and other variables (e.g., 
competitive marketing stock) that are summarized in the row vector Z. Without loss of 
generality, we focus on only one own stock variable. Let us decompose sales into two 
components 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,q t S g t S t f S t t=       Z Z ,    (1) 
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where g[·] is a growth function that represents a basic pattern of growth dynamics as known 
from diffusion and product life cycle research, and f[·] is a separate response function that 
measures the direct impact of S and Z on sales. Note that this decomposition is helpful for 
interpretation but does not limit the generality of our model development. The growth 
function describes the evolution of new product sales over the life cycle and is assumed to be 
influenced by investments into the marketing stock. Research on diffusion processes and 
product life cycles provides broad evidence for the dependence of growth dynamics on 
marketing-mix variables (e.g., Bass, Jain and Krishnan 2000; Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef 
2010). The marketing stock S follows a dynamic process that satisfies the differential equation 
(Nerlove and Arrow 1962) 
,     (2) 
where x denotes marketing expenditures and δ is the depreciation rate of the marketing stock. 
Let k denote the country with the index set K and i denote the product, whereas the set of 
products offered in country k may vary and is given by Ik. Let n denote the type of marketing 
activity or spending category, respectively, and Ni be the associated index set that may vary 
across products. We omit the time argument unless it is needed for an unambiguous 
understanding. Ski is an Ni-dimensional row vector summarizing the activity-specific 
marketing stocks for product i. Let ET measure the elapsed time since launch of a product in t 
= 0, r be a discount rate, 0 <r<∞, p denote price, c be marginal cost, and xn be activity-specific 
marketing expenditures. The constrained dynamic profit maximization problem of the firm is 
 
 
(Budget constraint) (3.1) 
, (State variable equation) (3.2) 
 (Boundary conditions) (3.3) 
SkinT is free but must be nonnegative and satisfy the budget constraint. In the Appendix, we 
show how this problem can be solved by employing the calculus of variations together with 
( ),   0,   and 0  knowndS S x x S
dt
δ= − + ≥
{ ( ) ( )0
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ki ki ki ki ki ki kink K i I k K i I n Nt
Max e p c q ET t x dt−
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈=
    Π = − ⋅ + − 
    




subject to  R= ,  with 0,
k i





,  with 0kin kin kin kin kin
dS S x x
dt
δ= − + ≥
( ) ( )00,   0 ,  and .kin kin kin kin kinTS S S S T S≥ = =
Dynamic Marketing Budget Allocation across Countries, Products, and Marketing Activities 7 
 
 
the Lagrange approach (Kamien and Schwartz 1991). Specifically, the solution to the 
 Euler-Lagrange equations is 
 
where εf(x) denotes the current-period elasticity of sales with respect to marketing 
expenditures, εg(x) measures the sales growth elasticity, γ measures the marketing carryover 
(with γ  = 1 - δ), λ is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier, and all other terms are defined as 
earlier. The star indicates that variable values correspond to the optimal solution for the 
marketing budget, which is measured as the optimal share in the fixed total budget R in 
Equation (4). In a common product portfolio, the number of allocation units tends to be quite 
large. Since the total budget R to be allocated is fixed, some stocks increase and others 
decrease in the dynamic optimum. As a result, gains and losses tend to cancel each other out 
and the second summand in the denominator of Equation (4) is close to zero. Considering the 
restriction that optimal budget shares must sum to 1 (see the Appendix), we obtain the 
following general solution for the optimal budget that is close to solution (4) 
, (5) 
with 
,   (6) 
where w is an allocation weight and all other terms are defined as earlier. 
The optimal solution considers dynamics in two different ways. First, it incorporates the 
dynamic effects of building and leveraging the marketing stock, which is reflected in the 
marketing carryover coefficient γ. Second, it accounts for the growth potential of a product 
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that is related to marketing investments as reflected in the growth elasticity εg(x). Note that our 
sales response in Equation (1) includes a growth function, g[·], that describes the evolution of 
new product sales along its life cycle. The growth elasticity measures the power of marketing 
to shape the life cycle. Hence, we assume that the growth process is endogenous with respect 
to marketing expenditures. A recent empirical study on drugs by Fischer, Leeflang and 
Verhoef (2010) supports this premise. The authors find that the shape of the life cycle is 
indeed influenced by investments in the marketing stock. More importantly, their results 
suggest that marketing investments in the growth potential of a new product have a strong 
impact on future cumulative sales and discounted cash flows. On the basis of a parametric 
growth model, we show subsequently how the optimal solution favors shifting marketing 
resources to young products so that they can leverage their endogenous growth potential. 
Equations (5) and (6) represent the first-order conditions of the constrained dynamic 
maximization problem. These conditions also need to be fulfilled by each firm under Nash 
competition. Here, each firm sets marketing budgets independently of its competitors by 
taking the competitor budgets as given. Equilibrium values may be obtained by numerically 
and simultaneously solving the budget equations for the portfolio of each competitor. Note 
that our general sales model in (1) assumes product sales being influenced by competitor 
variables such as competitive price and competitive marketing expenditures. Competitor 
actions thus have an impact on the optimal solution as they change q*, εf(x*), and εg(x*) in 
Equation (6). 
2.1.2 Allocation Solution for a Specific Growth Function. We now introduce a parametric 
growth function and derive the growth elasticity for this specific case. This enables us to 
demonstrate the effects of the growth potential on the allocation solution in more detail. 
Following the study on drug life cycles by Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef (2010) and 
consistent with our empirical application at Bayer, we specify the growth function as follows 
andt∈ [0,∞),  (7) 
where α is a scaling constant, and a and b are growth parameters that depend on the 
marketing stock. The model describes an asymmetric growth path that leads to a single peak 
in the life cycle which occurs at tPeak = a/b. Hence, the growth parameters determine the time-
to-peak sales and, as Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef (2010) also show, the height-of-peak 
sales. In addition, they define the shape of the life cycle. Equation (7) is equivalent to the 
gamma distribution, which has been frequently used by researchers because of their flexibility 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,   with , , 0ki ki ki kia b tki ki ki ki ki kig t t e a bα α−= >S SS
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to capture many shapes (see the Appendix). For example, if a = 0 it reduces to the exponential 
distribution that is characteristic for many media products such as movies. Most importantly, 
we assume that marketing investments have a long-term impact on cumulative sales that is 
mediated by the growth parameters. Figure 1 compares two life cycles that peak around the 
same time. Cumulative sales are, however, quite different because of the differences in 
growth parameters that are assumed to arise from either low or high marketing investments. 
In the appendix, we show that cumulative sales are always higher for the life cycle whose 
difference between growth parameters a and b is larger. 
Figure 1. Illustrative product life cycles for different marketing investment levels (see 
Equation 7) 
 
From Equation (7), we obtain for the growth elasticity 
, 
which can be inserted into (6) to yield the optimal allocation weight in planning period t 
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Growth parameters in low investment case:   a = 1.1, b = .10 (scale parameter α = 1)
Growth parameters in high investment case:  a = 1.6, b = .15 (scale parameter α = 1)
Cumulative sales = 198,328
Cumulative sales = 131,745
( ) ( ), ,lnkin a kin ki b kin kig x t a t bε ε ε= −
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where εa,kin and εb,kin measure the elasticity of the growth parameters with respect to 
expenditures on marketing activity n and all other terms are defined as earlier. Note that ET 
(elapsed time since launch in t = 0) accounts for differences in launch times among products 
in the portfolio context. 
2.1.3 Implications for Budget Allocation. The optimal solution provides a number of 
intuitive insights into the allocation problem. Equations (5) and (6) show that a fixed budget 
should be allocated according to a simple proportional rule. The optimal budget for a product 
relative to other products increases with its contribution margin p-c and its sales base q. 
Similarly, the larger product i’s long-term marketing effectiveness for activity n is the higher 
its budget. The long-term marketing effectiveness is composed of the short-term sales 
elasticity, the discount rate, and the marketing carryover: εf(x*)/(r+1-γ). Consequently, if long-
term marketing effectiveness is larger across all of product i's activities compared to other 
products the total budget for product i increases. Finally, Equations (5) and (6) reveal the 
importance of a product’s growth potential for budget setting as reflected by the sales growth 
elasticity. This term varies over the life cycle. It is largest at the beginning when most of the 
sales is yet to come. Hence, the potential impact of marketing expenditures on future cash 
flows is greatest at this stage, which is why young products get a higher allocation weight and 
thus a larger share in total budget. Because of the growth potential the optimal marketing 
budget might even be higher than revenues of a new product at the beginning of its life, i.e. 
the solution may suggest to spend money on products that may a temporary loss. 
The role of the growth potential term becomes more clear when we consider a specific growth 
function such as in Equation (7). Now, the optimal allocation weight is expressed in terms of 
growth parameters. From (8), it follows that the larger the difference 
 is the higher the budget for a product. For products that have 
been launched in the same year, we know that cumulative sales are higher for those products 
for which the distance between a and b is larger (see the Appendix). The distance may be 
enlarged by marketing investments to a certain extent as reflected in the elasticity parameters 
εa and εb. The growth expectations of a product also change over time. Since the growth 
potential term varies with t it accounts for this. To facilitate interpretation assume . 
Then, our measure simplifies to . For mature products, it gets 
smaller and may turn negative at some point in time. In the decline stage, the budget is likely 
to be zero as the sum of the short-term marketing elasticity and the growth potential measure 
in Equation (8) is eventually becoming smaller than zero. 




( ) ( )ln ET t a ET t b∗ ∗+ − +
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2.2 Proposed Near-optimal Allocation Rule 
The optimal budget for spending category n of product i in country k describes an endogenous 
relationship where various variables need to be in their optimum. To obtain the optimal values 
we need to solve the profit maximization problem (3) – (3.3) numerically. The use of 
numerical methods, however, has two disadvantages. First, it requires to explicitly specify the 
sales response function which limits the generalizability of the solution approach. Second, 
marketing managers are reluctant to accept results from numerical optimization because they 
do not understand how the budget recommendation is derived. While the optimization 
algorithm implicitly evaluates and trades-off factors such as marketing effectiveness, growth 
potential, or the size of the business, this process is not transparent for the manager. 
Consistent with Little (1970), we believe that simplicity of the allocation rule is important as 
it enables the manager to understand the allocation solution. The wide distribution of heuristic 
budget rules among companies (see Bigné 1995 again) despite the advances in the analytical 
marketing literature seems to support the need for simplicity in allocation methods in practice. 
We derive an allocation heuristic directly from the theoretical solution that produces near-
optimal budgets and is easy to understand for managers: 
,  (9) 
    (10) 
where 
 : Near-optimal budget for marketing activity n and product i in country k and 
period t; 
 : Heuristic allocation weight for marketing activity n and product i in country k 
and period t; 
Rt : Total budget to be allocated in period t; 
r : Discount rate (capital cost of firm, strategic business unit, etc.) ; 
γkin : Carryover coefficient of marketing activity n for product i in country k; 
εkin,t-1 : Short-term sales elasticity with respect to product i’s marketing expenditures on 
activity n in country k and available from last year; 
dki : (Percentage) contribution margin for product i in country k [= (pki-cki)/pki]; 
RVki,t-1 : Revenue level of product i in country k available from last year (= pki,t-1·qki,t-1); 
and
 
ρkit : Multiplier to measure the growth potential of product i in country k and period t. 
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The basic idea of the heuristic is to explicitly map Equations (5) and (6), the true optimum, to 
Equations (9) and (10), the heuristic approach. We do so by substituting currently available 
values for revenues and sales elasticity for their optimal values that are only endogenously 
determined by solving the equation system iteratively. We approximate the growth potential ρ 
by a multiplier that divides expected revenues in 5 years (planning horizon) by the current 
revenue level. By this heuristic approach, we assure that products get a greater share of the 
total budget as long as they are expected to grow. In contrast, when they are expected to turn 
into their decline stage their budget is reduced. Current values of revenues are available from 
last year and the contribution margin is a target figure decided by management. Data for the 
carryover coefficient, sales elasticity, and the growth multiplier are not readily available but 
must be estimated. In our empirical application, we specify a parametric response model to 
estimate these quantities econometrically. But we note that this is not a prerequisite of the 
allocation heuristic. The user may adopt other, non-parametric approaches to estimate the 
required data. 
Basically, the proposed heuristic is a simple proportional rule that integrates relevant 
information from three areas 
- the long-term effectiveness of marketing investments in the focal product, 
- the profit contribution of the focal product, 
- and the focal product’s growth expectations. 
The logic behind the selection and integration of information into a proportionality rule is 
well-founded in theory but at the same time easy to understand for practitioners.  
2.3 Testing the Near-optimality of the Allocation Rule via Simulation 
By definition, the heuristic solution is likely to differ from the optimal solution, but it should 
not deviate too much to be useful. Because the heuristic rule is a contraction mapping on the 
theoretical optimum, it exhibits a fixed point property. According to the Banach fixed-point 
theorem, an iterative sequence such as (9) and (10) where values are subsequently replaced by 
values closer to the fixed point will converge to the fixed point, which is in our case the true 
optimum (Granas and Gurundji 2003). Note that this holds also under Nash competition 
because the Nash equilibrium establishes the fixed point. The interesting question is how fast 
the convergence process is. 
To analyze the performance of the heuristic we therefore conducted an experimental 
simulation study (for full details see the Web Appendix). In this study, we analyze a firm with 
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a product portfolio of four products.2 We consider two scenarios, a single-firm scenario and a 
competitive scenario including a second firm with a portfolio of four products. Sales is 
generated by a multiplicative market response function, the most frequent type of response in 
empirical studies (Hanssens, Parsons and Schultz 2001). The response function includes an 
asymmetric growth function, consistent with Equation (7), and two expenditure categories, 
whose stocks evolve according to Equation (2). Six factors that characterize the products in 
the portfolio were experimentally manipulated: current-period elasticities, carryover 
coefficients, size of the revenue bases, profit contribution margins, growth parameters, and 
launch dates as reflected in the elapsed times since launch. Each factor has two levels. The 
initial condition assumes equally distributed budgets across the two marketing activities and 
four products. We use a five year planning horizon, and the objective criterion is the 
discounted profit over the five years. 
Optimal budgets are obtained by numerically solving the dynamic optimization problem as 
described by Equations (3)-(3.3). To reduce overall computation time, which is especially 
high in the competitive scenario, we construct an efficient Latin-square design that contains  
eight portfolio profiles. Profiles are randomly assigned to the two competitors. Consistent 
with practice, we simulate an annually recurring budget planning process and investigate 12 
planning cycles. We compare the performance of the heuristic with the optimal solution in 
terms of (profit) suboptimality and match with the optimally allocated budget (for details, see 
the Web Appendix). Figure 2 shows how these two performance criteria develop over time 
(the number of planning cycles). 
Values in Figure 2 represent mean values across the 16 experimental conditions. If we do not 
apply the heuristic rule to improve the initial naïve budget allocation the deviation from 
discounted profits of the optimal solution amounts to 19.2% on average. This suboptimality 
increases to 28.6% after 12 planning cycles (not shown in Figure 2). The match with the 
optimal budget allocation is 47.1% and remains around this level (50% after 12 planning 
cycles). As Figure 2 shows, we already achieve a dramatic improvement with our heuristic 
rule in the first planning cycle (4.3% profit suboptimality and 74.6% match with optimal 
budget allocation). Moreover, the rule quickly converges to the optimal solution when it is 
repeatedly used in the following planning cycles (0.95% profit suboptimality and 90.7% 
match with optimal budget allocation). This result holds under both the single-firm and the 
competitive scenario. Hence, the proposed rule appears to be a useful allocation heuristic. 
                                                 
2
 We also tried larger product portfolios, e.g., with eight products. Results do not change but computation time 
increases exponentially. 
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Figure 2. Performance of heuristic rule relative to optimal solution 
 
3 Background for Implementation in Practice 
3.1 Company Background 
Together with the management of Bayer, we implemented and adapted the proposed heuristic 
to the specifics of Bayer’s Primary Care business unit in the period 2005-2006 and derived 
budget recommendations for 2007. Bayer belongs to the leading companies in the 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals business sector of the world. As of 2008, the company had 
EUR 32.9 billion sales and around 107,000 employees (Bayer 2009). Bayer consists of three 
major business areas: Bayer HealthCare, Bayer CropScience, and Bayer MaterialScience. 
Bayer Healthcare is the largest area in terms of sales contributing almost 50% to total sales. In 
2008, the business area reported EUR 15.4 billion in sales positioning Bayer among the top 
10 pharmaceutical firms worldwide. Bayer Healthcare is divided into a prescription drug 
business (Pharmaceuticals: EUR 10.7 billion) and an OTC drug business (Consumer Health: 
EUR 4.7 billion). The prescription drug business is composed of several business units. 
Primary Care is the largest unit (EUR 3.1 billion) and our focus for implementation of the 
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Note: Data points represent averages from 16 experimental situations, 8 under monopoly and 8 under duopoly condition.
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Specialized Therapeutics, are rather new to the company as they mainly belong to Schering, a 
pharmaceutical competitor Bayer acquired in 2006. 
3.2 Market Background 
The Primary Care business unit of Bayer comprises prescription drugs that operate in four 
separate competitive market environments or therapeutic areas, respectively. These drugs treat 
diabetes, hypertension, erectile dysfunction, and infectious diseases. The hypertension 
segment is the largest one that includes several subcategories, such as beta blockers, calcium 
channel blockers, ACE inhibitors, and AII-antagonists. Bayer has several offerings in this 
segment. With EUR 626 m, the calcium channel blocker Adalat is its best-selling drug (Bayer 
2009) which has already been in the market since the mid-1970s. Although the drug has lost 
patent protection more than 20 years ago and is facing increasing generic competition it 
contributes substantially to sales and profits of the Primary Care business unit. Avelox and 
Ciprobay are Bayer’s drugs in the Antiinfectives business (EUR 445 m and 338 m). While 
Avelox is an innovative, young drug under patent protection, Ciprobay recently lost patent 
protection. In the antidiabetes segment, Glucobay is also off-patent and generated EUR 304 m 
in sales in 2008. All three mentioned therapeutic areas represent established areas which are 
in their saturation stage. Due to the aging of population in industrialized societies and 
innovative new product introductions they are, however, expected to continue to grow at 
moderate rates in the future. The biggest challenge for Bayer in these areas is to keep its 
market position. Innovative drugs by other global players are the main competitors for the 
Bayer drugs. In contrast, the market for the treatment of erectile dysfunction is a new category 
that was pioneered by Pfizer with its Viagra brand in 1998. Bayer and Eli Lilly followed in 
2003 with the introduction of their brands Levitra and Cialis, respectively. Levitra achieved 
EUR 341 m in 2008. The market is still growing and does not face generic competitors yet. 
To summarize, the Primary Care business unit of Bayer holds a broad portfolio of drugs that 
are at different stages in their life cycle, face varying conditions of competition, and differ in 
their contributions to sales/profits.Hence, the challenge for the management was to find a 
balance in the allocation of marketing resources that trades off the size of the business, the 
growth expectations, and eventually the effectiveness of marketing expenditures. The main 
objective was to improve the process and results of annual budget allocation in order to 
maximize discounted profits from the product portfolio over a planning horizon of five years. 
Bayer invests substantial resources in marketing and sales activities. Total marketing and 
selling expenditures were EUR 7.1 billion (∼21.5% of total sales) in 2008. For confidentiality 
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reasons, we cannot report on exact figures for the Primary Care product portfolio. The lion’s 
share is spent on detailing targeted at general practitioners and specialists. Competitors also 
spent a significant share of their budget on pharmacists detailing. In addition, Bayer invests in 
print advertisements, direct mailing activities, invitations of physicians to symposia, and other 
marketing activities. The implementation of the allocation tool is targeted at the five main 
European countries which contribute the largest share to total sales. The U.S. market provides 
also a substantial portion of sales. However, the Bayer products are marketed here by licensee 
firms. Hence, budget decisions are not under the control of the Bayer management. 
4. Data and Model Estimation 
4.1 Data 
To calibrate the heuristic allocation tool for Bayer we need to estimate a number of input 
variables. Specifically, we require product-specific data on the short-term sales elasticity of 
different types of marketing investments, carryover coefficients, and information to compute 
the growth multiplier. For this purpose, we use 10 years (1996-2006) of quarterly marketing 
and sales data at the product level to estimate a market response model for each product 
market. IMS Health, Inc. provided data on unit sales counted in standard units, revenues (all 
in EUR), and the date of product launch, which we use to obtain order-of-entry and life-cycle 
information. We computed prices from revenues and unit sales. Via their CAM database, 
CEGEDIM, S.A. provided information on detailing expenditures targeted at general 
practitioners, specialists, and pharmacists. In addition, we have information available on 
professional journal advertising expenditures (including direct mailing), expenditures on 
physicians for invitations to symposia, meetings, etc. (hereafter denoted as meeting 
invitations), and other expenditures (hereafter denoted as OME). 
The database covers the four strategic Bayer Primary Care prescription drug businesses 
Antidiabetes, Hypertension, Erectile Dysfunction, and Antiinfectives in five countries, 
Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Spain. Bayer management helped us to identify the 
relevant subcategories and competitors within each therapeutic area by country. Subcategories 
vary from 12 for Antiinfectives to one for Erectile Dysfunction. Products vary from 15 for the 
Erectile Dysfunction area and 306 for the Hypertension area (see Table 1). 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Antidiabetes  Hypertension  Erectile 
dysfunction 
 Antiinfectives 
 Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Unit sales in thousand standard units 16,319 20,674   11,891 16,649   1,008 649   5,291 8,004 
Elapsed time since launch in years 14.50 12.69  10.00 7.42  2.75 1.91  12.25 10.45 
Order of entry (Median) 3   4    2      3  
Price in EUR per standard unit .16 .26  .50 2.96   7.00 .48   2.01 1.97 
Marketing stock variables             
Detailing at general practitioners 
in thousand EUR 
22,519 36,566  64,595 87,134   55,026 30,326   44,259 34,930 
Detailing at specialists in thousand EUR 2,081 4,068  8,803 13,701   14,498 12,771   10,380 11,353 
Detailing at pharmacies in thousand EUR 588 1,453  1,930 3,039   1)   1,766 2,598 
Professional journal advertising 
in thousand EUR 
149 341  1)   458 502   165 295 
Meeting invitations in thousand EUR 730 2,030  1,361 3,062   3,884 2,481   471 837 
Other marketing expenditures in thousand 
EUR 
1)
   2,558 9,278   3,912 4,404   1) 
















# of subcategories    
# of products    
# of observations    
Notes: All units and EUR figures are on a quarterly basis. The marketing stock Skint for activity n of drug i in country k and period t is defined as , where 
δTA is the quarterly decay rate, specific for each therapeutic area TA, and x measures the marketing expenditures. We used a numerical search algorithm to estimate the decay 
coefficient in a first-stage non-linear regression of Equation (11) that minimizes the residual sum of squares. Due to the complexity of our model, we could only identify decay 
parameters at the level of the therapeutic area. With better data, a brand- and marketing-activity-specific parameter may be obtained. If we did not observe initial stocks we 
imputed the first quarter by dividing the average quarterly expenditures of the first observed year by the decay coefficient. 
1)
 Spending category was only rarely used by firms. 
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Table 1 also shows mean values and standard deviations for the variables used in estimation. 
The detailing stocks for general practitioners are highest, followed by the stocks for 
specialists. Stocks are computed consistent with Equation (2) (see also Berndt et al. 1994). 
Details on estimation are given in Table 1. The carryover is highest for Hypertension which is 
a chronic disease and lowest for Antiinfectives that are usually used for a one-time therapy 
(see also Tables 2a and 2b). Note that not all marketing spending categories are equally 
utilized across the different markets. For example, OME for antidiabetes and anitinfective 
drugs are rarely used, so that the data is not rich enough for estimating reliable marketing 
effects. Prices are highest in the youngest category, the Erectile Dysfunction category. Finally, 
we note that sample sizes differ to a great extent due to the number of brands. The Erectile 
Dysfunction category has only been launched in 1998, so that we have the smallest sample 
size here that limits model estimation to some extent. Finally, note that the samples are 
unbalanced, i.e. several drugs were launched after the start of the observation period and a 
few drugs left the market during that period. Thus, we observe 25.6 quarters per drugs on 
average. 
4.2 Specification of Market Response Model 
Following Fischer and Albers (2010), we specify a double-log sales response function for 
each therapeutic area. Let sales of drug i in country k and period t be defined as follows: 
   (11) 
where 
qkit : Unit sales of drug i in country k and period t; 
gp_sdetkit : Stock of detailing expenditures at general practitioners of drug i in country k 
and period t; 
sp_sdetkit : Stock of detailing expenditures at specialists of drug i in country k and period t; 
ph_sdetkit : Stock of detailing expenditures at pharmacists of drug i in country k and period 
t; 
sadvkit : Stock of professional journal advertising expenditures of drug i in country k 
and period t; 
smeetkit : Stock of expenditures on meeting invitations of drug i in country k and period t; 
sOMEkit : Stock of other marketing expenditures of drug i in country k and period t; 
scompkit : Stock of cumulative marketing expenditures by drug i’s competitors in country 
k and period t; 
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prckit : Price of drug i in country k and period t; 
comprckit : Average price by drug i’s competitors in country k and period t; 
OEki : Order of entry by subcategory of drug i in country k; 
stotkit : Stock of drug i’s total marketing expenditures in country k and period t; 
ETkit : Elapsed time since launch of drug i in country k and period t; 
CTYk : Country dummy variable for country k (1 for k = l, 0 else); 
SDht : Seasonal dummy variable for quarter h and period t (1/0); 
α, β, γ,γ’ : (Unobserved) parameter vectors; 
υ, σ² : Error terms and error variances; 
i : Index for drug that belongs to country-specific set Ik; 
k = 1, 2, …, l, …, M (number of countries); 
t = 1, 2, …, Ti (number of periods per drug); and 
h = 1, 2, …, H (quarters of the year). 
The α1-6-parameters measure the effects of own marketing expenditure stock variables. β1 
captures the effect of competitive marketing expenditures which are observable to competitors. 
We combine all expenditure types in a cumulative stock variable. We could have specified a 
greater number of more differentiated competitor variables. Since our interest does not rest on 
competitive effects, we save degrees of freedom by using a composite variable. The same 
argument applies for the average competitor price that we include in addition to own price. 
The sales model does not incorporate a distribution variable. Since pharmacies in Europe are 
required to list every prescription drug there is no variation in this variable. 
We include interactions of the stock of total marketing expenditures with elapsed time and the 
log of elapsed time to measure an asymmetric growth function that is consistent with 
Equation (7). By this specification, we assume that the growth parameters a and bare scaled 
by the stock whereas β5 and β6 measure the two scaling factors and are to be estimated. Note 
that the resulting growth parameters a and b are drug-specific since they are determined by a 
drug's total marketing stock. 
Finally, our model incorporates a number of control variables that have been shown to impact 
sales of pharmaceuticals. With order of entry, we control for the disadvantage of a late market 
entry (e.g. Berndt et al. 1995). Since order of entry is defined at the subcategory level we may 
have more than one pioneer drug in a therapeutic area. We account for product quality, brand 
equity, and other unobserved time-invariant variables by specifying a random drug-specific 
constant (α0ki). Since we include the randomness into the conditional mean function but not 
the error term we avoid potential endogeneity issues that arise from the correlation of 
unobserved product quality, brand equity, etc. with marketing-mix variables (Fischer and 
Albers 2010). Even though we do not model endogeneity in budget setting, e.g., allocating 
resources to more effective activities as represented by elasticities α1-6,we effectively control 
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for it and obtain consistent parameter estimates. We account for market size differences by 
including country dummies. Seasonal dummy variables by country control for seasonal 
variation in demand. 
4.3 Estimation and Results 
4.3.1 Estimation. We estimate four models, one for each therapeutic area. The specification 
of the sales model accounts for heterogeneity in the constant term and marketing effectiveness. 
We impose the following heterogeneity structure on these parameters: 
,    (12) 
whereαkiv represents an unknown drug-specific parameter associated with predictor v∈ [0,6], 
 are heterogeneity parameters to be estimated, and η1ki and η2ki denote variance 
components that vary by drug and country. The implied variance of αkiv is ( ). The 
variance-covariance matrix for αki is given by Σ= ΛΛ’. 
We adopt the estimation approach used by Fischer and Albers (2010). Estimation also 
produces a set of posterior means of the drug-specific elasticity parameters (for details, see 
Fischer and Albers 2010). 
4.3.2 Results. Tables 2a and 2b show the results of model estimations. Due to confidentiality 
reasons, we cannot show individual estimates for Bayer products. Reported estimates 
therefore reflect market averages. In-sample model fit is very good across all four therapeutic 
areas. Pseudo R², which is based on the squared correlation between predicted and observed 
values of the criterion variable, ranges from .933 (Hypertension) to .973 (Erectile 
dysfunction). Since we account for drug heterogeneity, it is quite high. In a few cases, a 
marketing spending category was used by only a very small number of firms leading to an 
inflation of zero-stock values (e.g., OME for Antidiabetes and Antiinfectives). Estimation of 
marketing effects was unreliable in such cases, so that we excluded this variable from the 
model. The relatively low number of 233 observations in the young Erectile Dysfunction 
category created collinearity issues for the interactions of total marketing stock with the 
elapsed-time variables and for the price variables. Since we could not separate the associated 
effects we estimated only main effects with respect to elapsed time since launch and the own 
price effect. In addition, we include a dummy variable for the pioneer Viagra, because only 
two competitors followed in the same quarter and the common order-of-entry variable lacks 
variation.
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2,   whith , ~ 0,1   and , 0kiv v v ki v ki ki ki ki kiN Covα α λ η λ η η η η η= + + =
1 2, ,  and v v vα λ λ
2 2
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 Table 2a.Estimation results for market response models (Equation 11): Antidiabetes and Hypertension categories 
 Antidiabetes  Hypertension 
















Constant 5.32 (.202)  .904 (.019)  9.06 (.154)  1.98 (.021) 
Ln(elapsed time since launch) × total 
marketing stock 
.225×10-5 (.155×10-12)     .897×10-8 (.470×10-9)    
Elapsed time since launch × total 
marketing stock 
-.531×10-9 (.598×10-14)     -.503×10-9 (.383×10-10)    
Ln(own price) -.597 (.026)     -.911 (.013)    
Ln(average competitor price) -.449 (.024)                -.049     (.018)    
Ln(order of entry) -.256 (.016)     -.225 (.011)    
Marketing stock variables            
Category-specific carryover 
coefficient (annual level) 
.57    .78   
Ln(detailing at general practitioners) .103 (.005)  .046 (.004)  .193 (.004)  .100 (.003) 
Ln(detailing at specialists) .016 (.007)  .089 (.005)  .047 (.004)  .085 (.003) 
Ln(detailing at pharmacies) .035 (.005)  .034 (.003)            .035   (.003)  .070 (.003) 
Ln(professional journal advertising) .060 (.010)           .032    (.006)   1)    
Ln(meeting invitations)           .023     (.006)  .030 (.005)  .019 (.003)  .016 (.003) 
Ln(other marketing expenditures)  1)     .001 (.003) NS           .033    (.002) 
Ln(cumulative competitive marketing 
expenditures) 
-.008 (.015) NS     -.224 (.011)    









Pseudo R²    
# of observations    
# of products    
Notes: NS = not significant (p> .05). Product-specific parameter estimates for Bayer brands cannot be shown for confidentiality reasons. Effects for country dummies and 
seasonal dummies are not shown but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
1)













































 Table 2b. Estimation results for market response models (Equation 11): Erectile dysfunction and Antiinfectives categories 
 Antiinfectives  Erectile dysfunction 
















Constant 8.95 (.216)  1.50 (.054)  .138 (.626) NS  2.84 (.315) 
Ln(elapsed time since launch) × total 
marketing stock 
.133×10-7 (.885×10-13)     .477 (.130) 1)    
Elapsed time since launch × total 
marketing stock 
-.299×10-9 (.516×10-14)     -.036 (.017) 1)    
Ln(own price) -.803 (.070)     -.848 (.255)    
Ln(average competitor price) -.023 (.068) NS     1)    
Ln(order of entry) -.267 (.011)          
Pioneer dummy       .540 (.109)    
Marketing stock variables            
Category-specific carryover 
coefficient (annual level) 
.33    .52   
Ln(detailing at general practitioners) .254 (.009)  .107 (.007)  .464 (.042)  .201 (.049) 
Ln(detailing at specialists) .032 (.005)  .029 (.004)  .080 (.031)  .032 (.026) NS 
Ln(detailing at pharmacies) .035 (.004)  .021 (.003)  2)    
Ln(professional journal advertising) .026 (.004)           .037     (.003)  .079 (.034)  .075 (.023) 
Ln(meeting invitations)            .004    (.003) NS  .011 (.003)  .059 (.047) NS  .080 (.042) NS 
Ln(other marketing expenditures)  2)     .034 (.014)           .032    (.012) 
Ln(cumulative competitive marketing 
expenditures) 
-.273 (.014)     -.007 (.008) NS    









Pseudo R²    
# of observations    
# of products    
Notes: NS = not significant (p> .05). Product-specific parameter estimates for Bayer brands cannot be shown for confidentiality reasons. Effects for country dummies and 
seasonal dummies are not shown but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
1)
 Due to the small number of observations and associated collinearity issues we were unable to fit a model that includes competitor price and interactions of the elapsed-time-
since-launch variables with total marketing stock. Therefore, results do not reflect interactions but main effects of elapsed time since launch. 
2)













































Dynamic Marketing Budget Allocation across Countries, Products, and Marketing Activities 23 
 
 
In a double-log model, parameter estimates for marketing-mix variables correspond to 
elasticities. These elasticities refer to marketing stock variables and reflect long-term 
elasticities with respect to current-period expenditures. To obtain short-term elasticities the 
stock elasticity needs to be multiplied with the decay coefficient. Elasticities for detailing and 
other marketing activities vary substantially across the different therapeutic areas. In general, 
they are highest in the Erectile Dysfunction category, which is not surprising as this category 
is the youngest category and still in its growth phase. Among the detailing elasticities, GP 
detailing appears to be more effective than detailing at specialists and pharmacists. However, 
considering that specialists account only for a share of ca. 20% in Antidiabetes and ca. 27% in 
Hypertension, segment-specific specialist detailing elasticities are 4-5 times higher. Note, for 
the application of our allocation heuristic, the sales elasticities with respect to total brand sales 
as reported in Tables 2a and 2b are relevant. Elasticities for professional journal advertising, 
meeting invitations and OME are usually considerably smaller than elasticities for detailing at 
physicians. Finally, we note that the estimated effects are within the range of results of recent 
studies on pharmaceuticals (e.g., Albers, Mantrala and Sridhar 2010; Fischer and Albers 
2010). 
In terms of control variables, we find significant but inelastic own price effects. For 
competitive prices, we find negative cross-effects. This finding is consistent with Fischer and 
Albers (2010) who provide an explanation for negative cross-effects. The impact of 
competitive marketing expenditures is negative across all therapeutic areas although it is not 
always statistically significant. We find a negative elasticity for order of entry, as expected. 
Although not reported in Tables 2a and 2b, seasonal effects are only relevant to Antiinfectives, 
which experience a high season in autumn and winter. 
4.3.2 Model Validation. We checked whether our model specification and estimation is 
appropriate for the data in several ways. First, we split the data sets into an estimation and a 
holdout sample. For the holdout, we used the four quarters of the last year of our observation 
period. Pseudo R² in the holdout samples ranged from .922 (Hypertension) to .972 (Erectile 
dysfunction) and were only slightly lower than those of the estimation samples. The same 
picture emerges with respect to the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) that ranges 
from 1.14% (Erectile dysfunction) to 4.24% (Hypertension) and strongly supports the 
predictive validity of our response model. Second, we compared the suggested log-log brand 
sales model with a linear model, a semi-log model, and an S-shaped model. The Davidson and 
MacKinnon (1981) test for unnested models suggests that the proposed specification is 
superior to the alternative specifications. By adding predicted values from an alternative 
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response model to the predictor set of the focal model, the test checks for the additional 
explanatory power of the alternative specification. Finally, we checked whether the residuals 
follow an autoregressive process by using the test for common factors (Greene 2006). We did 
not find evidence for it. Note that our sales model already incorporates dynamics in terms of 
marketing stock variables and the life-cycle function. 
5 Model Implementation and Impact 
In this section, we describe how we implemented the allocation heuristic into a Decision 
Support Tool in a spreadsheet environment. Further, we discuss the various impacts the new 
tool and the project had on the Bayer organization. 
5.1 Excel-based Decision Support Tool 
We developed a Decision Support Tool that integrates the proposed allocation heuristic into 
an Excel-based software program. Excel is particularly suitable for applications in practice as 
it is widely spread and easy to understand (Albers 2000). The tool is to assist the management 
with providing budget scenarios and their implications for the development of market shares 
and profits over the next five years. Specifically, the tool produces a recommendation for the 
allocation of the total marketing budget that is based on data on the effectiveness of marketing 
expenditures including carryover and discounting effects, the size of the product's business, 
product profitability, and growth expectations (see Equations 9 and 10). 
The tool applies to Bayer’s Primary Care product portfolio and covers expenditures in six 
spending categories for 36 products in four therapeutic areas and five countries as described 
earlier. Hence, at the product-country-activity level, 36 (products) × 6 (spending categories) = 
216 allocation decisions are made. It may easily be applied to other product portfolios that 
may be smaller or larger in size. Consistent with the periodicity of the response model 
estimation, metrics such as carryover coefficients, growth multipliers, etc. are defined at the 
quarterly level. The same applies to market-share and profit simulations. Based on the 
response model (11), the tool demonstrates the impact of budget decisions on sales and profits 
by extrapolating the evolution of sales and profits over the next five years. 
The heuristic rule requires to compute an allocation weight for each marketing spending 
category and each drug (see Equation 10). Input data have been obtained either from 
econometric analysis or internal records. The plausibility of input data, especially the 
estimated sales elasticities, has been extensively discussed with different groups of managers 
in several workshops (global marketing, market research, product management, sales 
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management, controlling, etc.). Internal records provided data on the discount rate, the profit 
contribution margin, and last year's product revenues. Estimation of the sales response model 
(11) produced data on the carryover coefficient, short-term sales elasticities, and the growth 
potential multiplier. Computation of the growth potential multiplier, ρ, is based on the life-
cycle function (7) that is incorporated into (11). Specifically, 
where T is the forecast horizon (20 quarters or 5 years, respectively), and  and  are 
estimated growth parameters. Since they depend on the marketing stock we obtain estimated 
values from the last period. 
Following the needs of management, we extended the tool in two ways. First, we included a 
threshold for product budgets. Although our demand analysis did not find evidence for an S-
shaped response that justifies a threshold, management required a threshold because of 
internal setup costs that are fixed at the product and marketing-activity level. Second, we 
allowed for manual adjustments to budgets recommended by the heuristic. By this feature, 
management can account for exogenous restrictions to budget setting, e.g., to counter 
competitive attacks in a predetermined way. In addition, it enables management to investigate 
the effects of budget scenarios on market share and profit as well as on the recommended 
budgets for other products and marketing activities. Technically, the budget for an allocation 
unit is exogenously set and subtracted from the total budget. The remaining budget is 
allocated according to the heuristic. 
The Excel-based decision support system offers a powerful tool to generate budget allocation 
options and analyze these options with respect to their economic consequences. The tool is 
easy to use and flexible enough to adapt to varying conditions of decision making. 
5.2 Impact on Managerial Decision Making 
The effort to develop and implement the budget allocation tool had significant impact on 
managerial decision making that is reflected in several aspects. 
5.2.1. Providing Structure to the Problem. The suggested allocation heuristic provides 
structure to a complex decision problem. 216 budget decisions arise from allocating a total 
budget across six spending categories for 36 drugs that are marketed in different countries and 
therapeutic areas. The market positions of these products are quite diverse and determined by 
product age and competition. Depending on age and expected changes in the competitive and 
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market environment, products offer different growth potentials. As a first benefit, the 
allocation rule provides the required information to solve the problem. These information fall 
into three groups. The first group refers to the effectiveness of marketing expenditures to 
build goodwill and impact sales in the long run (short-run elasticity and discounted carryover). 
The second group includes information on a product’s contribution to profit. This depends on 
the contribution margin (price minus marginal cost) as well as the size of the revenue base. 
The third group emphasizes the growth expectations of the product. It uses information on 
where the product stands in its life cycle. 
5.2.2. Providing Solution to the Problem. While management had a good understanding of 
the type of information required for budget decisions it benefited much from the new insights 
offered by the heuristic. Specifically, the allocation rule suggests that information on (1) long-
term marketing effectiveness, (2) profit contribution, and (3) growth potential are to be 
combined in a multiplicative fashion. Implications from this rule are straightforward. (1) 
Products that generate more incremental sales with the same budget should get a larger slice 
of the total budget. Of course, relative incremental sales tend to decline as sales and budgets 
increase due to saturation effects. The budget ratio of two products reflects their ratio in terms 
of sales elasticity. (2) The same principle of proportionality applies to the size of sales or 
profit contribution, respectively. Products with a higher level of profit contribution generate 
more financial resources to cover their own marketing expenditures and contribute more to 
overall profits. (3) Marketing should support growing and not declining products and shift 
resources over the life cycle. 
The rule also teaches that the drivers of a product’s near-optimal budget share interact with 
each other, i.e. there exist synergies between them. Finally, it makes the tradeoffs in budget 
allocation transparent. For example, a product with high marketing effectiveness but a low 
profit contribution level could get a lower budget than a product with a high level of profit 
contribution but lower marketing effectiveness. Even though that product’s spending is less 
effective it may still contribute more to overall profit because of its larger sales base. 
5.2.3. Understanding the Limitations of Separate ROI Analysis. Management was initially 
very focused on comparing incremental ROIs that result from raising/decreasing marketing 
expenditures for individual products and marketing activities (hereafter denoted as separate 
ROI analysis). Profit calculations with the allocation tool quickly revealed the limitations of 
such an analysis. First, separate ROI analyses for individual marketing activities do not 
consider synergies between marketing activities that interact with each other. Profit 
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simulations for several brands, for example, showed that the ROI of a 10% budget increase in 
a specific spending category is negative but turns positive if the budget increase is 
accompanied by a reallocation across the different spending categories. Hence, the synergy 
between marketing activities is only exploited by the allocation heuristic but not by separate 
ROI considerations. Second, separate ROI analyses do not consider the trade-offs that exist 
with respect to potential profit improvements by other products and activities. For example, 
even though simulated ROIs for a few products were positive the allocation heuristic 
suggested reducing the current budget on these products. The reason is that free budget 
resources were transferred to other products where the incremental return was even higher. 
Third, separate ROI analyses do not inform about the magnitude of budget changes for 
products and activities, given a fixed total budget. Marginal returns analysis teaches that it 
should be increased until ROI gets zero. However, if other products’ budgets are also raised it 
may exceed the total budget constraint. The allocation heuristic produces exact results for the 
recommended allocation of a fixed budget within one step. 
5.3 Organizational Impact 
The introduction of the allocation tool had a considerable impact on the organization. The 
project was part of a larger effort that aimed at revising the organization’s tools and processes 
to evaluate marketing initiatives in terms of their financial implications. This effort had the 
full attention of the managing board of Bayer. Budget decisions are often associated with 
several rounds of intensive discussions that follow a bottom-up process, i.e. product and 
country managers communicate their budget needs for the next year upwards. Budget 
discussions in companies are probably never fully free of politics and individual agendas. The 
allocation tool adds an independent, top-down perspective. Since it is strictly based on a range 
of verifiable input information its recommendations are fully fact-based. Assumptions about 
marketing effectiveness and other drivers may be discussed. Their implications for budget 
allocation are immediately transparent through application of the tool. Because of its 
transparency and top-down perspective, the allocation tool ameliorates the decision process 
that often appears emotional and inefficient. 
Although the allocation tool is not the only source used by Bayer to generate budget options, 
it has significantly improved the efficiency and quality of the decision process. The project 
contributed substantially to an organizational transformation that eventually resulted into the 
creation of a completely new marketing intelligence unit called Global Business Support. This 
unit supports global marketing management and sales including the global management board 
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with tools, results, and recommendations for a more efficient and effective use of marketing 
resources. 
5.4 Strategic Impact 
Application of the tool initiated an important strategic discussion within the firm. The results 
suggested that some older products which still hold a strong position in sizable markets did 
not get sufficient marketing resources anymore. The allocation tool showed a substantial 
profit improvement potential from shifting more resources to these older products. 
The results also initiated a discussion about the targets of sales calls and the relevance of 
accompanying marketing activities. In terms of targets, the results suggested to reconsider the 
strong focus on specialists. It seemed that due to higher frequency of sales calls at specialists 
by competitors, effectiveness is lower relative to sales calls at general practitioners. 
Consequently, the tool proposed to reallocate resources among those two target groups. In 
addition, the results suggested that the potential of accompanying activities such as meeting 
invitations and OME were not fully exploited, yet. 
5.5 Financial Impact 
The tool enables the user to simulate the financial impact of different budget allocation 
options. By analyzing the simulation results, it provides transparency about the impact of 
different assumptions on financial results. Based on the year 2007, the simulation suggested 
an increase in discounted profits of 55% over the next five years due to an optimized 
allocation. This is worth of EUR 493 m. In contrast, changing the overall budget by 20% 
promised a profit impact of less than 5%. Even if only a small portion of this increase can be 
realized, the additional profit for a business unit such as Primary Care with EUR 3 billion 
worldwide sales is substantial. 
Actual profit improvements are hard to evaluate. First, management did not completely follow 
the suggested reallocation by the tool for several reasons (e.g., varying personal experiences, 
concerns about errors in IMS data). Second, activities by competitors and exogenous 
influences on market dynamics impact profit results. Nevertheless, the business area Bayer 
HealthCare reports an increase in EBIT of 12% (EUR 273 m) compared to a 4% revenue 
increase for the year 2008 (Bayer 2009). Although we have no validation from a field test, 
these results are consistent with prior observations that reallocation really focuses on the 
bottom-line. 




Although the tool was applied to prescription drugs we emphasize that it is suitable for many 
other industries such as consumer durables, consumer packaged goods, etc. In all these 
markets, rich information is available at the aggregate product level that allows the calibration 
of market response models. But even if data on marketing effectiveness, carryover, etc. cannot 
be estimated with aggregate market response models, other data and methods including 
choice models and managerial experiments are available to generate the required input data 
for allocation. In this respect, we are not aware of a limitation to apply the allocation heuristic 
in other industries. 
6 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 
In this paper, we suggest an innovative approach to allocate a global marketing budget across 
countries, products, and marketing activities. Based on the theoretical solution to the dynamic 
optimization problem, we derive a simple but comprehensive heuristic that accounts for 
dynamics in marketing effects and product growth. It suggests to allocate a budget 
proportionally to the size of the business (sales and profit contribution margin), the 
effectiveness of the marketing activities (short-term elasticity and carryover coefficient), and 
the growth potential of the product (growth multiplier accounting for time discounting). A 
simulation study demonstrates that the heuristic quickly converges to the optimal solution 
under both monopoly and competitive conditions. The implementation of the heuristic at 
Bayer had various significant impacts on the organization. It revealed substantial profit 
improvement potentials by reallocating marketing resources for the Primary Care business 
unit. It also improved the quality and efficiency of the budget allocation process and 
contributed to organizational change. 
Our research has limitations that may stimulate future research. First, we have analyzed 
budget allocation issues under the assumption of a specific response function which has been 
found to best represent the data in this study. It would be interesting to extend the application 
to other response functions including different growth functions. Second, our simulation study 
covers only a limited range of conditions. Additional conditions such as more competitors and 
errors in input data may be analyzed and the number of scenarios extended. It would also be 
good to understand which conditions have a critical influence on the performance of the 
heuristic. Third, the tool may be extended to compute uncertainty bounds for recommended 
budget and market share and profit simulations. This would add a risk-analysis perspective to 
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the application. Finally, we note that our research lacks an experimental field test that is hard 
to implement in a global portfolio worth of EUR 3 billion. Future applications to smaller 
portfolios might, however, overcome this limitation and test the superiority of the suggested 
heuristic. Finally, we assume that the overall marketing budget is set exogenously. Unless the 
budget level is optimal, there is still profit improvement potential. The flat maximum 
principle, however, suggests that this potential is very small, provided the budget is set within 
a reasonable wide range around the true optimal level (Tull et al. 1986). 




1 Derivation of Theoretical Allocation Solution for Arbitrary Growth and Response 
Functions 
We consider the constrained dynamic profit maximization problem as stated in Equations (3)-
(3.3). We assume that the sales function in Equation 1 is twice differentiable in t and S. Note 
that it is sufficient to maximize profit contribution before marketing cost because these cost 
are fixed by the total budget and thus not relevant to the optimization. Using the state variable 
equation (3.2) to substitute xkin in the objective function (3), we can write the following 
Lagrange objective functional 
 
Note that the budget constraint (3.1) has to be fulfilled in each period, which may entail a 
time-varying Lagrange multiplier. A solution requires solving the  Euler-
Lagrange equations, which constitute the first-order conditions 
 
(A.2a) 
        
and 
,     (A.2b) 
where is the Lagrangean integrand and the star indicates that variable 
values correspond to the optimal solution for the marketing budget. Note that each competitor 
has to satisfy these conditions under Nash competition. The required derivatives to solve 
(A.2a) are 
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         (A.3b) 
 
         (A.3c) 
Setting (A.3c) equal to (A.3a) yields 
.                 (A.4) 
From Equation (1), we obtain 
 
 
that may be expanded into 
   (A.5) 
Inserting (A.5) into (A.4) and solving for  yields 
.     (A.6) 
We multiply both sides of Equation (A.6) with δkin and use the identities 
, γkin = 1–δkin, , and  to obtain 
,    (A.7) 
whereγmeasures the carryover coefficient and  and  are (short-term) sales 
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Recall that the budget constraint is binding and has to be satisfied in the optimum, i.e. 
. Since this constraint also applies to the end period, 
SkinT is free but only within the constraint. This turns the problem into a fixed-endpoint 
problem and we do not need a general transversality condition. From (A.7), we obtain the 
optimal share of the budget that is allocated to marketing activity n of product i in country k 
by 
 
which is equivalent to Equation (4). 
From the budget constraint, we know that the following linear restriction must hold 
 
In a typical product portfolio that includes several products of different ages and therefore 
different levels of marketing activity stocks, some stocks will increase and others will 
decrease from one period to the next because the total budget to be allocated is limited. For a 
fairly large number of allocations units, which are defined at the country-product-marketing 
activity level, gains and losses in stocks tend to cancel each other out, so that 
, with k = 1, …, l, … K, i = 1, …, j, …, Ik, and n = 1, …, 
m, …, Ni. As a result, we have 
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and obtain a solution for the optimal budget share that is very close to (A.8) 
  (A.9) 
Since we also need to satisfy the condition  that is violated if and 
, the optimal marketing budget for marketing activity n of product i in country k is 
given by 
 (A.10) 
which is equivalent to Equation (5). 
The solution establishes a global maximum because the Integrand  is 
concave in and . For a fixed-endpoint problem, the Euler-Lagrange Equations 
(A.2a) and (A.2b) are sufficient for an absolute maximum (Kamien and Schwartz 1991). 
2 Parametric Growth Model 
Consistent with (6), we consider the following parametric growth model 
andt∈ [0,∞).   (A.10) 
Equivalence with the Gamma Distribution. The p.d.f. of a gamma distributed random 
variable t is defined as follows 
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,      (A.11) 
where φ and θ are characteristic parameters that define the shape of the distribution. Let the 
parameters α, a, and b of (A.9) be defined as: , a = θ-1, b = φ. Then, it can be 
shown that (A.10) results into (A.11). 
Properties of Cumulative Sales. Let (A.10) measure unit sales. We obtain cumulative sales 
over the total lifetime of product i by solving the integral 
, with αi, ai, bi> 0.   (A.12) 
Let  measure the distance in growth parameters for i. Substituting bi for  in 
(A.12) and differentiating this expression with respect to the distance ωi yields 
   (A.13) 
Expression (A.13) is always greater than zero because all terms are greater than zero. Note 
that  since ai, bi > 0. From , it follows that ai >ωi. 
Hence, cumulative sales increase with the difference in the growth parameters a and b. This 
result also holds for discounted cumulative sales. Discounting (A.10) at rate r and 
differentiating with respect to ωi leads to 
.   (A.14) 
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Experimental Simulation Study 
We consider two firms with a product portfolio of four products that use two different 
marketing activities to promote their products. Both firms wish to maximize the discounted 
profits of the portfolio over a planning horizon of five years. The dynamic optimization 
problem and its constraints is stated in Equations (3)-(3.3). Sales are generated by a 
multiplicative response function similar to Equation (11). Specifically, let u and v denote the 
two competitors, s1 and s2 be the marketing stocks for the two spending categories, and stot 
measure the total marketing stock for a product, i.e. stot = s1 + s2. We then specify sales q for 
product i in period t as follows:  
,     (W.1) 
where α is a scaling constant, ε1 and ε2 measure own marketing effects, ε3 reflects the cross-
effect of competitive marketing,and a1, a2, b1, and b2 are growth parameters. Marketing stocks 
evolve consistent with Equation (2), whereas the decay coefficient may vary across 
products.Under monopoly conditions, the competitor stock variable looses its relevance and is 
excluded from Equation W.1. 
We analyze the performance of the heuristic (Equations 9 and 10) for firm u by simulating 
different monopoly and duopoly scenarios. The growth potential multiplier, ρ, of the heuristic 
is computed according to Equation (13) with a planning horizon of five years (T=5). 
We generate different experimental conditions by manipulating the following factors that 
characterize product portfolios of the two firms: 
- Current-period elasticity of the first marketing activity (ε1) 
- Carryover coefficients (δ) 
- Size of the revenue bases (RV) 
- Profit contribution margin (d) 
- Growth parameter (a1) 
- Launch dates (ET) 
We define two levels for each factor in the way that we create a situation of (nearly) equal 
data and a situation of strongly varying data across products. The values of the parameters ε2, 
ε3, a2, b1, and b2do not vary since the variation of ε1 and a1 already captures the variation in 
( ) ( )1 21 2 3 1 2 lnln1 2 1 2, , , , iutiu iu iu iu iu iut b b stot ta a stotiu u u u v iu ivtiut iutq t s s stot stot s s stot t eε ε εα − ++= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
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marketing effectiveness and growth pattern. Table W1 displays the chosen values of the 
parameters for our simulation. 
Table W1. Parameter values to generate different scenarios 
 ε1 ε2 ∆ RV D a1 ET 

























































We set the cross-effect of competitive marketing stock (ε3) to -.10 across all products. The 
remaining growth parameter a2, b1, and b2 are set to .005, .1, and .0001. These parameters 
generate a life cycle which peaks in about 11 to 12 years. The scaling constant α of the 
response function is determined endogenously from the initial values of each product in order 
to be consistent with the initial sales level. 
To reduce overall computation time, we construct an efficient Latin-square design containing 
eight portfolio profiles which we assign randomly across the two firms. Hence, in most 
scenarios we have an asymmetric competitive market situation. The generated eight profiles 
are given in Table W2. 
Table W2. Scenario design 
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ε1 Varied Equal Equal Varied Equal Varied Equal Varied 
δ Equal Equal Varied Equal Equal Varied Varied Varied 
RV Varied Equal Varied Equal Varied Varied Equal Equal 
d Varied Equal Varied Varied Equal Equal Varied Equal 
a1 Equal Equal Varied Varied Varied Equal Equal Varied 
ET Equal Equal Equal Varied Varied Varied Varied Equal 
We simulate an annual budget planning process with a five year forecast horizon and 
investigate 12 planning cycles. Optimal solutions are generated by numerically solving the 
constrained dynamic optimization problem in (3)-(3.3). Specifically, we use an iterative 
gradient search algorithm for which we adopt very tight convergence criteria. Since we do not 
have a closed-form solution, we also numerically compute the Nash equilibrium by iteratively 
optimizing the marketing mix of one firm while holding the marketing mix of the competitor 
constant. When we apply this method consecutively for both competitors, we reach a Nash 
equilibrium if none of the competitors can improve its solution.We compute two indices for 
measuring the performance of the heuristic. First, we compare the performance of the 
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heuristic in terms of suboptimality (deviations from the discounted profit of the optimal 
solution): 
.  (W.2) 
Second, we compute a metric that measures the match of the heuristic budget allocation with 
the optimal budget allocation: 
,  (W.3) 
Π is defined in Equation (3) and refers to results where budgets are obtained from numerical 
optimization or the proposed heuristic. xint denotes the budget for marketing activity n of 
product i in period t and R is the total budget. 
We assume a naïve allocation as initial condition, i.e. the total budget is equally allocated 
across products and marketing activities. We divide these expenditures by the product-
specific decay coefficient to obtain initial stocks. 
The Tables W3 and W4 display the simulation results for each single-firm scenario and each 
competitive scenario, respectively.  
Table W3. Simulation results for proposed heuristic (single-firm scenarios) 
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Table W4. Simulation results for proposed heuristic (competitive scenarios) 
Scenario for 
firm u 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Scenario for 
firm v 

























































Notes: Scenarios arebased on the design set of Table W2. 
The suboptimality criterion for the proposed heuristic already improves dramatically over the 
naïve allocation in the first iteration and develops very well over the next iterations (planning 
cycles). In most scenarios, the heuristic converges very close to the optimal solution when it 
is repeatedly used in the following planning cycles. This convergence can also be seen from 
the match with the optimal budget, which rapidly gets close to 100%. The Tables W5 and W6 
display the development of the two performance criteria if we apply the naïve allocation. It is 
obvious that this naïve allocation rule produces results that are far away from optimality, and 
they deteriorate over time. 
Table W5. Simulation results for naïve allocation (single-firm scenarios) 
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Table W6. Simulation results for naïve allocation (competitive scenarios) 
Scenario for 
firm u 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Scenario for 
firm v 

























































Notes: Scenarios are based on the design set of Table W2. 
As a robustness check with respect to the initial condition, we simulated all scenarios again 
and assumed that initial budgets are allocated proportionally to the product’s profit 
contribution. This allocation mimics the “percentage of sales” (size of the business) rule, 
which seems to be frequently applied in practice (see Bigné 1995 again). The size of the 
business is also recognized as an important allocation-relevant information by our proposed 
heuristic. The initial condition is therefore more favorable and the performance indices 
improve across the scenarios when we apply our suggested heuristic. 
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Abstract 
The marketing budget allocation process is one of the most important tasks a manager is 
being charged with. As firms in general sell a portfolio of products and can choose among 
various marketing activities with dynamic impact on future sales, their profit maximization 
problem is characterized by high complexity. For this reason, academics provided 
practitioners with various optimization approaches to find a solution for the budget allocation 
problem. But managers still prefer to use simple rules to determine the marketing budget 
because they find it difficult to fully understand sophisticated optimization algorithms. So in 
summary a huge variety of budgeting approaches exists. Nevertheless, literature does not 
provide a systematic analysis and comparison of the performance of these approaches, which 
would allow deriving implications about which approach should be preferred. 
We conduct a comprehensive simulation study by applying several allocation rules in a 
multitude of different generated scenarios in order to analyze and compare their performance 
as well as their sensitivity to different changes in the market environment. Specifically, we 
compare a naïve solution (equal product budgets), a common practitioner rule (percentage-of-
sales rule), a recently suggested award-winning allocation heuristic (Fischer et al. 2011), and 
a numerical optimization method. The evaluation of the performance of allocation rules is 
based on the profit gained by application of the respective allocation rule compared to the 
optimal solution. In addition, we analyze the sensitivity of the different rules by imposing an 
estimation error, which affects the parameters of interest. The authors find that the allocation 
rule by Fischer et al. (2011) is best performing and may even outperform the numerical 
optimization in case of estimation error and dynamic information updating.  
1 Introduction 
Setting the right marketing budget has been a key research problem and a top challenge to 
management for a long time. For companies that market a portfolio of products and use 
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different marketing tactics, it involves finding the optimal total marketing budget and its 
optimal allocation across allocation units such as products. Theoretical and empirical research 
(e.g., Fischer et al. 2011; Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners 1992) shows that solving the second 
problem, the optimal allocation of a marketing budget, is much more important. Better 
allocation results in profit gains between 40% and 60%, whereas the optimization of the 
overall budget level improves profit only by 3-5% (Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners 1992; Tull 
et al. 1986). Ideally, both problems are solved simultaneously. Theoretically, this can be 
achieved but at the cost of higher complexity and imposing restrictions in order to guarantee 
the uniqueness of an optimal solution. Practically, companies frequently separate these 
problems. Top management usually determines the overall marketing budget for the next 
fiscal year first. This budget is then allocated across country units, products, marketing 
activities, etc. (Fischer et al. 2011).  
Consequently, academics have developed methods and algorithms to solve complex 
allocation problems under a restricted marketing budget (e.g., Doyle and Saunders 1990; 
Mantrala 2002). These optimization approaches unfortunately rely often on numerical 
optimization techniques so that they are not used by managers. In fact, surveys among 
managers consistently reveal that they prefer simple allocation rules such as the percentage-
of-sales rule. But these practitioner rules are supposed to lead to allocation results that are 
rather far from the optimum. Therefore research started to find a way out of this dilemma by 
suggesting new heuristics that are derived from theory and accepted by managers (e.g., 
Fischer et al. 2011). In real-world applications, these heuristics seem to lead to large profit 
gains. However, this performance may be due to the specific conditions and may not 
generalize to other situations. 
To summarize, management can choose among several methods to solve the important 
marketing budget allocation problem. All these methods probably have their advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of optimality, practical applicability, etc. Surprisingly, despite the high 
managerial relevance of budget optimization, we do not know how well the methods perform 
relative to each other across varying market and firm conditions. Given that practitioner rules 
and decision heuristics do not guarantee the optimal solution, the question is how close they 
come to the optimum. What are the conditions that influence deviation from optimality most? 
Are theoretically derived heuristics really better than simple practitioner rules? Since 
numerical optimization incorporates demand parameters such as sales elasticities that are 
measured with error, how do these exact methods perform relative to heuristic decision rules? 
And how do all these methods perform over time when they are repeatedly applied? 
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Research on allocation rules. The sparse literature on comparing budgeting approaches 
cannot answer these questions. Tull et al. (1986) show how deviations from the optimal 
marketing spending level result in changes of the firm’s profit for different types of response 
functions. Their results indicate that the profit function is rather flat so that investment errors 
may have only a marginal effect on the firm’s profit if the investment decision remains within 
a range of 25% to the optimal solution. But they focus only on the total marketing budget 
decision and ignore allocation issues. Mantrala, Sinha and Zoltners (1992) address this gap by 
analyzing the sensitivity of profit to allocation errors under different scenarios. They solve the 
allocation problem in several market scenarios which are characterized by different response 
functions by applying a marginal analysis approach and compare the solution with the 
outcome of the application of a naïve solution of an equal distribution of the marketing budget. 
Their analysis shows that the potential for profit improvement is much higher for allocation 
decisions than for optimal overall budget levels. In particular, one can expect increases of 
only 2-3% for much larger budgets but up to 40% from better allocation. But their study is 
subject to several limitations. First, they apply only the naïve solution of an equal distribution 
across the product portfolio and the marginal analysis approach. But other (and more realistic) 
budgeting rules are not considered within their study. Second, they vary only the type of the 
market response function, but ignore for manipulation of other factors which might influence 
the performance of allocation approaches as well. Third, they do not show how strongly the 
numerical approach is influenced by estimation error. Thus, literature does not provide a 
systematic analysis of application and performance of budget allocation decision rules so that 
we are lacking information about the effectiveness and the value of specific rules compared to 
other budgeting approaches. A comprehensive understanding about the performance of 
budget allocation approaches is necessary to derive implications how budgets should be 
determined under different conditions.  
Contribution. We address this research gap by setting up a simulation experiment in which we 
analyze the performance of several different budgeting rules, manipulate all relevant factors, 
and further examine the effect of estimation error. The advantage of simulation experiments is 
that the true parameter values are known, their true relation is given and all characteristics of 
interest can be fully controlled. As a consequence the optimal solution is known and the 
suboptimality of applying the various allocation methods can be assessed. This is not possible 
with real-life data, simply because the real parameters and models are not known (Proppe and 
Albers 2009). Our experiment is based on a comprehensive variation of data conditions in 
which we apply four different allocation rules characterized by different complexity. In 
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summary, we consider the naïve budgeting approach of an equal distribution, the most 
common practitioner rule to allocate the budget proportional to product sales, the award-
winning allocation heuristic by Fischer, Albers, Wagner, and Frie (2011), denoted hereafter as 
FAWF, and a numerical optimization solution. Our experimental design considers dynamic 
effects and manipulates all factors and functions, which are incorporated into the dynamic 
profit maximization problem. This allows us to derive generalizable results and to analyze the 
impact of several factors on the performance of each of the considered budgeting methods. As 
a further aspect we create more realistic scenarios by imposing estimation errors on 
unobservable demand parameters. An analysis of the sensitivity to estimation error gives 
insights into how the performance of allocation rules changes if their estimated parameters are 
exposed to noisiness. In particular, our simulation study addresses the following four research 
questions: 
- How do the budgeting methods perform relative to the optimal solution? Are they 
close to being “optimal”? 
- How do the budgeting methods perform over time, i.e. by being subsequently applied? 
Do they converge to the optimal solution? 
- If the budgeting methods include unobservable demand parameters that need to be 
estimated: How strongly are these methods influenced by estimation errors?  
- Which are the most important factors that influence the performance (and the 
convergence properties) of the allocation rules? 
We follow prior simulation studies in marketing research to develop a Monte Carlo design 
(e.g., Andrews, Ainslie and Currim 2002; 2008). Note that these studies have much in 
common with simulation studies in statistics. They usually analyze the performance of 
empirical methods to describe and predict demand behavior such as brand choice under 
different conditions. Typical performance measures are the recoverability of behavioral 
parameters and predictive accuracy. In contrast, our study shares features of simulation 
studies in operations research. The objective is to study the optimality of firm behavior, i.e. to 
set the “right” marketing budget, by using different decision rules. As a consequence, the 
deviation from profit maximum and the speed of converging to that optimum are the relevant 
performance measures. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We continue in section 2 by presenting shortly 
the dynamic profit maximization problem on which we base our analysis and the four 
allocation rules we analyze. Section 3 provides information about the design of the simulation 
study. The sections 4 and 5 discuss the results of the simulation experiment and identify the 
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drivers of the performance (and the convergence properties) of the allocation rules. We close 
with limitations and suggestions for future research. 
2 Analysis background 
2.1 Dynamic profit maximization problem 
In the following analyses, we consider the realistic scenario of a multi-product, multi-country 
firm which wishes to maximize the net present value Π of its product portfolio over a 
planning period T, e.g. five years, by effectively allocating the fixed marketing budget R. 
Accordingly, the firm faces the constrained dynamic profit maximization as formulated in 
equation (1)-(1.3). Under the assumption of known parameters we may be able to solve the 
profit maximization problem and find the optimal budgets by application of dynamic 
numerical optimization methods. 
   	
Discounting ∑   !"#$%$&Profit	contribution	margin∈/ ∙ 123 4 5, 7, 8"#$$$$%$$$$&Unit	sales <  ∑ ∑ ==∈>∈/#$$$%$$$&Marketing	expendituresDE5#$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$%$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$&
Discounted	net	value	of	product	portfolio
     (1) 
subject to G  ∑ ∑ =,=∈>∈/ 	HI5J	 KLK  0, (Budget constraint) (1.1) 
 
KNK   O=P= 4 =, HI5J	= Q 0, (State variable equation) (1.2) 
 P= Q 0, P=0"  P=, RE	P=3"  P=  (Boundary conditions) (1.3) 
where t is the time period with planning horizon T. The product is denoted by i with the index 
set I. As the firm may sell its product portfolio with the help of various marketing activities, 
such as advertising or sales force, n denotes the type of marketing activity or spending 
category, respectively, and Ni is the associated index set that may vary across products. The 
discount rate is denoted by r, 0 < r < ∞. The absolute profit contribution of product i is 
determined by the profit contribution per unit and the unit sales. The difference of price p and 
marginal cost c gives the profit contribution margin. Unit sales q are determined by a function 
which is influenced by the elapsed time since launch of the product ET, the marketing stock S, 
which is a Ni-dimensional row vector summarizing the activity-specific marketing stocks for 
product i and a row vector of other variables Z (e.g. competitive marketing spending). To 
reflect the long-term impact of marketing spending, the marketing stock S follows a dynamic 
process that satisfies the differential equation 
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(2) 
where x denotes marketing expenditures and O is the depreciation rate of the marketing stock. 
Further, we account for life-cycle effects by including a life cycle function into our sales 
function, whose growth parameters may be influenced by marketing investments. In our 
experimental setting we analyze different demand and growth functions. Finally, marketing 
expenditures are the sum of the activity-specific marketing expenditures x. 
2.2 Allocation rules 
In our analysis of the performance of allocation approaches we focus on four different 
allocation rules which are characterized by different degrees of complexity: We apply a naïve 
solution of an equal distribution of the budget across the product portfolio and the most 
frequently used budgeting rule by practitioners, the percentage-of-sales rule (Bigné 1995). 
Further, we analyze the performance of methods that are based on the principle of marginal 
returns: a heuristic proposed by FAWF (2011) and a numerical optimization algorithm. 
2.2.1 Naïve allocation: Equal distribution 
The most naïve approach is an equal distribution across all products and activities, which 
ignores the heterogeneity of the product portfolio. The budget allocation is obtained as 
follows: 




T==UVW : Marketing budget for product i and marketing activity n in period t; 
Rt : Total budget to be allocated in period t; 
n = 1, 2, …, Ni (number of marketing activities); and 
i        = 1, 2, …, I (number of products);  
t = 1, 2, …, T (number of periods);  
2.2.2 Percentage-of-sales rule 
According to manager surveys (e.g., Bigné 1995) the percentage-of-sales method is the most 
often applied allocation rule in companies. It proposes to set the marketing budget as a 
specific percentage of the sales level. Accordingly, the budget is allocated proportional to 
sales across the portfolio, i.e. products with a greater sales level get a larger proportion of the 
marketing budget and vice versa. By assuming that product budgets that are derived from the 
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percentage-of-sales rule are allocated equally across the two marketing activities, the 
allocation solution is given by: 
T=`WaW=  b> Lc,Xde∑ Lc,XdeY∈Z G, ∀	I ∈ \, R ∈ ] , 5 ∈ ^0, 3_,  (4) 
where 
T=`WaW=: Marketing budget for marketing activity n and product i in period t; 
Rt  : Total budget to be allocated in period t; 
RVi,t-1  : Revenue level of product i available from last year; 
i  = 1, 2, …, I
 
(number of products);  
n  = 1, 2, …, Ni (number of marketing activities); and 
t  = 1, 2, …, T (number of periods);  
2.2.3 Attractiveness allocation heuristic by FAWF (2011) 
FAWF (2011) propose to allocate the budget for spending category n of product i proportional 
to its allocation weight w: 
T=fghf  ij NX∑ ∑ ijYkXk∈lYY∈Z G, ∀	I ∈ \, R ∈ ] , 5 ∈ ^0, 3_,     (5) 
with		Hj=  n=,
b/p 4 1  r="#$$$$$%$$$$$&
Long-term	marketing	effectiveness





    (6) 
where 
T=fghf : Marketing budget for marketing activity n and product i in period t; Hj= : Heuristic allocation weight for marketing activity n and product i in period t; 
Rt : Total budget to be allocated in period t; 
r : Discount rate (capital cost of firm, strategic business unit, etc.); 
δin : Carryover coefficient of marketing activity n for product i; 
εin,t-1 : Short-term sales elasticity with respect to product i’s marketing expenditures on 
activity n available from last year; 
cmi : (Percentage) contribution margin for product i; 
RVi,t-1 : Revenue level of product i available from last year;  
ρit : Multiplier to measure the growth potential of product i in period t; 
i = 1, 2, …, Ik (number of products);  
n = 1, 2, …, Ni (number of marketing activities); and 
t = 1, 2, …, T (number of periods);  
This allocation heuristic is directly derived from the optimality conditions that need to be 
satisfied for solving the dynamic optimization problem (for details see FAWF 2011). 
Basically, the rule teaches to allocate the total budget according to the relative attractiveness 
of an allocation unit, whereas its attractiveness is represented by the allocation weight w. For 
this reason, we call this rule an “attractiveness allocation heuristic”. The allocation weight 
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incorporates information on the profit improvement potential that results from assigning a 
higher budget to the allocation unit. This information includes the long-term marketing 
effectiveness of a product’s marketing activity, the product’s profit contribution level, and its 
growth potential. FAWF (2011) suggest approximating the growth potential ρ by a multiplier 
that divides expected product revenues in 5 years (planning horizon) by its current revenue 
level. In our study, we follow FAWF (2011) by computing the expected product revenues 
based on the parameters of the growth function. Note that equation (5) reduces to the 
percentage-of-sales rule (4) if long-term marketing effectiveness, contribution margins, and 
growth potential multipliers are equal for all allocation units. For application of the 
attractiveness heuristic, r, cm, and RV are usually readily available from internal records, but 
δ, ε, and ρ must be estimated by econometric models, as an example (FAWF 2011). In our 
simulation experiment, we also investigate the performance of the heuristic for parameters 
that are estimated with error, which is most likely to be the common situation in reality. 
2.2.4 Numerical optimization method 
We employ a numerical optimization routine to obtain a unique solution to the dynamic 
optimization problem stated in equations (1)-(1.3). For this procedure, we need to specify the 
demand function q(ET+t,S,Z) and provide parameter values such as r, p, c, etc. The big 
advantage of numerical optimization is that it generates optimal budgets for the specified 
problem. The disadvantages in practical application are, however, that we must correctly 
specify the demand function and know the parameter values. In addition, the black-box 
character inhibits acceptance by managers (e.g., FAWF 2011, Prendergast, West and Shi 
2006). While numerical optimization results are always superior to those of the attractiveness 
heuristic under full information, it is interesting to compare the performance of both methods 
under more realistic conditions when demand parameters are subject to estimation error, e.g., 
marketing elasticities. 
We solve our optimization problem by applying the enhanced Generalized Reduced Gradient 
(GRG) 2 algorithm (for further details see Lasdon et al. 1978) implemented in the Premium 
Solver Platform of Frontline Systems. The nonlinear optimization algorithm GRG2 iteratively 
varies the marketing allocation to maximize total discounted profits. It stops when the relative 
change in the objective is less than the convergence tolerance for the last five iterations. We 
set the convergence tolerance to the value of 10-10. The constraints of our maximization 
problem are classified as active when they are within the range of 10-12 of one of their bounds. 
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Since we do not have a closed form solution, we numerically compute the Nash equilibrium 
in our competition scenarios by iteratively optimizing the marketing mix of one firm while 
holding the marketing mix of the competitor constant. When we apply this method 
consecutively for both competitors, we reach a Nash equilibrium if none of the competitors 
can improve its solution. (Fylstra 1998) 
3 Experimental Design 
3.1 Setup of the decision problem  
FAWF (2011) investigate the performance of their suggested attractiveness heuristic in a 
small simulation study. They assume a firm using two types of marketing activities to 
stimulate sales of a product portfolio of four products. The firm sets the total marketing 
budget at the end of each year. The task is to find an optimal allocation of this budget across 
the four products and two activities, i.e. in total an allocation decision for eight allocation 
units has to be made. The discounted profit over the next five years is the objective criterion. 
Equations (1)-(1.3) formalize the profit maximization problem. The budget planning process 
recurs every year. As a result, the firm may revise allocation decisions based on new market 
information that are available for the next budget planning cycle. 
We follow the setup of FAWF (2011) to develop our experimental design. This setup fully 
reflects the conditions of a dynamic multi-product, multi-activity allocation problem. We 
report on the systematic variation of factors influencing the allocation decision and profit 
outcome subsequently. Our experimental simulation study, however, differs from the small 
simulation study of Fischer et al. (2011) in several important ways: First, we analyze and 
compare more than just one budgeting method. Second, we include all parameters which 
might have an impact on the performance of the allocation approaches. FAWF (2011) do not 
analyze the type of the demand model, the type of growth model, and the initial budget 
allocation. Third, we create a full factorial design in contrast to FAWF (2011) who use only a 
reduced Latin square design of 16 experimental conditions producing 192 allocation solutions. 
Our full design with more factors creates 512 experimental conditions and 5,120 allocation 
solutions. Fourth, we impose an error on unobservable demand parameters which need to be 
estimated. This allows us to analyze the sensitivity of the allocation approaches to estimation 
error, which has not been done in FAWF (2011). Because of this error it is no longer 
guaranteed that numerical optimization produces optimal budgets. Fifth, we conduct a 
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regression analysis to study the relative impact of the various factors on the performance (and 
the convergence properties) of the four allocation rules. 
3.2 Data generation without estimation error 
We design a Monte Carlo experiment, in which we experimentally manipulate 9 factors that 
can be divided into the following groups: 
1. Market response model: multiplicative model or modified exponential model;  
2. Growth model: symmetric or asymmetric growth function; 
3. Product characteristics: equal or unequal values for the five characteristics of marketing 
elasticities, marketing carryover coefficients, revenue levels, growth parameters, 
and launch dates across products; 
4. Competitive situation: no competition or Nash competition; and 
5. Initial budget allocation: equal or proportional-to-sales initial allocation across products. 
We create a full factorial design. Group 1, 2, 4, and 5 each includes one factor with two levels. 
Group 3 includes 5 factors, each with two levels. As a result, we have 29 = 512 experimental 
conditions under which we use the attractiveness heuristic and numerical optimization to 
generate allocation decisions. Recall that the objective is to maximize discounted profit over 
the next five years. Consistent with our setup of the decision problem, we generate allocation 
decisions and the resulting discounted profit for ten consecutive planning periods. Hence, we 
observe 512 × 10 = 5,120 allocation and profit results that can be compared with the optimal 
solution. The observation of the performance of the decision rule over ten planning periods 
enables us to investigate the convergence properties of the rule. 
Factor 5 is not meaningful for using the naïve and the percentage-of-sales rules to generate 
data. As a result, the number of experimental conditions and total allocation decisions reduces 
to 28 = 256 and 256 × 10 = 2,560, respectively. Since we assume that the true values of all 
parameters are known, the numerical optimization method by definition yields the true 
optimum. We next explain the factors and their levels. 
Market response model 
Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz (2001) discuss a variety of response functions that have been 
used in market research. Note that models, which assume linear or increasing returns to scale, 
are not eligible because the optimal budget is zero or infinity. For the allocation of a fixed 
budget, this would lead to meaningless corner solutions. We therefore choose functional types 
that experience diminishing returns for higher levels of spending. Specifically, we use the 
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multiplicative model and a modified exponential model. To keep notation low, we do not use 
indices for the factor levels. Unit sales q for product i in equation (1) are specified for the 
multiplicative model as follows: 
1   ∙ Pbze ∙ P{z| ∙ }23 4 5, 7"~8"    (7a) 
where ai is a scaling constant, and b1i and b2i are sales response parameters that determine 
marketing responsiveness. g(⋅) represents the growth function and f(Zi) represents the 
influence of other variables summarized in the vector Z. We discuss these variables and 
relations subsequently. Sales elasticities, which we need as input for the attractiveness 
heuristic, are equal to the power coefficients. Note that they already measure the long-term 
impact of marketing expenditures. To obtain short-term effects, we need to multiply them 
with (1-δi), the carryover information from the differential equation (2). We use this equation 
to compute the marketing stock S. The scaling constant ai is computed in the starting solution 
of our simulation experiment when the sales level and all other parameters of equation (7a) 
are known. 
We choose the multiplicative response model because it is by far the most frequent aggregate 
response model type in empirical research. It shows diminishing returns for response 
parameters between 0 and 1 and accommodates interaction effects among marketing activities. 
However, this specification has its limitations. It assumes constant elasticities and does not 
accommodate a saturation level for sales.  
The modified exponential model allows for these effects and has seen several empirical 
applications to marketing spending models (Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2001): 
1  1  expbPb 4 {P{}23 4 5, 7"~8"
  
(7b) 
where Mi is the market potential for product i and other terms are defined as earlier. The 
square root of the marketing stock avoids corner solutions, i.e. an allocation solution where 
the budget is fully invested in only one of the two marketing activities. 
To guarantee comparability with the response parameters of the multiplicative function we 
estimate the b parameters of the modified exponential function with simulated data for 
marketing input and sales output generated by the multiplicative function with the respective 
elasticity values. More specifically, we first generate several auxiliary simulated scenarios of 
different marketing input and estimate the corresponding sales output based on the 
multiplicative model. Subsequently, we integrate the marketing input and the corresponding 
sales output into the modified exponential function for which we assume that the market 
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potential equates to a third of the actual sales level. This allows us to compute the transformed 
term of equation (7b) ln	1  1  " for each of our generated auxiliary simulated scenarios 
which we regress on the corresponding square roots of the marketing stocks Pb and P{. 
This provides us with the response parameters b as a result of this auxiliary regression. 
Growth model 
The growth model describes the life cycle of a product. Research (e.g., Fischer, Leeflang, and 
Verhoef 2010) shows that marketing investments have the power to significantly shape the 
life cycle, i.e., the growth potential of a new product. Fischer, Leeflang, and Verhoef (2010) 
discuss several parametric growth functions and differentiate between symmetric and 
asymmetric life cycles. We adopt a symmetric model (Polli and Cook 1969) and an 
asymmetric model (Brockhoff 1967). Both specifications are highly flexible and allow 
capturing a multitude of different shapes and thus represent most forms of growth patterns 
observed in empirical studies: 
(symmetric life cycle) }^23 4 5, P_  P" ∙ 23 4 5" 4 P" ∙ 23 4 5"{
 
(8a) 
(asymmetric life cycle)  }^23 4 5, P_  23 4 5"" ∙ exp	^ P" ∙ 23 4 5"{_
  
(8b) 
where λ and µ are the growth parameters which determine the shape of the life cycle in terms 
of their time-to-peak as well as their height-to-peak. Following FAWF the growth parameters 
λ and η are influenced by the marketing stock according to P"   4 0.005 ∙ ln	P", and P"   4 0.00005 ∙ ln	P", with the basic growth parameters , and , respectively.1 
Assuming the same growth parameter values across the two specifications (8a) and (8b) 
yields different results for the time-to-peak and height-of-peak. However, we do not want to 
vary the length of the growth phase and the level of sales at this point. We include this 
variation under product characteristics. Instead, we want to vary the shape pattern here. For 
this reason, we rescale parameters in the symmetric model so that it yields the time- and 
height-to-peak sales as in the asymmetric model.  
  
                                                 
1
 The values of 0.005 and 0.00005 which reflects the influence of marketing stocks on growth parameters are 
chosen in order to generate a significant effect of marketing on the shape of the life cycle, but similarly do not 
create illegitimate life cycle effects, e.g. negative values generated by g(.) in case of the symmetric growth 
function. 
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Product characteristics 
Table 1 shows the values for the demand parameters and how they vary across products in the 
experimental conditions. There are five factors for which we create a situation of equal 
parameter values or unequal parameter values across products. Considering the profit 
maximization problem of (1)-(1.3), one could think of varying the discount rate, the profit 
contribution margin, the number of products, and the number of marketing activities. We did 
not vary these parameters because they do not generate new insights but increase 
computational burden. Firms usually do not use different discount rates for products in the 
same portfolio. Because profit margins just scale revenues downwards or upwards, their 
variation does not add explication beyond varying the revenue level, which we do. Simulation 
runs with larger product portfolios and more marketing activities did not reveal significant 
differences compared to the results obtained from our firm setting.  
Factor sales elasticity. We assume two marketing activities for each product that could be 
sales force and advertising, for example. Motivated by meta-analyses we choose an average 
elasticity of about 0.3 for sales force (Albers, Mantrala and Sridhar 2009) and of about 0.15 
for advertising (Sethuraman, Tellis and Briesch 2011; Lodish et al. 1995). To reduce 
computational burden we vary only the sales force elasticity while keeping the advertising 
elasticity constant as this satisfies heterogeneity across marketing responsiveness. Based on 
the chosen elasticity values in Table 1, we derive the response parameters for the response 
models (see equation (7a) and (7b)). For model (7a) the response parameters b1 and b2 
correspond to the elasticities. For model (7b), we find response parameters that are consistent 
with the elasticity estimates and the initial sales level, as described above.  
Factor carryover coefficient. Following equation (2) we assume a long-term impact of 
marketing investments so that we need the carryover coefficient δ to compute the marketing 
stock S. We set the carryover coefficient to 0.5 in the homogeneity scenario, which is the 
generalized value found in meta-analyses (Leone 1995; Sethuraman, Tellis and Briesch 2011) 
and vary these values between 0.4 and 0.6 for the heterogeneity scenarios. Larger carryovers 
are unrealistic for annual data and resulted into problems that a unique solution often was not 
found with numerical optimization. Smaller values are less interesting because they take out 
the dynamics, which we want to analyze.  
  
 
Table 1. Variation of product cahracteristics 
 Elasticity of 
activity 1 
Elasticity 
of activity 2 
Carryover 
coefficient (δ) 
Sales level q  
in t=0 
Growth parameter  Growth parameter  Elapsed time since launch (ET) 














































































































Factor revenue level. The sales level of the product q defines how much sales of the 
corresponding product are generated in the starting period. While the sales level is constantly 
2.5m across the portfolio for the homogeneous case, we vary it from 1m to 4m for the 
heterogeneous scenario. 
Factor growth parameter. For life cycles, we follow Fischer, Leeflang and Verhoef (2010) 
who find that their products reach the peak after approximately 11 years and ends after 
approximately 25 years. From this information, we derive the parameters for the asymmetric 
growth model in the homogenous case: = 1.1 and = -0.1. The parameter   in the 
symmetric model assumes a value of -0.05 to yield the same time-to-peak sales. Again, to 
reduce computational burden, we just vary the growth parameter  as this is sufficient to 
model heterogeneous life cycles.  
Factor launch time. Finally, we assume that our simulation starts for the homogenous case in 
year three after product launch and we vary the elapsed time since launch from one to four 
years across the portfolio in the heterogeneous case. We are limited by year 4 to avoid that the 
life cycle ends within the simulation time in the case of the symmetric function. 
Competitive situation 
We test the sensitivity to competitive actions by considering two different scenarios. First, we 
assume a monopoly situation with just one firm. Second, we assume Nash competition and 
simulate the dynamic game for two firms with a portfolio of four products and two marketing 
activities. Both firms face the same profit maximization problem (1)-(1.3). Each product has a 
direct competitive product in the portfolio of the other firm. One firm is exposed to all 
possible combinations of experimental factors. We randomly assign experimental conditions 
to the competitor firm. Trying all possible combinations across the two competitors yields up 
to 65,536 experimental conditions and 655,360 profit simulations depending on the rule, 
which increases computation time extensively without generating substantial new insights. 
To represent the competitive effects in the sales response functions (7a) and (7b), we specify 
the respective market response function as follows: 
1   ∙ Pbze ∙ P{z| ∙ Pz ∙ }23 4 5, P" ∙ ~8"
    
(9a) 
1  1  expbPb 4 {P{ 4 P}23 4 5, P"~8"
  
(9b) 
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with the total marketing stock SCi of the competitive product of product i and the parameter 
bCi that determine responsiveness to competitive marketing of product i. We set the cross-
effect of competitive marketing stock elasticity εC to -.10 across all products (e.g., 
Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005).  
Initial budget allocation 
We need to make an assumption about the allocation of the total marketing budget at the 
beginning of the first decision cycle. This initializes the marketing stocks across the various 
products and activities. We assume that firms followed either the naïve rule or the percentage-
of-sales rule to set their marketing budgets prior to the start of the simulation experiment. We 
divide these marketing budgets by the product-specific carryover coefficient to compute the 
initial marketing stocks. 
Since it does not make sense to assume the firm changes the initial allocation rule, we only 
vary the initial budget allocation for the attractiveness heuristic and the numerical 
optimization but not for the naïve and the percentage-of-sales allocation rules.  
3.3 Data generation with estimation error 
The assumption that managers know the true values of unobservable demand parameters is 
probably a very unrealistic assumption. For that reason, we impose an estimation error on 
demand parameters and generate data under all 512 experimental conditions again. 
Specifically, we impose an error on the response parameters for the two marketing activities 
b1 and b2 and on the growth parameters λ and η. We do not assume an error for the carryover 
coefficient because that coefficient just scales short-term responsiveness to long-term 
responsiveness adding no additional insight but increase computational complexity. 
The simulation error is randomly generated for each parameter by drawing a number from a 
symmetric triangular distribution with the lower limit of -25 % of the parameter value and an 
upper limit of +25 % of the parameter value. A range of 25% is larger than the standard 
deviation for generalized effects found in meta-analyses (e.g., Albers, Mantrala and Sridhar 
2008; Sethuraman, Tellis and Briesch 2011). Specifically, the estimated parameters are 
obtained by: 
   4 ,							~	3 0.25 , 0.25"   (10) 
where µEP is the estimated parameter value, µTP the true parameter value, and ξ	 is	 the	 error	term. We use the triangular distribution to avoid that nonsense values (e.g., negative response 
parameters) are generated that may happen with extreme value distributions. 
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To reduce overall computation time we use the technique of common random numbers 
(Kleijnen and Groenendaal 1992). This technique is widely used in simulation literature. It 
consists of using the same set of random numbers for all simulation runs within one 
replication. This guarantees that all variations in the simulation outcome are only due to 
desired changes in the experimental variables and not due to random changes in the 
simulation environment. The random numbers only vary across replications. We generate a 
total of three replications of the random data. This number is consistent with previous 
simulation studies (Vriens, Wedel and Wilms 1996; Andrews, Ainslie and Currim 2008; 
Proppe and Albers 2009).  
Because the naïve and the percentage-of-sales rules do not use unobservable demand 
parameters, no new data are generated for these methods. The numerical method, however, 
does not automatically provide the optimal solution as if true parameter values are known. It 
is interesting to see how this method performs relative to the attractiveness heuristic rule. 
3.4 Measure of Performance 
The key single objective is profit maximization. Thus, our performance measure is defined by 
the extent to which discounted profits under a specific allocation rule differ from the profit 
generated with the true optimal allocation:  
	_  `U  W"/`U
    
(11) 
where Π optimal is the discounted profit generated with the optimal budget allocation and Π rule 
is the discounted profit that results from budget allocation according to a specific rule.  
Recall that we apply numerical optimization with true demand parameters to compute profits 
for the optimum. Our performance measure is indexed by t because we simulate an annually 
recurring budget planning process. For the first planning cycle, discounted profit is obtained 
from years 1-5, for the second cycle from years 2-6, etc. 
We expect the naïve solution to show the worst performance results as it ignores the 
heterogeneity of the product portfolio. Percentage-of-sales allocates the budget according to 
the sales output of products and therefore is probably positively correlated with the optimal 
solution. For this reason, the rule is expected to outperform the naïve solution. FAWF 
additionally utilizes information about marketing responsiveness and product’s growth 
potential which is supposed to improve the allocation solution further. Finally, numerical 
optimization provides optimal budgets. The expected performance may change due to 
inclusion of estimation error. FAWF bases its budget allocation on some unobservable 
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demand parameters which have to be estimated, and numerical optimization even utilizes only 
unobservable demand parameters so that noisiness in parameters is supposed to reduce their 
performance.  
4 Results 
Results of our simulation experiment are summarized in Table 2 and 3. We show means of 
the deviation from maximum profit for each allocation rule and each of the ten consecutive 
planning cycles. The results are presented separately for the type of competition, monopoly or 
Nash competition. All other simulation factors vary within these scenarios. Table 2 includes 
results under the assumption that true demand parameters are known. Table 3 shows the 
results for simulations with noisy demand parameters. 
4.1. Performance of rules for demand parameters without error 
The overall means give an overview of how the allocation rules perform on average in terms 
of their deviation from maximum profit. By definition, the numerical optimization performs 
best as it determines the maximum profit. The second best results are provided by the 
attractiveness heuristic of FAWF which deviates by only .64% from maximum profit, on 
average (under Nash competition .68%), followed by the percentage-of-sales rule (10.3%, 
resprectively, 8.7% under Nash competition), and the naïve solution (20.7%, respectively, 
22.0% under Nash competition). On average, percentage-of-sales outperforms the naïve 
solution in the monopoly scenarios by factor 2 (under Nash competition even by factor 2.5). 
The attractiveness heuristic outperforms in the monopoly scenarios the naïve solution even by 
a factor of 32.4 (under Nash competition 32.2), and percentage-of-sales still by factor 16.1 
(under Nash competition 12.8).  
Analyzing the performance over time, the attractiveness heuristic even provides in the first 
planning cycle of our simulation experiment close-to-optimum results with a deviation of less 
than 2% on average. When repeatedly using the heuristic the allocation solutions quickly 
converge to the optimal solution which is in line with the Banach fixed-point theorem as the 
allocation is subsequently replaced by allocations closer to the fixed point, the true optimum 
(Granas and Gurundji 2003).2 These results also hold for the Nash competition scenarios, but 
the rule performs slightly less optimal in the first planning cycle and the convergence process 
                                                 
2
 To test whether the observed convergence process of FAWF is only the result of a better adaptability in the 
later stages of the product life cycle, we conduct the simulation experiment again in a static market by ignoring 
all product life cycle effects. As expected, the allocation rule performs even better in this static market. Results 
are not shown but are available from the authors. 
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is slower. Solutions provided by percentage-of-sales are also improving over time because the 
rule incorporates parts of the solution structure and represents a special case of FAWF. 
Contrary, the naïve allocation is a static rule that does not process new information over time 
to adapt the allocation in future planning cycles. The performance even decreases after being 
subsequently applied. 
The informational value from average performance numbers is limited as it is not shown how 
the rules perform in extreme scenarios. Therefore, Table 2 and 3 also show the maximum 
deviation from optimal profit overall and in the last planning cycle. The maximum deviation 
from the profit optimum for the attractiveness heuristic across all 5,120 applications is only 
5.72%. Due to its convergence to the optimum over time, it even reduces to only 1.15% in the 
10th planning cycle. In contrast, the maximum deviation for the percentage-of-sales rule is 
21.91%. It improves only slightly over time to 19.81%. Finally, the naïve solution even shows 
a maximum deviation of 44.38% overall and in the last planning cycle. All of these extreme 
scenarios are characterized by heterogeneity across parameters. While FAWF shows the worst 
performance results for a modified exponential response function, a symmetric growth 
function, and Nash competition, percentage-of-sales performs worst for a modified 
exponential response function, a symmetric growth function, and no competition, and the 
naïve solution provides worst solutions in case of a multiplicative response function, a 
symmetric growth function, and no competition.  
These results demonstrate a remarkable robustness of the attractiveness heuristic under 
extreme scenarios. The overall standard deviations also show that the profit deviations are 
much less varying across scenarios if the attractiveness heuristic is applied compared to the 
other rules. This provides evidence that FAWF is very robust. 
4.2. Performance of rules for demand parameters with error 
In this section we impose error on the marketing responsiveness parameters and the growth 
parameters. We only compare the performance of the attractiveness heuristic with the 
numerical optimization. Simulation results of the naïve solution and percentage-of-sales do 
not change because the rules do not make use of these parameters. 
Interestingly, numerical optimization performs worse than the attractiveness heuristic (see 
Table 3). This holds both under monopoly and Nash competition. It seems that numerical 
optimization is more sensitive to error in demand parameters than the heuristic. While the 











 Numerical Optimization 
method3 
Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash 
Planning cycle           
1st .18501 .19378  .11252 .10620  .01950 .02008  - - 
2nd .19564 .20927  .11136 .10123  .01417 .01562  - - 
3rd .20134 .21414  .10762 .09442  .00937 .01048  - - 
4th .20523 .21723  .10423 .08886  .00610 .00688  - - 
5th .20837 .22057  .10175 .08486  .00409 .00456  - - 
6th .21120 .22351  .10009 .08212  .00291 .00318  - - 
7th .21398 .22653  .09906 .08028  .00227 .00225  - - 
8th .21670 .22969  .09847 .07906  .00194 .00197  - - 
9h .21949 .23306  .09817 .07828  .00181 .00174  - - 
10th .22255 .23674  .09809 .07781  .00180 .00165  - - 
            
Overall mean .20706 .22045  .10313 .08731  .00640 .00684  - - 
Overall median .21171 .21614  .09831 .09635  .00360 .00346  - - 
Overall Std. Dev. .10179 .09284  .05371 .04264  .00809 .00875  - - 
Overall Min. .02937 .04552  .02937 .01875  .00000 .00000  - - 
Overall Max. .44381 .40020  .21910 .18682  .05113 .05727  - - 
Max. for 10th planning cycle .44381 .40020  .19810 .13304  .01070 .01158  - - 
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 Numerical Optimization 
method 
Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash  Monopoly Nash 
Planning cycle           
1st .18501 .19378  .11252 .10620  .02116 .02960  .02612 .03118 
2nd .19564 .20927  .11136 .10123  .01561 .01887  .02744 .03085 
3rd .20134 .21414  .10762 .09442  .01094 .01308  .02785 .03086 
4th .20523 .21723  .10423 .08886  .00785 .00931  .02789 .03046 
5th .20837 .22057  .10175 .08486  .00596 .00707  .02870 .03069 
6th .21120 .22351  .10009 .08212  .00485 .00580  .02918 .03101 
7th .21398 .22653  .09906 .08028  .00421 .00513  .03041 .03138 
8th .21670 .22969  .09847 .07906  .00387 .00479  .03070 .03188 
9h .21949 .23306  .09817 .07828  .00371 .00467  .03169 .03263 
10th .22255 .23674  .09809 .07781  .00367 .00467  .03281 .03382 
            
Overall mean .20706 .22045  .10313 .08731  .00818 .01029  .02932 .03148 
Overall median .21171 .21614  .09831 .09635  .00634 .00627  .01582 .01363 
Overall Std. Dev. .10179 .09284  .05371 .04264  .00935 .00960  .04073 .03517 
Overall Min. .02937 .04552  .02937 .01875  .00026 .00022  .00000 .00000 
Overall Max. .44381 .40020  .21910 .18682  .06397 .07970  . 24645 .26181 
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incorporates feedback from the market in subsequent periods in terms of actually realized 
product sales. This information goes directly into the allocation weight and it also contributes 
to update elasticity and growth multiplier estimates (see again equation 6). The negative 
influence of noise in demand parameters is compensated to a certain extent by this feedback 
mechanism. In contrast, the numerical optimization routine has no built-in feedback 
mechanism but relies on the noisy parameters. The error seems to propagate across 
subsequent planning periods. 
On average, the attractiveness heuristic provides solutions which outperform those of the 
numerical optimization method by a factor of 3.58 (under Nash competition by a factor of 
3.05). This is a significant performance difference between numerical optimization and 
FAWF. The maximum deviation from the profit optimum for the attractiveness heuristic 
across all scenarios is 7.97% and decreases to only 1.76% in the 10th planning cycle. For the 
numerical optimization method the maximum deviation is 26.18% overall and in the last 
planning cycle. This is even larger than for the percentage-of-sales rule (21.91% overall and 
19.81% for the last planning cycle). The performance in the 10th planning cycle by the 
attractiveness heuristic under the extreme scenario outperforms numerical optimization by a 
factor of 14.9. The lower standard deviation of .94% versus 4.07% for numerical optimization 
(.96% versus 3.53% under Nash competition, respectively) strongly underlines the robustness 
of the heuristic. 
5 Influence of experimental conditions on the performance of rules 
We now report on the performance of the rules under different experimental conditions. 
5.1 Expected effects 
The product characteristics vary in terms of the degree of heterogeneity across the product 
portfolio. We expect for the naïve solution, the percentage-of-sales rule, and the attractiveness 
heuristic to provide superior solutions for a more homogeneous product portfolio. In case of a 
homogeneous portfolio the profit maximizing budget allocation is more equally distributed 
across the products. Therefore the naïve solution which proposes to allocate the budget 
equally across the portfolio is closer to the optimal solution in case of a homogeneous 
scenario. Percentage-of-sales utilizes the information of the sales level of products. So 
differences in the sales base across the portfolio are directly reflected in the proposed budget 
allocation and therefore are supposed to have no effect on the performance of percentage-of-
sales. But information about differences in other factors is not considered and therefore 
Investigating the Performance of Budget Allocation Heuristics: A Monte Carlo Study 23 
 
 
cannot be captured by the percentage-of-sales rule. So we expect that percentage-of-sales is 
not affected by heterogeneity in the sales level, but is negatively affected by heterogeneity in 
one of the other product characteristic factors. As shown in equation (6) the attractiveness 
heuristic takes all of the product characteristics, partly indirectly, into account which may 
decrease the influence of portfolio heterogeneity on the heuristic performance. For this reason, 
we do not hypothesize on any effect of product characteristics on the attractiveness heuristic 
and leave it as an issue to be estimated in this study. Contrary, numerical optimization is 
supposed to provide better results for a more heterogeneous product portfolio. The reason is 
that the profit maximizing budget allocation is more likely to be a corner solution if the 
portfolio is characterized by strong heterogeneity. So in spite of noisy demand parameters 
numerical optimization is more likely to stay in this corner solution and therefore is less 
affected by estimation error. 
The asymmetric and the symmetric growth functional type are equal in terms of height-to-
peak and time-to-peak but vary in their shape. The symmetric function is flatter when 
approaching the maximum of the function, while the asymmetric function becomes flatter in 
the extensions of the function. As our simulation experiment generally starts after the product 
launch phase 4  products are less exposed to differences in life cycle effects during the 
simulation experiment in case of the symmetric function, i.e. the product portfolio is more 
likely to stay homogeneous during the experiment. For this reason, the naïve solution which 
benefits from a more homogeneous portfolio is expected to provide superior solutions in case 
of the symmetric growth function. Similarly, percentage-of-sales and the attractiveness 
heuristic are supposed to provide superior solutions in case of the symmetric growth function 
because they utilize information from the previous period so that they benefit from smaller 
changes in life cycle effects. We are not able to predict the effect on the performance of 
numerical optimization. 
Due to our model specification, the sales outcome is less affected by estimation error in the 
demand parameters in case of the modified exponential function within the range of our 
simulation experiment. For this reason, we expect the numerical optimization to perform 
better in scenarios characterized by a modified exponential function. Similarly, the 
attractiveness heuristic may provide superior results in case of the modified exponential 
function in all scenarios which include an estimation error. But as we are not able to predict 
the effect of the type of the market response model specifications on the attractiveness 
heuristic if we assume known parameters we do not hypothesize on the effect of the response 
                                                 
4
 The average of elapsed time since launch is about three years (see section 3). 
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model specification in general. Thereby, we may also not predict the effect on the naïve 
solution and percentage-of-sales. 
Nash competition is expected to have a negative effect on the performance of the naïve 
solution, the percentage-of-sales rule, and the attractiveness heuristic because competitive 
activities complicate the allocation decision by adding further factors which have to be 
captured by an allocation rule. But we are not able to predict the effect of competition on the 
performance of numerical optimization.  
The initial allocation of the attractiveness heuristic and the numerical optimization approach 
can be determined by equal distribution or percentage-of-sales. We expect that percentage-of-
sales as initial budget allocation provides superior solutions on average because the marketing 
stocks in the first planning cycles are probably closer to the optimal state so that both rules 
benefit from superior initial marketing stocks. 
The factor of estimation error is only experimentally manipulated for the attractiveness 
heuristic. The heuristic is a contraction mapping on the theoretical optimum and subsequently 
approaches to the profit maximum by utilizing information about unobservable demand 
parameters and the sales outcome. If the utilized demand parameters are exposed to noisiness 
due to estimation error the rule may not directly point to the true optimum which deteriorates 
the performance results. 
Finally, we expect different effects across the rules due to the factor of time, i.e. how the 
performance of the rules changes over time if they are subsequently applied. The 
attractiveness heuristic is an iterative sequence where values are subsequently replaced by 
values closer to the fixed point. It will converge to the fixed point after being subsequently 
applied, which is in our case the profit maximum (Granas and Gurundji 2003). So we expect 
that the attractiveness heuristic converges to the optimal solution over time and therefore time 
has a positive impact on the performance. Similarly, percentage-of-sales utilizes the 
information of sales outcome and thereby moves more of the total budget to the more 
profitable products of the portfolio over time, i.e. time is expected to have a positive effect. 
Contrary, the performance of the naïve solution is expected to decrease over time because it 
stays with the initial allocation and is not able to reduce the share of its suboptimal allocated 
marketing stocks, unlike all other rules, including the optimal solution. Finally, we predict a 
negative impact of time on the performance of numerical optimization because the true 
optimal solution is able to build down the suboptimal initial marketing stock over time, while 
the numerical optimization approach is based on noisy parameters and therefore is expected to 
replace the suboptimal initial marketing stock by another suboptimal marketing stock. 
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5.2 Descriptive analysis 
Table 4 shows the deviation from optimal profit means by rule and experimental condition. 
As expected, the naïve solution shows superior performance results for a homogeneous 
parameter set, only the difference between the two means of carryover coefficients is 
insignificant. Further, it performs better in case of a modified exponential response function 
and a symmetric growth function. The existence of Nash competition hampers slightly the 
performance of the naïve solution. 
The percentage-of-sales rule generally performs better if the product portfolio is characterized 
by homogeneity. Only unequal sales levels and carryover coefficients have no significant 
effect on the performance. The type of the growth function is not meaningful for the 
percentage-of-sales rule, but it shows superior results in case of a multiplicative response 
function. Surprisingly, it performs slightly better under Nash competition. 
The attractiveness heuristic provides generally superior results if the product portfolio is 
characterized by homogeneity. But interestingly, unequality in the sales levels as well as in 
the growth parameters has a marginal, but significant negative effect. The heuristic performs 
better in scenarios characterized by a symmetric growth function, but the shape of the 
response function seems to have no impact on average. As expected, the attractiveness 
heuristic provides superior results if the initial budget allocated is determined by percentage-
of-sales, no competition exists and no estimation error occurs. 
Finally, the numerical optimization method performs better if the product portfolio is 
heterogeneous, only heterogeneity in carryover coefficients and in the elapsed time since 
launch has a negative effect on the performance. The type of growth function has no influence, 
but the type of the response function is meaningful as numerical optimization provides clearly 
superior results in case of a multiplicative response function. If no competition exists and the 
initial budget allocation is determined by equal distribution the numerical optimization 
performs better. By definition, numerical optimization provides the optimal solution if no 
estimation error occurs, but the performance significantly deteriorates due to inclusion of 
estimation error. 
But insights based on the results shown in Table 4 are limited because they are not 
differentiated between planning cycles. The convergence properties and experimental 
conditions are analyzed in a regression model, discussed in the next section.  
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   Equal 
 .15435**  .05164**  .00738**  .03193** 
   Unequal 
 .27405**  .13881**  .00979**  .02887** 
Sales level 
        
   Equal 
 .17485**  .09548ns  .00872*  .03388** 
   Unequal 
 .25356**  .09496ns  .00845*  .02691** 
Growth parameters 
        
   Equal 
 .20271**  .09336**  .00882**  .03254** 
   Unequal 
 .22570**  .09709**  .00835**  .02826** 
Carryover coefficient 
        
   Equal 
 .21356ns  .09503ns  .00634**  .02951** 
   Unequal 
 .21485ns  .09541ns  .01083**  .03129** 
Elapsed time since launch 
        
   Equal 
 .16163**  .08848**  .00753**  .04261** 
   Unequal 
 .26678**  .10197**  .00964**  .18185** 
Growth function 
        
   Asymmetric 
 .21716**  .09572ns  .00916**  .03067ns 
   Symmetric 
 .21125**  .09473ns  .00800**  .03012ns 
Market response function  
       
   Multiplicative 
 .21764**  .08504**  .00869ns  .05039** 
   Modified exp. 
 .21076**  .10541**  .00848ns  .01041** 
Competition  
       
   Monopoly 
 .20795**  .10314**  .00774**  .02932** 
   Nash competition 
 .22045**  .08731**  .00943**  .03148** 
Initial budget allocation  
       
   Equal distribution 
 -  -  .00913**  .02933** 
   Percentage-of-sales 
 -  -  .00804**  .03147** 
Estimation error  
       
   Not included 
 -  -  .00662**  .00001) 
   Included 












Notes: ** p<.01; * p<.05; ns = not significant (Difference between the two means, based on ANOVA F-test) 
1) No deviation from optimal profit by definition. 
5.3. Regression analysis 
Model specification 
To analyze the impact of experimental conditions on performance and convergence property 
of rules, we specify the following regression model for each rule: 
	_K   4 b ∙ !_2 5 4 { ∙ !_P	 4 ¡ ∙ !_¢p£H 4 ¤ ∙ !_¥p4 ¦ ∙ !_23 4 § ∙ !_¢p 4 ¨ ∙ !_G	  4 © ∙ !_\RIª				12" 	4 « ∙ !_¥£u 4 b ∙ !_2pp 4 bb ∙ ¬ 4 ­ ∙ ^¬ ∙ ®_ 4 	K 
where 
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	_K : Deviation from maximum profit for scenario l and  
  replication d in planning cycle m; !_2 5 : Heterogeneity of elasticities across products (0: equal, 1: unequal); !_P	  : Heterogeneity of sales level across products (0: equal, 1: unequal); !_¢p£H : Heterogeneity of growth parameters across products (0: equal, 1: unequal); !_¥p : Heterogeneity of carryover coefficient across products (0: equal, 1: unequal); !_23  : Heterogeneity of elapsed time since launch across products (0: equal, 1:   
  unequal); !_¢p  : Shape of growth function (0: asymmetric, 1: symmetric); !_G	  : Shape of market response function (0: multiplicative, 1: mod. exponential); !_\RIª  : Initial budget allocation (0: equal, 1: percentage-of-sales); !_¥£u : Competitive situation (0: No competition, 1: Nash competition); !_2pp  : Estimation error (0: non-included, 1: included); ® : Vector of all simulation factors for scenario l; , , ­  : (Unobserved) parameters; 
e : Error term; 
z = 1, 2, …, 10 (number of planning cycles); 
l = 1, 2, …, 1024 (number of scenarios); and 
d = 1, …, Dl (number of replications). 
 
All scenarios of our simulation experiment in which we do not incorporate an estimation error 
are independent, i.e. 	K~]0, ¯{", with the variance σ2. This allows us to apply OLS for 
estimating equation (12) for the models of the naïve solution and the percentage-of-sales rule. 
But in all scenarios in which we incorporate an estimation error we apply the technique of 
common random numbers. As we use the same error terms for each scenario and each 
planning cycle we have to account for correlation among regression errors (Kleijnen 1988). 
The error terms for each replication across scenarios as well as across planning cycles within 
a scenario are correlated, while the error terms across replications within a scenario are 
uncorrelated, i.e. 	K~]0, ¯{ ", with the variance ¯{ , and Cov(elz,elz’)=σlz,lz’ for ¬ ° ¬±. 
Therefore, we estimate equation (12) for the models of the numerical optimization and the 
attractiveness heuristic by using two step GLS which allows us to account for the serial 
correlation and correlation across scenarios (Greene 2006). 
Equation (12) assumes a linear convergence process. We also tested as a log-linear process, 
i.e. z is replaced by Log(z). Estimation results were very similar, so that we do not discuss 
them here in detail. 
5.2. Results 
The results of our models are shown in Table 5a and 5b. The constant can be interpreted as 
the average in our basic scenario, i.e. if all dummies in equation (12) equal zero: a 
homogeneous parameter set, an asymmetric growth function, a multiplicative market response 
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function, no estimation error, and (if the factor of initial budget is included) an equal initial 
allocation. The coefficient values of the main effects show how the performance of the 
allocation rule would change on average in terms of deviation from maximum profit if the 
corresponding simulation factor changes to the specific experimental condition. A positive 
value means a worse, a negative value a better performance of the allocation rules. For 
example, a coefficient value of 0.1 for the simulation factor unequal elasticities means that 
the rule would have a higher deviation from the optimal solution of 10 % on average if we 
have a scenario characterized by heterogeneous elasticity across the portfolio instead of a 
homogeneous elasticity set. The interaction effects with the time variable show the impact of 
the factors over time, i.e. their influence on the convergence properties. A negative coefficient 
indicates a faster convergence process under the specific experimental condition, while a 
positive coefficient indicates a slower process. 
By comparing the constant across all allocation rules in Table 5a and 5b we see that the 
attractiveness heuristic has the lowest value which confirms that it outperforms all other 
allocation approaches in our basic scenario on average.5  
The effect of heterogeneity across the product portfolio is reflected by the coefficients of the 
product characteristics. The three simpler rules, i.e. the naïve solution, percentage-of-sales, 
and the attractiveness heuristic, are all strongly and negatively affected in their performance 
by heterogeneity in elasticities and elapsed time since launch. But while the interaction effect 
with time for the naïve solution is positive, i.e. the performance is getting even worse over 
time, the interaction effects for percentage-of-sales and the attractiveness heuristic are 
negative, i.e. the negative effect on the performance diminishes if the rule is applied 
subsequently. This is a reasonable finding as marketing responsiveness as well as life cycle 
effects are reflected in the sales outcome which is incorporated into both rules. The 
attractiveness heuristic even directly includes the elasticity and the growth multiplier (see 
equation (6)). As expected, heterogeneity in the sales level has a negative effect on the 
performance of the naïve solution, while percentage-of-sales and the attractiveness heuristic 
are able to capture the heterogeneity. The effect on performance becomes even positive for 
these two rules. Heterogeneity in the carryover coefficients affects the performance of all 
three rules negatively, but this effect decreases over time. As expected, numerical 
optimization generally performs better if the portfolio is characterized by heterogeneity as it 
has negative coefficients for the elasticity, the sales base, the growth parameters, and the 
                                                 
5
 Note that the constant of the numerical optimization method is not directly comparable as it only includes 
scenarios with an estimation error. 
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elapsed time since launch. Only heterogeneity in the carryover coefficient affects the 
performance of numerical optimization negatively. 
The type of the growth model specifications is meaningful for all budgeting methods apart 
from numerical optimization. As expected, better allocation solutions are provided in the 
scenarios characterized by a symmetric growth function. 
Percentage-of-sales provide superior results in scenarios characterized by a multiplicative 
response function, while the type of the response function has no impact on the performance 
of the naïve solution and the attractiveness heuristic. Contrary, numerical optimization works 
much better in case of the modified exponential function which confirms that the sales 
outcome based on this model specification is less affected by noisy demand parameters. 
Nash competition has a negative effect on the performance of the naïve solution, the 
attractiveness heuristic, and numerical optimization. Contrary to our expectations, it has a 
negative effect on the percentage-of-sales rule, which is probably the result of an asymmetric 
portfolio structure of the two competitors, i.e. the larger products of company A compete with 
the smaller products of company B and vice versa. Based on this rule the budget is more 
heavily allocated to the products which generate larger sales so that an asymmetric portfolio 
structure across competitors avoids negative substitution effects and therefore is closer to the 
optimal solution. 
In line with our expectations, percentage-of-sales as initial budget allocation leads to a 
superior performance of the attractiveness heuristic. But numerical optimization provides 
better results if the initial budget allocation is determined by equal distribution. This finding is 
contrary to our first expectations but may be explained by the replacement of the initial 
marketing stocks over time. Numerical optimization and the true optimal solution both suffer 
equally from a suboptimal initial solution but start replacing these stocks subsequently by new 
stocks based on their calculations. In case of a better initial allocation the suboptimal share of 
the marketing stocks is faster build down so that they can be replaced by new stocks. But 
while this is the true optimal stock for the profit maximum solution, the numerical 
optimization approach builds up another suboptimal stock in case of noisy demand parameters. 
Therefore, the deviation to the profit maximum is larger in case of superior initial marketing 
stocks. 
 Table 5a. Experimental factors influencing the deviation from maximum profit: regression coefficients (standard errors) I 
   Naïve solution  Percentage-of-sales 
  
   Main effects  Interaction with 
time 
 Main effects  Interaction with 
time 
    




















Constant    .041 (.005)**      .042 (.002)**    
Elasticities Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  + .118 (.003)**  3×10-4 (.001)  + .096 (.001)**  -.002 (2×10-4)** 
Sales level Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  + .084 (.003)**  -.001 (.001)  +/- -.005 (.001)**  .001 (2×10-4)** 
Growth parameter Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  + .010 (.003)**  .002 (.001)**  + .005 (.001)**  -3×10-4 (2×10-4) 
Carryover coefficient Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  + .008 (.003)**  -.001 (.001)**  + .003 (.001)**  -.001 (2×10-4)** 
Elapsed time since launch Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  + .081 (.003)**  .004 (.001)**  + .032 (.001)**  -.003 (2×10-4)** 
Type of Growth function Asymmetric  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Symmetric  - -.009 (.003)**  .001 (.001)  - -.003 (.001)**  4×10-4 (2×10-4)* 
Type of Market response 
function 
Multiplicative  0  0   0  0  0   0 
Modified exp.  +/- 4×10-4 (.003)  -.001 (.001)**  +/- .012 (.001)**  .001 (2×10-4)** 
Type of Competition Monopoly  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Nash competition  + .011 (.003)**  3×10-4 (.001)  + -.008 (.001)**  -.001 (2×10-4)** 
Initial budget allocation Equal distribution               
 Percentage-of-sales               
Error in demand 
parameters 
Not included               
               
Time (# planning cycle)   + .002 (.001)**     - -2×10-4 (3×10-4)    
 
(Pseudo) R² 
# of observations 
    
.868 
2,560 
       
.915 
2,560 
    
Notes: ** p< .01, * p< .05 
The factor of initial budget allocation and estimation error is not included in our analysis of the naïve solution and the percentage-of-sales-rule (see section 3.2). Numerical 





















































 Table 5b. Experimental factors influencing the deviation from maximum profit: regression coefficients (standard errors) II 
   Attractiveness heuristic  Numerical Optimization method 
  
   Main effects 
 
 Interaction with  
time 
 Main effects  Interaction with  
time 
    




















                
Constant    .001 (4×10-4)**      .004 (.002)**    
Elasticities Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  +/- .008 (2×10-4)**  -.001 (.4×10-4)**  - -.004 (4×10-4)**  3×10-4 (.6×10-4)** 
Sales level Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  +/- -.001 (3×10-4)**  1×10-4 (.4×10-4)*  - -.003 (.001)**  -1×10-4 (.8×10-4)* 
Growth parameter Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  +/- -.001 (2×10-4)**  1×10-4 (.4×10-4)*  - -.003 (.001)**  -5×10-5 (.8×10-4) 
Carryover coefficient Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  +/- .009 (3×10-4)**  -.001 (.4×10-4)**  - .003 (.001)**  -.001 (.7×10-4)** 
Elapsed time since launch Equal  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Unequal  +/- .007 (2×10-4)**  -.001 (.3×10-4)**  - -.015 (.001)**  -.001 (.5×10-4)** 
Type of Growth function Asymmetric  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Symmetric  - -.002 (2×10-4)**  3×10-4 (.3×10-4)**  +/- -.001 (.001)  3×10-4 (.5×10-4)** 
Type of Market response 
function 
Multiplicative  0  0   0  0  0   0 
Modified exp.  +/- 3×10-4 (2×10-4)  -1×10-4 (.3×10-4)**  - -.031 (.001)**  6×10-5 (.5×10-4) 
Type of Competition Monopoly  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Nash competition  + .001 (2×10-4)**  -2×10-4 (.3×10-4)**  +/- .005 (.002)**  9×10-5 (.8×10-4) 
Initial budget allocation Equal distribution  0  0   0  0  0   0 
 Percentage-of-sales  - -.007 (2×10-4)**  .001 (.3×10-4)**  - .005 (.001)**  -.001 (.5×10-4)** 
Error in demand 
parameters 
Not included  0  0   0        
Included  + .003 (2×10-4)**  -1×10-4 (.2×10-4)**        
Time (# planning cycle) Planning cycle  - -.001 (1×10-4)**     + .001 (2×10-4)**    
                
 
(Pseudo) R² 
# of observations 
    
.820 
20,480 
       
.691 
15,360 
    
Notes: ** p< .01, * p< .05 
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The inclusion of estimation error has a negative effect on the performance of the 
attractiveness heuristic, as expected.   
Finally, the estimation results of factor time is only significantly negative for the 
attractiveness heuristic which confirms that only this rule converges to the optimal solution. 
The interaction effects across all factors are exactly contrary to the corresponding main effects 
which indicate that all influences on the performance are overcome over time. So it can be 
concluded that all simulation factors have no or only a marginal impact on the performance of 
the attractiveness heuristic and all negative effects diminish when the heuristic is applied 
subsequently over time.  
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
We analyzed the performance of four different allocation methods by varying experimentally 
all factors incorporated in the profit objective function. The performance of the methods is 
investigated under realistic market conditions, the existence of competitors and the imperfect 
knowledge of unobservable demand parameters.  
We conclude from the scenario results in which no error in demand parameters is assumed 
that percentage-of-sales outperforms a naïve solution of equal distribution, but that the 
solutions provided by FAWF are far superior to the other rules and are robust to all changes in 
the simulation design. The results of the scenarios which assume an estimation error are quite 
surprising as FAWF even outperforms solutions provided by numerical optimization in most 
scenarios. Only in the scenarios characterized by strong heterogeneity of the portfolio and a 
modified exponential response function numerical optimization may outperform the 
attractiveness heuristic. Thus, our simulation results indicate that numerical optimization is 
much more sensitive to estimation error than the attractiveness heuristic. In fact, the inclusion 
of observed past sales overrides the negative effects due to noisiness in the parameters. 
Similarly, FAWF still outperforms significantly the simpler rules which do not take any 
unobservable demand parameters into account and therefore are not exposed to noisiness in 
the parameters. 
Our study identified heterogeneity of elasticities and the elapsed time since launch across the 
portfolio as the most critical variables reducing the performance of the naïve solution, 
percentage-of-sales, and the attractiveness heuristic. The performance of the naïve solution is 
further strongly and negatively affected by heterogeneity in the sales base across the portfolio. 
Contrary, numerical optimization provides better solutions if the portfolio is rather 
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heterogeneous. Our analysis of the factor time reveals that only the attractiveness heuristic 
converges to the optimum if applied subsequently.  
Two main implications for practitioners may be derived from our simulation study. First, we 
provide strong support for the usefulness of the FAWF heuristic as it shows a high degree of 
flexibility in the face of a multitude of different market situations and is robust to all kind of 
changes in our simulation experiment. It provides solutions which are much closer to the 
profit maximum compared to simpler rules, such as the naïve solution or percentage-of-sales 
on the one side. And it is not as sensitive to estimation error as numerical optimization on the 
other side. Only if true demand parameters are known numerical optimization by definition 
provides optimal values. However, such a situation is unrealistic. Second, our study indicates 
that practitioners should be not too concerned about noisy parameters due to limited 
information about future trends or a lack of data and insufficient knowledge of econometric 
estimation if they apply an approach such as the attractiveness heuristic for budget allocation. 
Although the estimation error hampers slightly the performance in the beginning, the 
inclusion of the observable sales outcome outrides the negative effects after a few iterations. 
As even small estimation errors are unavoidable, this finding contradicts conventional 
wisdom which holds that by using simpler heuristics the allocation solution are achieved at 
the expense of poorer profit performance (Blackburn and Millen 1980). 
Our study is also subject to a few limitations. The simulation factors are limited to the factors 
that characterize our profit maximization problem setting. For other settings, other factors 
might be relevant. However, we believe that this setting is quite realistic as it considers 
various forms of dynamics, portfolio effects, several marketing activities, competition, and 
noisy demand parameter information. Our focus is on estimation error in demand parameters, 
but not on specification error, i.e. assuming a wrong demand model. Since only numerical 
optimization requires the explicit specification of a demand model but not the other methods, 
we believe that the performance of that method is negatively affected. This raises even more 
concern about the practical application value of numerical methods. 
For future studies we recommend to analyze and compare the performance of new and old 
heuristic methods developed in marketing science by a dynamic comprehensive simulation 
framework, as developed in this study, which also impose an estimation error on demand 
parameters to simulate realistic scenarios. Hopefully our work will motivate such efforts. 
Furthermore, we provide a new approach of analyzing the driver of convergence properties 
for further research. 
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